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UAS Pilot Letter

PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD
OF THE

AVIATORS CODE INITIATIVE
AND THE

UNIVERSITY AVIATION ASSOCIATION
DEAR UAS PILOT:
THIS LETTER INTRODUCES VERSION 1.0 OF THE UAS PILOTS CODE (UASPC). DEVELOPED
BY A TEAM OF AVIATION AND UAS PROFESSIONALS, THE UASPC RECOMMENDS
OPERATING PRACTICES TO ENHANCE THE QUALITY AND SAFETY OF YOUR OPERATIONS.
THE UASPC APPLIES TO A RANGE OF OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS AND EXPERIENCE
LEVELS, FROM THE UAS NOVICE TO EXPERIENCED UAS PILOTS.
PILOT CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONALISM AFFECT THE ENTIRE AVIATION COMMUNITY,
INCLUDING ITS SAFETY CULTURE. CORRESPONDINGLY, ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY
CULTURE AFFECTS PILOT CONDUCT. A VOLUNTARY, ASPIRATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT
PROMOTES PILOT PROFICIENCY AND OPERATIONAL SAFETY. THE UASPC IS JUST SUCH A
TOOL: A SET OF GUIDELINES, AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES ADAPTABLE TO EACH PILOT
AND ORGANIZATIONAL NEED.
THE UASPC REFLECTS YEARS OF SAFETY PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED IN MANNED
AND UNMANNED AVIATION THAT ARE APPLICABLE TO UAS OPERATIONS. WE ENCOURAGE
YOU TO ADOPT IT, AND TO COMMIT TO THE HIGHEST PRINCIPLES OF AVIATION SAFETY.
THE UASPC WAS DEVELOPED AS A VOLUNTEER EFFORT AND IS PROVIDED AS A FREE
PUBLIC SERVICE. THE UASPC AND SUPPORTING MATERIALS CAN BE FOUND ONLINE AT
WWW.SECUREAV.COM AND WWW.UAA.AERO.
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Preface

[Y]ou don’t have to be a manned pilot to understand and embrace a
safety culture. We all share the same sky, and we must all consider the
impact of what we do on everyone.1

Dallas Brooks, Chairman, AUVSI
Director, Raspet Flight Research Lab, MSU
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Introduction
The UAS PILOTS CODE2 (UASPC)3 offers recommendations to advance flight safety,4 ground safety,
airmanship,5 and professionalism.6 It presents a vision of excellence for UAS pilots and operators,
and includes general guidance for all types of UAS. The UASPC offers broad guidance—a set of
values—to help a pilot interpret and apply standards and regulations, and to confront real world
challenges to avoid incidents and accidents. It is designed to help UAS pilots develop standard
operating procedures (SOPs), effective risk management,7 safety management systems (SMS), and to
encourage UAS pilots to consider themselves aviators and participants in the broader aviation
community.
The FAA Airman Certification Standards (ACS) establish the pilot certification testing standards.8
Regulations and standards9 alone, however, do not necessarily prepare a pilot to handle every unusual
or unanticipated situations, especially those beyond the scope of standard procedures, checklists or
operating manuals. The UASPC’s principles complement and underscore legal requirements.10
Because regulation may lag behind technology developments, the UASPC can be particularly helpful
in providing guidance.11
The UASPC is designed to be a living document, intended to be updated periodically to reflect
changes in aviation practices and the aviation environment.
This document is applicable to civil unmanned aircraft system (UAS) pilots, ground crew including
visual observers, operators, operations managers, safety officers, and other interested or responsible
parties.12 The UASPC may also serve as a supplemental resource for other UAS operations.13
The UASPC is a model,14 not a standard.15 Users may customize this document to suit their needs
including title,16 length, organization, and level of technical detail or sophistication. For further help
with customization see “Additional Resources.” The UASPC is most effective if users commit to the
pursuit of professionalism as well as a firm grasp of the fundamentals of UAS flight and flight safety.
Three versions of the UASPC are available:
●
●
●

Annotated Version - this unabridged document includes supplemental materials, extensive
supporting endnotes, and drafting considerations,
Condensed Version - without annotation, intended for pilot implementation (see Appendix
4), and
Abbreviated Version - containing only the core principles, introducing and promoting the
UASPC (see Appendix 5).
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The UASPC has seven sections, each presenting Principles and Sample Recommended Practices
(SRPs).17

The Sections:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.

GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF UAS PILOTS
MANNED AIRCRAFT AND PEOPLE ON THE SURFACE
TRAINING AND PROFICIENCY
SECURITY AND PRIVACY
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
USE OF TECHNOLOGY
ADVANCEMENT OF UAS AVIATION

The Principles:
The Principles are recommended best practices addressing safety, training, risk management, and
technology. General and concise, the Principles are designed to provide a foundation for building
professionalism and a safety culture.

The Sample Recommended Practices:
Sample Recommended Practices are suggestions for applying the principles of the UASPC and tailoring
them to individuals and organizations. Sample Recommended Practices may be reordered, modified,
or eliminated when not applicable, to satisfy the unique capabilities and requirements of each pilot,
mission, unmanned aircraft, organization, and flight environment.

The Annotated Version and The Commentary:
Extensive annotation is presented in this version of the UASPC to provide support, resources,
discussion, and drafting considerations. In addition, commentary is published at www.secureav.com.
The commentary provides discussion, interpretive guidance, and suggested ways to adopt the
UASPC. The annotated version is intended primarily for flight departments,18 managers, UAS
businesses, policy administrators, compliance officers, and UAS pilots and operators who wish to
explore the UASPC in greater depth.19

Definitions:
Recognizing that the field of unmanned aviation represents a confluence of aviation and consumer
technology, terms likely to be more familiar to members of one group than the other are explained in
brief parentheses. The annotated version contains extensive definitions of these and other terms.

Benefits of the UASPC:
The UASPC benefits UAS pilots and the UAS community by:
❏ recommending practices to support safety and professionalism among UAS pilots,
❏ encouraging UAS pilots to recognize themselves as aviators and members of the broader
aviation community,
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❏ promoting improved training,20 airmanship, conduct, personal responsibility, and pilot
contributions to the UAS community and society at large,
❏ encouraging the development and adoption of ethical practices21 and good judgment,
❏ advancing self-regulation and responsibility in the UAS community, and
❏ supporting improved communications between pilots, regulators, and others in the UAS
industry to further enhance safety within the National Airspace System (NAS).
Note: References to civil aviation authorities (CAAs), including the US Federal Aviation
Administration are used as examples. In all jurisdictions, applicable laws and regulations must be
followed.
**
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UAS Pilots Code
PRINCIPLES AND
SAMPLE RECOMMENDED PRACTICES

I. General Responsibilities of UAS Pilots
UAS pilots should:
a. make safety a top priority,22
b. seek excellence in airmanship (knowledge, skill, ability, and attitude that
promote safe and efficient operations),23
c. adopt sound principles of aeronautical decision-making (ADM)24 (the process

used by pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response to
the circumstances), and develop and exercise good judgment,25
d. use sound principles of risk management,26
e. maintain situational awareness (the accurate perception and understanding of
your operation and environment),27 and adhere to prudent operating practices,28
f.

aspire to professionalism,29

g. act with responsibility, integrity,30 and courtesy, and
h. adhere to applicable laws, regulations, and industry guidance.31

Explanation: These General Responsibilities serve as a preamble to the UASPC’s other principles.
Sample Recommended Practices:
a.

make safety a top priority
❏ Recognize, plan for and accept the costs of implementing effective safety practices.
❏ Organizations of any size and scope should apply the principles of a safety management system
(SMS): understand the risks in your operations, take steps to control them, and monitor
operations to assure that these controls are working.32
❏ Improve safety margins and reduce unnecessary risk by planning and flying conservatively.
❏ Recognize that use of a visual observer enhances safety, even when not required.33
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❏ Do not carry hazardous payloads unless authorized.34
❏ Do not assume that the altitudes prescribed in UAS Facility Maps are necessarily accurate or
appropriate for flight.35
❏ Create an emergency response plan, and implement it in the event of an incident or accident.36
b. seek excellence in airmanship
❏ Identify and adapt to changing flight conditions based on airmanship, sound principles of UAS
safety and risk management. Be prepared to alter your flight plan or discontinue your flight
accordingly.37
c. adopt sound principles of aeronautical decision-making, and develop and exercise good judgment
❏ Ensure UAS flight controllability is not adversely affected by payload weight, placement, and
loading.38 Follow manufacturer's instructions if provided. In the absence of provided guidance,
use conservative loading practices.
❏ Consider conducting a stability and controllability test at the start of each flight.39
❏ Understand the unique relationship between UAS piloting and aeronautical decision-making,40
ethical choices, and flight safety.41
❏ Recognize the difficulty of visually estimating UAS altitude and distance.42
❏ Incorporate Threat and Error Management (TEM - process of detecting and responding to threats and
errors)43 into your operation to aid in identifying errors and external threats that could
compromise safety.44
❏ Employ Crew Resource Management (CRM - the effective use of all available resources:
human resources, hardware, and information) techniques to foster effective crew coordination,
teamwork, and enhance safety culture.45
❏ Consider the effect of weather such as wind, precipitation, and temperature on power, fuel
reserves, and performance, and their impact on the safe completion of flight.46
❏ Refuse to operate a UAS that is unsafe for flight because of mechanical, electrical or control
system discrepancies, failure to meet applicable inspection requirements, airworthiness (suitability
for safe flight), or any anomaly that adversely affects airworthiness.47
❏ Discontinue UAS operations in the event of potential conflict with other aircraft, mechanical
anomaly, low power or fuel condition, adverse weather, or any other condition that may
compromise safety.
d. Use sound principles of risk management
❏ Use risk management tools to identify, evaluate and mitigate the effects of hazards, and do
not subject anyone to unnecessary risks.48
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❏ Keep operations well clear of airports, heliports, and seaplane bases.49 Conduct such
operations only when safety can be reasonably assured. Where applicable, make notification,
and obtain authorization from proper authorities.
❏ Recognize the restrictions50 associated with flying near airports or other aircraft, in
controlled airspace, over people, in inclement weather (including reduced visibility
environments), and at night. Be aware of the increased risk associated with flying in
congested, urban,51 or confined areas; near obstacles; over water,52 rugged, mountainous, or
forested terrain; in high density altitude conditions;53 and in other circumstances that may
adversely affect safety.54
❏ Have a ground safety plan for and ready access to appropriate fire suppression and other
emergency equipment and the ability to contact emergency services.55
❏ Recognize that aviation or other charts may not accurately reflect all obstructions and hazards
that could affect UAS operations. Maintain chart currency.56 Supplement aeronautical charts
with visual observers, site survey, and other mapping resources.57
❏ Prevent distractions that could lead to errors and compromise safety by limiting unnecessary
tasks or communication during launch, recovery, and other critical phases of flight.58
❏ Where practicable, enhance visibility through appropriate use of aircraft lighting and bright paint
schemes or markings. Ensure aircraft lighting does not impair night vision.59
❏ See and be seen. Maintain a robust scan and practice techniques for seeing and avoiding other
aircraft.60 Recognize that manned aircraft pilots are unlikely to anticipate or see your UAS.
❏ Fly at an altitude appropriate to the mission. Consider the risks associated with higher altitude
flights, such as higher wind speeds, maintaining separation from other aircraft and potential
crash impact velocity with respect to people,61 structures or property on the surface. Be aware of
the risks of flying at low altitudes, such as manned operations, obstructions, turbulence induced
by urban structures, and other relevant hazards.62
❏ Make an honest evaluation of your mental and physical fitness a precondition of each flight—
for example, by using the I’M SAFE (Illness, Medication, Stress, Alcohol, Fatigue, Emotion)
checklist.63
❏ Recognize that some emergency scenarios should not be practiced in the absence of an
experienced UAS pilot or knowledgeable mentor.64
e. Maintain situational awareness, and adhere to prudent operating practices
❏ Improve situational awareness by using sound principles of airmanship, crew resource
management, scenario-based training, and risk management.
❏ Become familiar with and monitor appropriate aviation frequencies to enhance your
awareness of other aircraft in proximity to your UAS operation.65 Where authorized,
accurately inform other pilots of your position and intentions on appropriate frequencies,
and air traffic control of emergencies including loss of separation with other aircraft, or loss
of control of your UAS.66
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❏ For flights to, from, at, or in proximity to airports,67 contact the controlling facility, and review
applicable Chart Supplements (formerly Airport Facilities/Directory (AF/D))68 and other
resources to ascertain each airport’s environment, operational conditions, surrounding terrain
and obstructions.
❏ Remain aware of changing or deteriorating weather and other circumstances that may make
continued flight unsafe. Be particularly aware of crosswinds, tailwinds, and gusty wind/turbulent
conditions when landing, departing, or hovering. In such cases, make an informed risk
management decision whether to continue the flight.
❏ Avoid the flow of all manned aircraft traffic unless directed otherwise by air traffic control
(ATC). For off-airport flights, include review of relevant maps, and local knowledge.
❏ Plan for the possibility that curious onlookers may approach your UAS operation creating a
potential distraction or hazard.
❏ Check relevant Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs)69 including Temporary Flight Restrictions
(TFRs)70 prior to commencing flight operations, and update as practicable during extended or
multi-flight operations. When appropriate, file and update NOTAMs regarding your flight.71
❏ Complete a comprehensive preflight inspection prior to commencing flight operations72 to
determine that the UAS is airworthy.
❏ Ensure that your aircraft’s firmware (software that controls essential system functions) and
other software is up to date.73 Recognize that various systems may require update, including
aircraft, ground station, control application or display tablet and power supply. Be sure you
understand the impact of any firmware/software updates.74
❏ As part of preflight planning, identify options for emergency landing locations.75
❏ Develop, use, periodically review, and refine checklists76 and personal minimums (an
operational envelope within which the pilot is adequately trained and competent) for all
phases of flight. Review these materials regularly with an experienced UAS pilot or
knowledgeable mentor.
❏ Before takeoff, understand your mission plan.77 The mission plan should include
consideration of the objectives, pilot capabilities, UAS platform, operations area,
environmental conditions, and other external factors affecting flight safety.
❏ Maintain an altitude and configuration that will permit an emergency landing without undue
hazard to people or property.
f. aspire to professionalism
❏ As part of preflight planning, identify locations where either manned or unmanned aircraft
may be encountered and develop contingencies for avoidance. UAS pilots may encounter
VFR aircraft at lower than normal altitudes during periods of reduced visibility or limited
ceiling height.
❏ Be aware of personal susceptibility to, and seek to avoid or manage distraction, fatigue, and
stress.
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❏ Be aware of your personal susceptibility to attitudes that adversely influence good aeronautical
decision-making.
❏ Develop conservative personal operating limitations78 reflecting experience, and proficiency,
especially in challenging conditions.
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g. act with responsibility, integrity, and courtesy
❏ Approach UAS operations with seriousness, commitment, and diligence, recognizing that your
actions may jeopardize the lives, well-being, and property of people in manned aircraft and on
the surface.79
h. adhere to applicable laws, regulations, and industry guidance
❏ Understand and comply with the privileges and limitations of your certificates,
authorizations, and waivers.80
❏ Adhere to rules and operating practices of your airport or operating location,81 employer, flight
school, or flight center, and recommendations from recognized UAS organizations.
❏ Maintain awareness of local laws, regulations, or ordinances that may affect UAS operations.82
❏ As soon as practicable but no later than 10 days after an occurrence, report UAS accidents to
the FAA;83 immediately report accidents that meet NTSB thresholds to the NTSB, and report
near mid air collisions to the FAA’s Near Mid Air Collision System (NMACS),84 and/or safety
incidents via the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS).85
❏ Comply with manufacturer’s operating manuals and instructions, especially with regard to
performance, limitations, and abnormal/emergency conditions.
❏ Understand the requirements and benefits of complying with manufacturer’s recommended
inspections and maintenance guidance, and in the absence thereof, consider developing a
scheduled maintenance plan that achieves the longest and safest service life of the UAS.86
❏ Complete post-flight procedures such as ATC flight completion notification, cancellation of
flight plan, post-flight inspections, and discrepancy reporting.87 Keep a log of UAS maintenance
and operational status and ensure that appropriate measures are taken to correct system
deficiencies.88
❏ Identify safety and compliance issues, and communicate them appropriately.89
❏ Confirm availability of all required or recommended ground support equipment before
initiating flight operations.90
❏ Learn and remain familiar with lost control link,91 stabilization, and other automation failure
procedures.92 Follow manufacturer’s or builder’s instructions if provided.
❏ Use caution when charging, transporting, discharging, storing, disposing or otherwise handling
batteries to minimize risk to persons or property.93
**
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II. Manned Aircraft and People on the Surface
UAS pilots should:
a. manage and avoid unnecessary risk to manned aircraft, and to people and
property on the surface,94 and
b. avoid operations that may alarm or disturb people on the surface95 or in manned
aircraft.

Explanation: UAS pilots must avoid harming persons or property. Civil aviation authorities
accommodate flight operations with the expectation that UAS pilots exercise due care and adequately
mitigate risks to others and their property.

Sample Recommended Practices:
a. Manage and avoid unnecessary risk to manned aircraft, and to people and property on the surface
❏ Recognize that responsible planning precedes every UAS mission.
❏ Give right-of-way to all manned aircraft.96
❏ Do not operate over people without authorization, proper training and equipment.97
Consider using a covered area or safety line to segregate flight operations from nonparticipants and minimize risk to people.98
❏ To the extent practicable, use aircraft and payloads composed of frangible or energyabsorbing materials, propeller guards, and other available mechanisms99 to mitigate risk of
injury to persons.100
❏ Monitor people within the proximity of your intended operations closely. Keep them
informed and clear of potential UAS hazards including propellers, rotors, and hazardous
materials.
❏ UAS pilots and crew members should consider the use of protective, highly-visible clothing
(such as safety vests and other markers), helmets, and eye protection.101 Use high visibility
area markers such as traffic cones to denote takeoff and landing areas to protect everyone.
❏ Maintain adequate insurance coverage for all UAS operations. Understand and comply with
all policy terms and limitations.102
❏ Brief all participants on the planned UAS operation to mitigate the potential for injury.
❏ Instruct non-crewmembers to avoid touching or obstructing equipment and payload.
❏ Develop and maintain an operations manual103 to help identify and describe the system and
operations characteristics, including specifications of the aircraft, responsibilities of the crew,
scope of operational decision-making authority, pre- and post-flight checklists, and processes
that promote risk management.
❏ Collision avoidance may require UAS pilots to perform an aggressive maneuver. During
such maneuvers be aware of the increased risk of impact with aircraft and people or
structures on the surface.
❏ Consider the use of visual observers to aid the UAS pilot in maintaining situational
awareness as well as identifying both airborne and ground hazards.
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b. avoid operations that may alarm or disturb people on the surface or in manned aircraft
❏ Ensure adequate separation from people, other aircraft, and unauthorized airspace.104
❏ Avoid manned aircraft traffic patterns unless authorized and operationally required.
❏ Act professionally towards all people affected by your UAS operations.
❏ Tactfully disclose risks to all affected parties and address their concerns regarding flight
operations, and seek to accommodate their needs.
❏ Take responsibility for any harm you may cause to people, property, or wildlife.105
**
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III. Training and Proficiency
UAS pilots should:
a. participate in regular training to maintain and improve proficiency106 beyond
minimum requirements,107
b. pursue a rigorous, lifelong course of aviation study,
c. remain vigilant and avoid complacency,
d. train to recognize and effectively respond to emergencies, and
e. maintain an accurate log to document your experience and improve future
aeronautical decision-making and risk management.

Explanation: Training and proficiency underlie aviation safety. Regular training is a primary
component of proficiency and should include both air and ground training. Training and proficiency
each contribute significantly to flight safety and neither can substitute for the other.

Sample Recommended Practices:
a. participate in regular training to maintain and improve proficiency beyond minimum requirements
❏ Develop and follow a training regimen that incorporates the assessment of your progress.
Obtain guidance and seek feedback from an experienced UAS pilot or mentor.
❏ Obtain equipment and operational training before commencing flight operations.
❏ Learn appropriate use of the UAS manufacturer’s manual108 or instructions to conduct flight
planning, properly secure payloads,109 determine aircraft limitations, performance, and power
or fuel requirements, assess weight and balance, and safely undertake flight operations.
❏ Recognize applicable safety or informational placards placed on the UAS platform,
components, attachments, related devices, or manuals. Understand and comply with all
placard instructions, limitations, or information. Ensure placards are visible and properly
affixed.110
❏ Become familiar with orientation or aircraft status lighting and their related meaning to
enhance situational awareness.111
❏ Learn and adhere to airspace classes, requirements, and restrictions.112
❏ Integrate manual flight, autonomous flight,113 and scenario-based training (real-world
situations that meet flight training objectives in an operational environment) in the training
regime.
❏ Incorporate simulation into your training program,114 with an emphasis on
abnormal/emergency conditions, including loss-of-control115 and traffic conflicts.
❏ Learn how your automated systems work and understand their limitations.
❏ Learn and practice obstacle and wire avoidance techniques.116
❏ Complete training appropriate to specialized operations or unique mission requirements.117
❏ Develop a systematic approach to obtaining timely and reliable weather information118 and
evaluating flight conditions.
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❏ Learn and remain familiar with aviation regulations and associated guidance material.
Understand their intent and implications.
❏ Train for flight over challenging environments such as water, remote areas, desert, or
mountainous terrain, woodlands, urban areas, and understand that such environments may
compromise or degrade the performance or functionality of some UAS.119
❏ Learn how to determine and adhere to airworthiness requirements for each UAS you fly, and
confirm its airworthiness before each flight by conducting a thorough preflight inspection.120
❏ Develop a practical understanding of the mechanics, systems, and unique risks of each UAS
you fly.
❏ Conduct a periodic review of recent accidents, incidents, and unsafe conditions focusing on
probable causes.121
❏ Periodically demonstrate mastery of applicable Airman Certification Standards (ACS);122
study and train to exceed ACS requirements.
❏ Select an appropriate training area, taking into consideration property ownership, airspace,
local restrictions, and potential safety and privacy issues.123
❏ Fly often enough to maintain proficiency consistent with your certificates and authorizations.
❏ Use flight simulators and other training devices that appropriately reflect your system’s
automation.124
b. pursue a rigorous, lifelong course of aviation study
❏ Invite and accept constructive criticism125 from your fellow aviators and provide the same
when asked.
❏ Attend aviation training programs,126 FAA Pilot Proficiency Program (“WINGS”) safety
seminars, and complete online FAAST courses and training materials.127
❏ Participate in organizations that can improve your UAS platform knowledge and flight skills
regarding their capabilities, limitations, and safe operation.128
❏ Achieve and maintain proficiency in the operation of UAS systems, manual flight controls
and automation.
❏ Commit to and maintain an ongoing course of training in both flight skills and aeronautical
knowledge.
❏ Register at www.faasafety.gov to receive announcements of safety meetings and literature,
and to review appropriate safety courses.
❏ Stay current with relevant aviation publications.129
c. remain vigilant and avoid complacency
❏ Obtain adequate training before flying an unfamiliar UAS, or operating unfamiliar UAS
automation or systems, even if you have flown a similar make or model in the past.130
❏ Ensure before each flight that your safety, failsafe, and other settings are configured
appropriately.
❏ UAS pilots who are not certificated to fly manned aircraft may benefit from introductory
ground and flight training in manned flight. Such training will help the UAS pilot better
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understand the unique challenges of operating manned aircraft, including detecting and
avoiding UAS operations.131
❏ Manned aircraft pilots who intend to fly UAS should obtain additional training to address
the unique challenges of conducting UAS operations. Such training may cover command
and control (C2) systems,132 including telemetry, data management, failure modes,
autonomous operations,133 and aerodynamics.134
❏ Recognize the vulnerability of UAS to wind, turbulence, and other weather conditions, and
how these effects may vary in fixed-wing, multirotor, and hybrid unmanned aircraft.
d. train to recognize and effectively respond to emergencies
❏ Practice emergency procedures regularly. Recognize that improper responses to simulated
emergencies can lead to actual emergencies.135
❏ Understand your authority and responsibilities as a UAS pilot including recognizing an
emergency when it occurs, and communicating that knowledge to crew, bystanders or
external authorities as appropriate.
❏ Understand and train to use appropriate procedures in the event of system malfunctions or
failures such as electrical, rotor, propulsion, or loss of control link.136
e. maintain an accurate log to document your experience and improve future aeronautical decision-making and risk
management
❏ Debrief each flight. Review your objectives, identify mistakes and any unnecessary risks to
enhance safety and improve your performance on future flights. Maintain a log to track
errors and lessons learned during each flight.
**
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IV. Security and Privacy
UAS pilots should:
a. take measures to maintain the security of persons and property affected by UAS
activities,
b. remain vigilant and immediately report suspicious, reckless, or illegal UAS
activities,137
c. become familiar with current security and privacy rules and best practices,138
d. avoid controlled and special activity/special use airspace139 except when approved
or necessary in an emergency, and
e. recognize and respect the public’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

Explanation: Security pertains to measures taken to protect people, property, and information
from criminal or terrorist acts. It also includes measures taken by UAS pilots to avoid inadvertently
becoming a real or perceived security threat. In addition, UAS operations present a new and unique
potential to compromise privacy. This section addresses the UAS pilot’s essential role in promoting
national security, preventing criminal acts, and respecting privacy rights.140

Sample Recommended Practices:
a. take measures to maintain the security of persons and property affected by UAS activities
❏ Secure your UAS if it will be unattended.141
❏ Determine the ownership of property on which you desire to launch or recover, and seek
prior permission where required.142
❏ Do not deactivate or degrade geo-fencing or other security features on your equipment
unless they present a flight hazard or impede authorized operations.143
❏ To the extent practicable, seek to avoid even the appearance of a security threat.144 UAS
operations may be perceived as a threat by property owners, security, military, or law
enforcement personnel, and may put the UAS at risk of being disabled, damaged, destroyed,
or confiscated in response to a perceived threat.145 If your UAS operation may have been
perceived as a threat, move away, change the flight path, or consider landing the UAS and
explaining your intentions.
b. remain vigilant and immediately report suspicious, reckless, or illegal UAS activities
❏ Become familiar with the means to report and deter suspicious activities, such as a call to law
enforcement and follow-up to the FAA Hotline https://hotline.faa.gov/.
c. become familiar with current security and privacy rules and best practices
❏ Comply with applicable UAS registration requirements, including the proper display of
registration number.146
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❏ Comply with applicable requirements for electronic identification, tracking, and
authorization.147
❏ Comply with all rules relating to UAS payload or cargo, such as the carriage of hazardous
materials, weapons, ammunition, or other contraband.148
❏ Consider use of systems that improve data security (including encrypted command and
control systems, and relevant security standards149), and provide at least the level of security
required to satisfy information security requirements.150
❏ Complete any required or recommended security training applicable to your flight
operations.151
d. avoid controlled and special activity/special use airspace except when approved or necessary in an emergency
❏ During preflight preparation, check airspace and location restrictions applicable to your
operation, including NOTAMs152 and temporary flight restrictions (TFRs).153
❏ Avoid TFRs, public safety/emergency operations or other areas of intensive manned aircraft
operations, and events that may attract other aircraft or crowds.154
❏ Avoid UAS operations near prisons, power plants, military bases, and other critical
infrastructure.155 Notify such entities prior to operating nearby.
❏ Be cognizant of operations that may be subject to privacy, trespass,156 nuisance,157 intrusion
upon seclusion,158 or other considerations.159
❏ Query applicable charts, available/approved applications, Flight Service (air traffic facilities that
provide preflight briefings, flight plan processing, and inflight advisories),160 or ATC to avoid operating
in special activity/special use airspace161 or other areas not authorized for UAS flight.162
❏ Comply with airspace restrictions and authorized operational limitations approved for your
flight and UAS platform.163
e. recognize and respect the public’s reasonable expectation of privacy
❏ Understand and respect the public’s reasonable expectation of privacy rights of others by
conducting your UAS operations with prudence and restraint.164
❏ Seek to avoid even the appearance of impropriety regarding potential violations of privacy
with your operations.165
❏ Limit data capture to mission-related objectives.166
❏ Retain personal data only when legally and purposefully collected, and only for the duration
necessary.167
❏ Avoid the collection of personal data168 without the subject’s consent. Delete such data
immediately upon discovery, and maintain a de-identified log of the deletion.
❏ Implement a written privacy policy that is appropriate and responsive to your UAS
operations.169
❏ Recognize that limited societal experience may cause some people to consider unmanned
aircraft harassing, invasive, or threatening. Respond with courtesy and professionalism.
**
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V. Environmental Issues
UAS pilots should:
a. recognize and seek to mitigate the environmental impact of UAS operations,170
b. minimize the discharge of fuel, oil, and other chemicals into the environment
during refueling, preflight preparations, servicing, and flight operations,
c. recognize that some UAS components, including batteries, other fuels, and
lubricants, may be hazardous and require special handling procedures,
d. respect and protect environmentally sensitive areas,171 and
e. avoid flight over noise-sensitive areas, and comply with applicable noiseabatement procedures.

Explanation: Environmental issues can cause harm, hamper operations, and increase regulatory
burdens. Mitigating the environmental impact of UAS operations will improve public health and
society's perceptions of the industry.172 Through the thoughtful exercise of responsible practices,
most environmental issues are manageable.173

Sample Recommended Practices:
a. recognize and seek to mitigate the environmental impact of UAS operations
❏ Learn and adopt environmentally responsible methods for all aspects of UAS care.
❏ Adopt organizational policies for managing environmental issues.
❏ Complete a post-flight assessment to ensure that the UAS operations did not cause
environmental harm. If the UAS operation causes damage to property or the environment,
restore it to its previous condition.
❏ Patronize service providers that adhere to environmentally friendly practices.
b. minimize the discharge of fuel, oil, and other chemicals into the environment during refueling, preflight preparations,
servicing, and flight operations; and c. recognize that some UAS components, including batteries, other fuels, and
lubricants, may be hazardous and require special handling procedures
❏ Adopt environmentally sound and legally compliant procedures for battery or fuel
transportation, storage, fueling174 sampling, defueling, disposing of batteries175 or fuel samples,
and remediating fuel spills.
d. respect and protect environmentally sensitive areas
❏ Consider the potential impact of UAS on animal life, and comply with recommended
practices when flying near wilderness, wildlife, marine sanctuaries,176 and other
environmentally sensitive areas. Recognize that UAS may attract, frighten, or injure birds and
other animals. Remember that UAS may be mistaken as predators by nesting birds and other
wildlife, causing harmful stress or abandonment of nests and habitat.177
e. avoid flight over noise-sensitive areas, and comply with applicable noise-abatement procedures
❏ If practicable, avoid residential and other noise-sensitive areas.
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❏ Be aware of the noise signature of your aircraft, take steps to limit ambient UAS noise, and
consider system modifications that do so.178
**
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VI. Use of Technology
UAS pilots should:
a. become familiar with UAS equipment and related technologies,179
b. make effective use of technology by integrating technical guidance and solutions
into your standard operating procedures,
c. practice effective system monitoring and ensure you are prepared to revert to
manual operations if available,
d. Identify failure modes, and where practicable, test and deploy fault-tolerant or
redundant180 equipment, and
e. use, and understand the limitations of, position-indicating technologies including
detect-and-avoid (DAA), if available and authorized.181

Explanation: Innovative, compact, and inexpensive aviation technologies offer expanded
capabilities and enhanced safety. This section encourages the use and promotion of such safety- and
capability-enhancing technologies.

Sample Recommended Practices:

a. become familiar with appropriate UAS and other technologies
❏ When practicable, invest in new technologies that enhance your proficiency, knowledge,
situational awareness, and advance flight safety.
❏ Recognize that new technologies will increasingly provide enhanced safety capabilities,
including, e.g., detect-and-avoid,182 obstacle avoidance, graceful degradation,183 and advanced
UAS traffic management (UTM) capabilities184 supporting beyond visual line of sight
(BVLOS) operations.185
❏ Do not engage in UAS operations unless the instruments and equipment needed for the type
of flight operation, including controls, transmitters, and sensors, are installed and in an
operable condition.186
❏ Recognize conditions that may induce control signal attenuation, interference, or
disruption.187 Electromagnetic fields near power lines, transmission towers, or other
transmitting devices may disrupt control signals.188 Determine the potential impact and
develop contingency plans if the UAS encounters signal interference.189
❏ Recognize many UAS contain magnetic sensors critical for navigation. Consider conditions
that may induce magnetic interference,190
❏ Understand how to interpret and respond to weather radar imagery and other advanced
weather tools, and become apprised of new weather products that may inform and enhance
flight planning and safety.191
❏ Understand the currency of weather information sources, and obtain weather updates as
appropriate.
❏ Consider the use of flight data monitoring, tracking, and flight recording to improve training,
flight operations, post-flight review or debrief, and post-crash/injury investigation.
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❏ Use web-based flight planning, compliance,192 and management tools to enhance safety,
situational awareness, and efficiency.193
❏ Understand and comply with any licensing requirements for use of certain radio frequency
bands.194
b. make effective use of technology by integrating technical guidance and solutions in your standard operating procedures
❏ Understand the accuracy limitations of the aircraft’s altimetric equipment.195
❏ Understand the accuracy limitations of your GPS and other navigation systems, learn to
identify degradation or failures, and how to apply effective recovery procedures.196
❏ Familiarize yourself with your UAS’s entire feature set, and configure all systems to ensure
safe operations.197 Do not assume that factory default settings are necessarily safe or
adequate. Modify factory default settings as needed.
❏ Understand the capabilities, limitations, and proper operation of safety devices (such as prop
guards and parachutes).198
c. practice effective system monitoring and ensure you are prepared to revert to manual operations if available
❏ Learn and understand manual and automated features, limitations, and proper use of UAS
control system technologies.
❏ Properly manage autoflight systems. Understand that programming avionics during flight
operations may cause distractions and that distractions may lead to errors, particularly during
critical phases of flight.199
❏ Recognize that increasingly complex UAS may be subject to unpredictable anomalies.200
❏ Maintain basic flying and navigating skills to enhance safety in the event of in-flight
emergencies or abnormal conditions.
d. Identify failure modes, and where practicable, test and deploy fault-tolerant or redundant equipment
❏ Test third-party applications and devices before mission critical operations.
❏ Consider keeping backup devices201 accessible including extra batteries202 or power supplies.
❏ Learn to identify and correct system degradation or failures. Incorporate risk management
practices into the decision process to continue, modify, or cancel a flight under degraded
system conditions.
❏ Report inoperative GPS and other navigation signals and areas of poor radio/signal coverage
to the appropriate authority.203
e. use, and understand the limitations of, position-indicating technologies including detect-and-avoid (DAA), if
available and authorized
❏ Understand the limitations for the use of (DAA) detect-and-avoid technologies, and comply
with DAA alerts, cautions, and warnings.204
**
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VII. ADVANCEMENT OF UAS AVIATION
UAS pilots should:
a. advance and promote aviation safety as well as adherence to the UASPC,
b. collaborate with or assist organizations that advance UAS aviation and contribute to
society at large; encourage other UAS pilots to do so as well,
c. demonstrate appreciation for aviation professionals and service providers,
d. advance an aviation culture that values openness, humility, positive attitudes, and
the pursuit of personal improvement,
e. promote ethical behavior within the UAS community,205 and
f. mentor new and future UAS pilots.

Explanation: Vigilance and responsive action are essential to ensure aviation vitality and to enhance
the aviation community.

Sample Recommended Practices:
a. advance and promote aviation safety as well as adherence to the UASPC
❏ Strive to adopt the UASPC.206
❏ Be aware of the impact of your UAS on manned aviation. As a UAS pilot, be a respectful207
user of the National Airspace System, recognizing that adherence to regulations, best
practices, and safe operational procedures protects all users of shared airspace.
b. collaborate with or assist organizations that advance UAS aviation, contribute to society at large, and encourage
other UAS pilots to do so as well
❏ Advocate and promote the development of unmanned aviation.
❏ Consider participating in local government efforts that advance flight safety and advocate
appropriate enforcement of UAS regulation.208
❏ Participate in local aviation and recognized UAS associations209 to learn and contribute to
the knowledge base on the safe operation of UAS.
❏ Participate in the review of UAS Facility Maps to ensure they reflect safe altitude separation
between UAS and manned aircraft, or other safety hazards.210
❏ Consider making charitable use of your expertise and resources such as participating in
community events, humanitarian initiatives, or donating flight time to search and rescue
organizations and environmental programs.
❏ Participate in FAA Safety Team meetings and events. Learn from and interact with other
aviation professionals.211
c. demonstrate appreciation for aviation professionals and service providers
❏ Express appreciation to air traffic controllers, airport staff, and service personnel for their
valuable assistance.
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d. advance an aviation culture that values openness, humility, positive attitudes, and the pursuit of personal
improvement
❏ Consider your responsibility to promote safe and appropriate behavior to other pilots and
aviation professionals.
❏ Recognize that your actions can reflect upon the entire UAS community.
❏ Serve as an aviation ambassador to the public by providing accurate information, refuting
misinformation concerning UAS activities, and encouraging prospective UAS pilots.
e. promote ethical behavior within the UAS community
❏ Adhere to the highest ethical principles in all aviation dealings, including business practices.212
❏ Seek to resolve disputes quickly and informally.
❏ Advance the promotion of data privacy.213
f. mentor new and future UAS pilots
❏ Strive to engender professionalism, to serve as a role model and convey best practices to new
and future UAS pilots.214
**
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Additional Resources
❏ Annotated commentary, source materials, implementation examples, and supplemental aids
for the Codes of Conduct are available at secureav.com, and Notes for Implementers at
secureav.com/Notes-for-Implementers.pdf.
❏ The AVIATION MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS, AVIATORS, FLIGHT INSTRUCTORS, GLIDER
AVIATORS, Helicopter Pilots, LIGHT SPORT AVIATORS, SEAPLANE PILOTS, STUDENT
PILOTS, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS MODEL CODES OF CONDUCT, and SAFETY
GUIDANCE FOR MANNED AIRCRAFT PILOTS OPERATING IN THE PRESENCE OF DRONES
are available at secureav.com.
❏ Further information about UAS is available at:
FAA
www.faa.gov/uas
AEA
www.aea.net
AMA
www.modelaircraft.org
AOPA
www.aopa.org/215
ASTM Int’l
www.astm.org216
AUVSI
www.auvsi.org
CANSO
www.canso.org
CTA
www.cta.tech
EAA
www.eaa.org
EASA
www.easa.europa.eu217
EUROCAE
www.eurocae.net218
Flight Service
1-800-WX-BRIEF
ICAO
www.icao.int219
ISO
www.iso.org220
JARUS
http://jarus-rpas.org/publicati>ons
NBAA
www.nbaa.org
RTCA
www.rtca.org
SAE Int’l
http://www.sae.org/
UVS Int’l
https://rps-info.com
**
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Notice

The UASPC is available at secureav.com and UAA.aero. UAS Pilots CODE © Aviators Code Initiative
(ACI) and University Aviation Association (UAA). All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use are available at
secureav.com/terms.pdf.
The UASPC is a joint initiative between the Aviators Code Initiative and the University Aviation
Association.
The UASPC does not purport to address every possible safety concern. It is the responsibility of the
user of the UASPC to establish appropriate safety and health practices and determine the
applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use. It is not intended to provide legal advice and must
not be relied upon as such.

Edits, Errata, Comments

Please send your suggestions, edits, errata, questions and comments to: PEB@secureav.com.
**
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Appendices
Appendix 1 - Abbreviations
AC
ACI
ACS
AD
ADS-B
AIM
AFSS
AGL
API
ATC
ATO
AUVSI
BVLOS
CAA
C2
C.F.R.
CRM
DAA
DHS
EASA
FAA
FAAST
FCC
Fed. Reg.
Final Rule
FSIMS
FTC
GPS
HEMS
ICAO
IFR
IoT
JARUS
JARUS-SORA
LAANC
NAS
NEPA

Advisory Circular
Aviators Code Initiative
Airman Certification Standards
Airworthiness Directive
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
Aeronautical Information Manual
Automated Flight Service Station
Above Ground Level
Application Interface
Air Traffic Control
Air Traffic Organization
The Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International
Beyond Visual Line of Sight
Civil Aviation Authority
Command and Control
US Code of Federal Regulations
Crew Resource Management
Detect-and-Avoid
US Department of Homeland Security
European Aviation Safety Agency
Federal Aviation Administration
FAA Safety Team
Federal Communications Commission
US Federal Register
14 C.F.R. Part 107, Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems
FAA Flight Standards Information System
Federal Trade Commission
Global Positioning System
Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) Tool
International Civil Aviation Organization
Instrument Flight Rules
Internet of Things
Joint Authority for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems
JARUS Specific Operations Risk Assessment (Annex 1 - Glossary)
Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability
National Airspace System
National Environmental Policy Act
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NGO
NOTAM
NTIA
Part 107
PEB
PKI
RP
RPA
RPIC
RPAS
RPS
SAA
SB
sm
SMS
SOP
SRM
SRP
SUA
sUAS
TFR
UA
UAS
UASPC
UAT
UAV
UTM
VFR
VLOS
VMC
WAAS
WX

Non-Governmental Organization
Notice to Airmen
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
14 C.F.R. Part 107
Permanent Editorial Board, Aviators Code Initiative
Public Key Infrastructure
Remote Pilot
Remotely Piloted Aircraft
Remote Pilot In Command
Remotely Piloted Aircraft System
Remote Pilot Station
Special Activity Airspace
Service Bulletin
Statute Mile
Safety Management System
Standard Operating Procedure
Safety Risk Management
Sample Recommended Practice
Special Use Airspace
Small UAS
Temporary Flight Restriction
Unmanned Aircraft
Unmanned Aircraft System
UAS Pilots Code
Universal Access Transceiver
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UAS Traffic Management
Visual Flight Rules
Visual Line of Sight
Visual Meteorological Conditions
Wide Area Augmentation System
Weather
**
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Appendix 2 - Definitions221
accident—An unplanned event or series of events that result in death, injury, or damage to, or loss
of, equipment or property.222
aeronautical decision-making (ADM)—A systematic approach to the mental process used by
aircraft pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given set of
circumstances.223 Effective ADM skills incorporate systematic approaches to risk assessment and risk
mitigation.224
aircraft—A device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the air.225
airplane—An engine-driven fixed-wing aircraft heavier than air, that is supported in flight by the
dynamic reaction of the air against its wings.226
airport—An area of land or water that is used or intended to be used for the landing and takeoff of
aircraft, and includes its buildings and facilities, if any.227
airport environment—The area or airspace on or proximate to an airport, generally defined as: a)
Class A, B, C, D, or E controlled airspaces which touch the surface with an airport and/or controlled
airspaces which do not touch the surface, but in connection to an airport (normally depicted on
aeronautical charts and sectionals); or b) Any Mode C Veil (US) or TMZ (Europe) in Class A, B, C,
D, or E, controlled airspace; or c) 5 nautical miles from an airport having an operational control
tower; or d) 3 nautical miles from an airport with a published instrument flight procedure, but not an
operational tower; or e) 2 nautical miles from an airport without a published instrument flight
procedure or an operational tower; or f) 2 nautical miles from a heliport with a published instrument
flight procedure.228
airworthiness—See “airworthy”.
airworthy—A UAS conforming to its type design (TD), if certificated, or in lieu of a certificated
design, the manufacturer’s design, and determined to be in a condition for safe operation.229
autonomous aircraft—An unmanned aircraft that does not allow [or is capable of operating
without] pilot intervention in the management of the flight.230
autonomous operation—An operation during which a remotely-piloted aircraft is operating
without pilot intervention in the management of the flight.231
best practice—a procedure that has been shown by research and experience to produce optimal
results and that is established or proposed as suitable for widespread adoption.
beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS)—A means of flying the UAS without the direct, unaided
visual supervision of the aircraft [by the crewmembers].232
C2 link—The data link used for the purpose of UAS command and control (C2).233
C2 link loss—Any situation in which the unmanned aircraft can no longer be controlled by the
remote pilot due to the degradation or failure of the communication channel between the RP and
UAS.234
civil aircraft—Aircraft other than public (or state) aircraft.235
command and control link—See “C2 link”.236
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concept of operations (CONOPS)—A user-oriented document that describes systems
characteristics and limitations for a proposed system and its operation from a user’s perspective. A
CONOPS also describes the user organization, mission, and objectives from an integrated systems
point of view and is used to communicate overall quantitative and qualitative system characteristics
and operational procedures to stakeholders.
condition for safe operation—See “airworthy”.
configuration—The requirements, design and implementation that define a particular version of a
system or system component.237
control station (CS)—The equipment used to maintain control of, communicate with, guide, or
otherwise pilot an unmanned aircraft.238
controlled airspace—An airspace of defined dimensions within which air traffic control service is
provided to IFR flights and to VFR flights in accordance with the airspace classification. In the US,
controlled airspace is a generic term that covers Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E
airspace.239
covered data—Information collected by a UAS that identifies a particular person. If data collected
by UAS likely will not be linked to an individual’s name or other personally identifiable information,
or if the data is altered so that a specific person is not recognizable, it is not covered data.240
crewmember—Remote pilot in command (RPIC), other person manipulating the controls, a visual
observer, or crewmembers necessary for the safety of the UAS operation.241
critical infrastructure—Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to a sovereign state
that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those
matters.242
critical system—Systems needed to perform one or more safety functions, in which failure would
cause a significant increase in the safety risk for the third parties and/or environment involved.
data link—Interconnections to, from and within the remotely piloted aircraft system, includes
control, flight status, communication, and payload links.
detect and avoid (DAA)—The capability to see, sense or detect conflicting traffic or other hazards
and take the appropriate action to comply with the acceptable rules of flight.243
failure mode—A loss of function or a malfunction of a system or a part thereof.
flight manual—A manual, [where applicable, associated with the certificate of airworthiness,]
containing limitations within which the aircraft is to be considered airworthy, and instructions and
information necessary to the flight crew members for the safe operation of the aircraft.
flight safety—See “safety”.
flight termination—Flight termination is a system, procedure or function which aims to
[immediately] end the flight. It can be initiated by pilot or autonomously. Flight termination is not a
return-home function.
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fly-away—Unintended flight outside of operational boundaries (altitude/airspeed/lateral) as the
result of a failure of the control station or onboard systems or both. Fly-away is a loss of trajectory
control.
geo-fencing—A system that would prevent UAS flight in specifically designated areas or constrain
the flight to within specifically designated areas.
ground control station—See “control station (CS)”.
guidelines—Recommended practices for promoting safety, proficiency and, as applicable,
compliance with regulations.
hazard—A potentially unsafe condition resulting from failures, malfunctions, external events, errors,
or a combination thereof.244
human factors—how people respond to and interact with machines, with procedures and with the
environment [including other people] about them.245
incident—An occurrence other than an accident that affects or could affect the safety of operations.
IFR conditions—Weather conditions below the minimum for flight under visual flight rules.246
likelihood—Estimated probability or frequency, in quantitative and qualitative terms, of a hazard’s
effect or outcome.
lost link—The loss of command and control link contact with the UAS such that the remote pilot
can no longer manage the aircraft’s flight. Lost link is not inherently a fly-away.
maintenance—Inspection, overhaul, repair, preservation, and the replacement of parts.247
malfunction—Failure of a system or component to operate as specified or designed.
model aircraft—An unmanned aircraft that is: (1) capable of sustained flight in the atmosphere; (2)
flown within visual line of sight of the person operating the aircraft; and (3) flown for hobby or
recreational purposes.248
navigable airspace—Airspace at and above the prescribed minimum flight altitudes, including
airspace needed for safe takeoff and landing.249
near mid air collision (NMAC)—An incident associated with the operation of an aircraft in which
a possibility of a collision occurs as a result of proximity of less than 500 feet to another aircraft, or a
report is received from a pilot or flight crew member stating that a collision hazard existed between
two or more aircraft. A report does not necessarily involve the violation of regulations or error by the
air traffic control system, nor does it necessarily represent an unsafe condition.250
night—The time between the end of evening civil twilight and the beginning of morning civil
twilight, as published in the Air Almanac, converted to local time.251
non-participant—Any individual in the vicinity of a UAS operation who is not participating in the
operation of the UAS.
operational risk assessment (ORA)—Evaluation of the proposed design and operation of the
UAS, its intended mission, and proposed area of operation to determine potential risk to persons and
property.
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operational risk management (ORM)—A systematic, cyclical process of identifying hazards,
assessing the associated risks, and facilitating informed and effective risk management decisions by
individuals and organizations.252
operations manual—A manual containing procedures, instructions and guidance for use by
operational personnel in the execution of their duties.
operator—A person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to engage in an aircraft
operation.253
participant—Those persons directly involved with the operation of the UAS or fully aware that the
UAS operation is being conducted near them. Active participants should be fully aware of the risks
involved with the UAS operation and have accepted these risks. Active participants are informed on
and able to follow relevant effective emergency procedures and/or contingency plans.
payload—A system, an object or collection of objects onboard or otherwise connected to the UAS
that performs, or is related to, a mission function but is not required for flight.254
personal data—See “covered data”.255
pilot—Remote pilot-in-command (RPIC) or other pilot who is controlling the flight of a UAS under
the supervision of the RPIC.
practice—Recommended methods, rules, and designs for voluntary compliance.
public aircraft—An aircraft owned, operated, or under contract to any federal, state, local or tribal
government entity, and performing a government function.256
radio line of sight (RLOS)—Operational state in which radio communications are over distances
where the path between the transmitter and receiver is not obstructed by the curvature of the earth
or other obstructions such as terrain or structures.
rating—A statement that, as a part of a certificate, sets forth special conditions, privileges, or
limitations.257
reliability—The probability that an item will perform a required function under specified conditions,
without failure, for a specified period of time.
remote pilot station (RPS)—See “control station (CS)”.
remote pilot-in-command (RPIC)—Person who is directly responsible for and is the final
authority as to the operation of the UAS, has been designated as remote pilot in command before or
during the flight of a UAS, and holds the appropriate certificate(s) for the conduct of the flight.
remotely piloted aircraft system (RPAS)—A remotely piloted aircraft, its associated remote pilot
station(s), the required command and control links and any other components [as specified in the
type design].258
required link performance (RLP)—Generic term for required end to end C2 link performance.259
residual risk—Any risk that remains after mitigation or other control actions.
risk—Composite of predicted severity and likelihood of the potential effect of hazards.
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risk analysis—Analyses used to determine or estimate the likelihood of an event (usually described
as an accident, fatal accident, etc.) and the potential severity of the event if it occurs. These analyses
could be either quantitative or qualitative.
risk management—A formalized method of dealing with hazards through the logical process of
weighing the potential costs of risks against the possible benefits of allowing those risks to stand
uncontrolled.260
risk mitigations—The process of incorporating defenses or preventive controls to lower the
severity and/or likelihood of a hazard’s projected consequence.
safety—The state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to,
and maintained at or below an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification
and safety risk management.261
safety management system (SMS)—The formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to
managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls.262 SMS is comprised of
four functional components, including an intangible, but always critical, aspect called safety culture:
(1) safety policy, (2) safety risk management, (3) safety assurance, and (4) safety promotion, including
promotion of a safety culture within all levels of a workforce.263
see and avoid—The requirement for the pilot of an aircraft to “see” and to remain well clear of
other aircraft, and “avoid” a collision.264
situational awareness—The accurate perception and understanding of all the factors and
conditions within the five fundamental risk elements (flight, pilot, aircraft, environment, and type of
operation that comprise any given aviation situation) that affect safety before, during, and after the
flight. Thus, loss of situational awareness results in a pilot not knowing where he or she is, an
inability to recognize deteriorating circumstances, and the misjudgment of the rate of deterioration.265
small unmanned aircraft (sUA)—An unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds on takeoff,
including everything that is on board or otherwise attached to the aircraft.266
small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS)—A small unmanned aircraft and its associated elements
(including communication links and the components that control the small unmanned aircraft) that
are required for the safe and efficient operation of the small unmanned aircraft in the national
airspace system.267
special activity airspace (SAA)—Airspace with defined dimensions within the National Airspace
System wherein limitations may be imposed upon aircraft operations.268
special use airspace (SUA)—Airspace of defined dimensions identified by an area on the surface
of the earth wherein activities must be confined because of their nature and/or wherein limitations
may be imposed upon aircraft operations that are not a part of those activities.269
standard operating procedure—A set of instructions covering those features of operations which
lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness.
threat—Events or errors that occur beyond the influence of an operational person, increase
operational complexity and must be managed to maintain the margin of safety.270
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threat and error management (TEM)—The process of detecting and responding to threats and
errors to ensure that the ensuing outcome is inconsequential, i.e. the outcome is not an error, further
error or undesired state.271
uncontrolled airspace—Airspace excluding Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E
airspace.272
unmanned aircraft—An aircraft operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from
within or on the aircraft.273
unmanned aircraft system (UAS)—Unmanned aircraft and associated elements (including
communication links and the components that control the unmanned aircraft) that are required for
safe and efficient operation in a national airspace system.
visual flight rules (VFR)—Flight rules adopted by a CAA governing aircraft flight using visual
references. VFR operations specify the amount of ceiling and the visibility the pilot must have in
order to operate according to these rules. When the weather conditions are such that the pilot cannot
operate according to VFR, he or she must use instrument flight rules (IFR).274
visual line of sight (VLOS)—An operation in which the RPIC and the person manipulating the
controls (and visual observer, if used) is capable of seeing the unmanned aircraft with vision unaided
by any device other than corrective lenses.275
visual observer (VO)—Person who is designated by the RPIC to assist the RPIC and the person
manipulating the flight controls of the UAS to see and avoid other air traffic or objects aloft or on
the ground.
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http://servicos.decea.gov.br/arquivos/drone/Doc_10019_Manual_on_RPAS__English_.pdf
ICAO, Safety Management Manual, Doc. 9859 AN/474 (3d. ed. 2013),
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NIST, Cybersecurity Framework, https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework
NTIA, Voluntary Best Practices for UAS Privacy, Transparency, and Accountability (May 18,
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Appendix 4 - UASPC Condensed Version
The UASPC Condensed Version is intended for pilot implementation. Its content includes the
introduction, provisions, and the sample recommended practices contained in the UASPC Annotated
Version. It is available at secureav.com/UAS.

UAS PILOTS CODE
CONDENSED VERSION
VERSION 1.0

Tools to advance UAS safety and professionalism

The UASPC Condensed Version cover page.
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Appendix 5 - UASPC Abbreviated Version
The UASPC Abbreviated Version includes a brief introduction, the provisions (without sample
recommended practices), and links to all UASPC versions and resources. It provides an introduction
to, and promotion of the UASPC. It is available at secureav.com/UAS.

d. avoid controlled and special activity/special
use airspace except when approved or
necessary in an emergency, and
e. recognize and respect the public’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.

V. Environmental Issues
UAS pilots should:

The UAS PILOTS CODE (UASPC) offers recommendations to advance flight and ground safety, airmanship, and
professionalism. It presents a set of recommended practices—a vision of excellence—to help UAS pilots interpret
and apply standards and regulations, and to confront the real world challenges to avoid mishaps. It is designed to
help UAS pilots develop standard operating procedures, effective risk management, safety management systems,
and to encourage UAS pilots to consider themselves aviators and participants in the broader aviation community.

a. recognize and seek to mitigate the
environmental impact of UAS operations,
b. minimize the discharge of fuel, oil, and other
chemicals into the environment during
refueling, preflight preparations, servicing,
and flight operations,

The UASPC is a model, not a standard. Three versions are available: the annotated version unabridged with
extensive endnotes and supplemental materials, the condensed version intended for pilot implementation, and this
abbreviated version containing only the core principles, and introducing and promoting the UASPC.

I. General Responsibilities of UAS Pilots
UAS pilots should:
a. make safety a top priority,
b. seek excellence in airmanship (knowledge,
skill, ability, and attitude that promote safe
and efficient operations),
c. adopt sound principles of aeronautical
decision-making (ADM) (the process used by
pilots to consistently determine the best
course of action in response to the
circumstances), and develop and exercise
good judgment,
d. use sound principles of risk management,
e. maintain situational awareness (the accurate
perception and understanding of your
operation and environment), and adhere to
prudent operating practices,
f.

aspire to professionalism,

g. act with responsibility, integrity, and
courtesy, and
h. adhere to applicable laws, regulations, and
industry guidance.

d. respect and protect environmentally
sensitive areas, and

III. Training and Proficiency
UAS pilots should:

e. avoid flight over noise-sensitive areas, and
comply with applicable noise-abatement
procedures.

a. participate in regular training to maintain
and improve proficiency beyond minimum
requirements,

VI. Use of Technology

b. pursue a rigorous, lifelong course of
aviation study,

UAS pilots should:
a. become familiar with appropriate UAS and
other technologies,

c. remain vigilant and avoid complacency,
d. train to recognize and deal effectively with
emergencies, and

b. make effective use of technology by
integrating technical guidance and solutions
into your standard operating procedures,

e. maintain an accurate log to document your
experience and improve future aeronautical
decision-making and risk management.

c. practice effective system monitoring and
ensure you are prepared to revert to manual
operations if available,

IV. Security and Privacy
UAS pilots should:
a.

take measures to maintain the security of
persons and property affected by UAS
activities,

b.

remain vigilant and immediately report
suspicious, reckless, or illegal UAS
activities,

c.

become familiar with current security and
privacy rules and best practices,

II. Manned Aircraft and People on the Surface
UAS pilots should:
a. manage and avoid unnecessary risk to
manned aircraft, and to people and property
on the surface, and

c. recognize that some UAS components,
including batteries, other fuels, and
lubricants, may be hazardous and require
special handling procedures,

b. avoid operations that may alarm or disturb
people on the surface or in manned aircraft.

VII. ADVANCEMENT OF UAS AVIATION
UAS pilots should:
a. advance and promote aviation safety as well
as adherence to the UASPC,
b. collaborate with or assist organizations that
advance UAS aviation and contribute to
society at large; encourage other UAS pilots
to do so as well,
c.

demonstrate appreciation for aviation
professionals and service providers,

d. advance an aviation culture that values
openness, humility, positive attitudes, and
the pursuit of personal improvement,
e.

promote ethical behavior within the UAS
community, and

f.

mentor new and future UAS pilots.

Notice
UAS Pilots CODE © Aviators Code Initiative (ACI) and
University Aviation Association (UAA). All Rights
Reserved. Terms of Use: secureav.com/terms.pdf.
The UASPC is a joint initiative of the ACI and UAA.
The UASPC does not purport to address every safety
concern. It is the responsibility of the user of the UASPC
to establish appropriate safety and health practices and
determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior
to use. It is not intended to provide legal advice and
must not be relied upon as such.

Acknowledgments
Various subject matter experts have provided input for
the UASPC. We gratefully acknowledge their editorial
assistance. See ACKNOWLEDGMENTS:
secureav.com/ack.pdf.

d. Identify failure modes, and where
practicable, test and deploy fault-tolerant or
redundant equipment, and
e. use, and understand the limitations of,
position-indicating technologies including
detect-and-avoid (DAA), if available and
authorized.

All UASPC versions are available here:

www.secureav.com/UAS
v1.0
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Endnotes
1

Five Questions for Dallas Brooks, AOPA (June 12, 2017), https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/allnews//2017/June/12/Five-questions-for-DallasBrooks?utm_source=drone&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=170613drone.
2

A family of aviation codes of conduct was developed by the Aviators Code Initiative (ACI), formerly known
as the Aviators Model Code of Conduct (AMCC) Initiative, www.secureav.com. See ACI, Introduction to the
Aviators Model Code of Conduct, http://www.secureav.com/Comment-AMCC-Introduction.pdf.
3

Title - Resolving a title for the UASPC was challenging because relevant taxonomy in both industry and
government is still evolving. The title, UAS Pilots Code, reflects the following considerations:
Audience The primary audience includes civil, commercial unmanned aircraft system (UAS) pilots,
operators, visual observers, operations managers, safety officers, and other interested or
responsible parties. The UASPC also serves as a supplemental resource for diverse UAS
operations, and may be useful for some public aircraft operations.
“UAS” A. UAS vs. RPAS: The term “UAS” enjoys widespread usage in the US and other
jurisdictions, and regulatory adoption in the FAA’s Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems rule,
14 C.F.R. Part 107, available at https://www.eC.F.R..gov/cgi-bin/textidx?SID=5a94599c486631fe22f2127461f38a26&mc=true&node=pt14.2.107&rgn=div5.
The term “RPAS” is largely unfamiliar outside of military aviation in the US. In contrast,
while focused on civil UAS, the UASPC applies broadly to any type of non-military
unmanned aircraft operation. Thus, “UAS” most accurately characterizes the UASPC’s
scope and content.
The ICAO, Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), Doc. 10019, Fig. 1-2 & §
1.5.1 (2015) (“Manual on RPAS”), available (fee) at https://store.icao.int/manual-onremotely-piloted-aircraft-systems-rpas-doc-10019-english-printed-12792.html graphically
presented remotely piloted aircraft, model aircraft, and autonomous aircraft each “as one
subset of UAS.” ICAO’s UAS Study Group (UASSG) “first considered introducing the term
‘remotely piloted’ [in] 2009, after reaching the conclusion that only unmanned aircraft
that are remotely piloted could be integrated alongside manned aircraft in nonsegregated airspace and at aerodromes [and] therefore narrow[ed] its focus from all UAS
to those that are remotely piloted.” ICAO, § 1.2.14. Cf., it has been recognized that “Art. 8
of the ‘Chicago Convention’ means there must [be] a person accountable for the
operation of the aircraft, hence under the ICAO framework there is a need to refer to
RPAS (rather than the more generic UAS) to reflect the pilot aspect.” Michael Gadd
(FRAeS), Policy Lead, UAS, Civil Aviation Authority (UK) (Jan. 21, 2018).
Drafting Considerations: The term “UAS” is used to make the UASPC more accessible and
relevant to the broadest possible audience.
B. UAS vs. Drone: The term “drone” has historically applied to airborne military practice
targets, and more recently to model or hobbyist aircraft. In contrast, the term “UAS” is
widely recognized as applying to civil, scientific or professional operations, among others.
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C. UAS vs. sUAS: We use the blanket "UAS" when we mean all, and "sUAS" (small UAS)
only when we mean that specific subset of UAS.
“Pilots” A. Pilots vs. Operators: The term “pilots” was adopted rather than “operators” reflecting
(1) broad industry and government consensus that licensed UAS aviators should be
considered pilots, (2) the FAA’s and other civil aviation authorities (CAAs) issuance of UAS
“pilot” certificates, and (3) the specific meaning of the word "pilot" as someone who
operates the controls of an aircraft. See FAA, Becoming a Pilot,
www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/fly_for_work_business/becoming_a_pilot. As UAS
platforms become increasingly automated, the transfer of direct control shifts from the
human operator or “pilot” to automated systems. The term “pilot” underscores that
automation should be subordinate to the responsibility and authority of the human
component. Notwithstanding, the UASPC addresses and seeks to include “operators”
extensively. See UASPC, n.133 (addressing autonomous aircraft and systems).
B. Pilots vs. Remote Pilots: Our use of the term “Pilots” mirrors usage of the term by
certification authorities as discussed immediately above, and reflects acceptance of UAS
aviators as members of the pilot community with commensurate responsibilities to
adhere to applicable rules and embrace aviation safety culture.
C. Plural Non-possessive Form: The usage of “Aviators” or “Pilots” in the Aviators Code
Initiative’s title takes the plural, and non-possessive form, i.e., “Pilots”, as opposed to
“Pilot’s”. “Pilots” is here used as a modifier, as in "Air Line Pilots Association".
D. Pilots vs. Commercial Pilots: The term “Commercial” was considered to underscore that
many of the UASPC’s practices are geared to the comparatively rigorous requirements of
commercial operations (in contrast to certain hobbyist or certain other types of
operations). Nonetheless “Commercial” was rejected because: (1) much of the UASPC is
extensible or relevant to non-commercial operations, (2) the UASPC’s introduction
describes its scope and audience, and (3) there is an editorial preference for a concise
title.
“Code” Code vs Code of Conduct: The term “Code” is a more concise version of the phrase “Code
of Conduct” used in the ACI's earlier documents. As used in this title, “Code” is not
intended to connote a collection or compendium of laws.
Drafting Considerations: Further discussion regarding the titling of our codes of conduct is presented in
ACI, Commentary to the Title, http://secureav.com/Comment-AMCC-Title.pdf.
4

See ACI, Commentary to AMCC 1.a – General Responsibilities, http://www.secureav.com/CommentAMCC-1.a-General-Responsibilities.pdf (addressing safety).
5

See ACI, Commentary to AMCC 1.b – General Responsibilities, http://www.secureav.com/CommentAMCC-I.b-General-Responsibilities.pdf (addressing airmanship).
6

All pilots share many attributes traditionally identified with aviation professionals, including: (1) a wide
range of required specialized skills, (2) a need for good judgment, (3) a need for proficiency and ongoing
training, (4) a direct responsibility for the well-being of others, and (5) serious consequences for
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misfeasance or malfeasance. ACI, Commentary to AMCC 1.f – General Responsibilities,
http://www.secureav.com/Comment-AMCC-I.f-General-Responsibilities.pdf (addressing professionalism).
7

See UASPC, § I.d, and associated Sample Recommended Practices (SRPs) (addressing risk management).
Two paradigms have emerged in the practice of risk management. "One is related to hazard based risk
analysis driven by technical professionals. The other [is] the precaution based risk analysis driven by the
legal system." Tracy Lamb, Risk Management for a Booming Drone Industry - ALARP VS SFAIRP who cares
anyway? (Oct. 6, 2016), available at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/risk-managment-booming-droneindustry-alarp-vs-sfairp-tracy-lamb/ (considering retrospective vs forward-looking proactive risk analysis in
the UAS industry). Note the European Commission’s embrace of the precautionary principle. Euro. Comm.,
Press Release, IP/00/96 (Feb. 2, 2000), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-00-96_en.htm; and EASA,
‘Prototype’ Commission Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Operations, Art. II.34 (Aug. 22, 2016),
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/UAS%20Prototype%20Regulation%20final.pdf (includes the
precautionary principle).
The FAA uses the term Safety Risk Management (SRM) as a primary component of safety management
systems (SMS) throughout the aviation industry as well as in FAA operations. “The objective of SRM is to
provide information regarding hazards, safety risk, and safety risk controls/mitigations to decision makers
and to enhance the FAA's ability to address safety risk in the aerospace system. SRM consists of conducting
a system analysis; identifying hazards; and analyzing, assessing, and controlling safety risk associated with
the identified hazards.” FAA, Order 8040.4B, Safety Risk Management Policy, p.1 (May 2, 2017),
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_Order_8040.4B.pdf. These principles are
consistent with the general concept of “risk management,” the terminology used in the UASPC.
Cf., U.S. 14 C.F.R. Part 5, ❡ 5.51 (required for part 121 air carriers) also specifies Safety Risk Management
processes to be performed prior to implementation of new systems or revision of existing systems,
including processes for system analysis, identification of potential hazards, analysis and assessment of risk,
and, where necessary, development of risk controls.
8

FAA, Remote Pilot - Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Airman Certification Standards, FAA-S-ACS-10 (July
2016), https://www.faa.gov/training_testing/testing/acs/media/uas_acs.pdf (“The FAA views the ACS as
the foundation to an integrated and systematic approach to airman certification. The ACS is part of the
safety management system (SMS) framework . . .” Foreword). See FAA Order 8900.1 CHG 477, vol. 16,
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, ch. 3, Airmen Certification, § 1, Remote Pilots (Oct. 17, 2016),
http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/8900.1/v16%20unmanned%20aircraft%20systems/chapter%2003/16_003_001.
htm (presenting UAS pilot certification requirements and procedures).
9

Standards - Voluntary standards organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) developing
UAS standards include, but are not limited to: the Am. Nat’l Standards Institute (ANSI), ANSI Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Standardization Collaborative (UASSC),
https://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/standards_boards_panels/uassc/overview?menuid=3; ASTM
Int’l, Comm. F38 on Unmanned Aircraft Systems, https://www.astm.org/COMMITTEE/F38.htm; AUVSI,
http://www.auvsi.org/rpc-top; Consumer Technology Ass’n, R6WG23 - Small Unmanned Aerial Systems,
www.cta.org; Int’l Civil Aviation Org. (ICAO) RPAS Panel, www.icao.int; Int’l Org. for Stds. (ISO),
www.iso.org; Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS), http://jarus-rpas.org; RTCA,
SC-228, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, www.rtca.org; and
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE), Technical Committee AS-4, Unmanned Systems,
http://www.sae.org.
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Ideally, individuals adhere to codes for their own good reasons. Such deferential adherence may occur in
part as a result of deliberate organizational or cultural encouragement. And, individuals may seek rules
more stringent than their status requires.
The UASPC is informed by the US FAA's Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems rule (as codified in 14 C.F.R. §
107) and applicable rules and guidance of other jurisdictions and intergovernmental organizations,
including, but not limited to:
● Australia (CASA) - https://www.casa.gov.au/standard-page/casr-part-101-unmanned-aircraft-androcket-operations
● Canada (DoT) - https://www.unmannedsystems.ca/download/usc-small-rpas-bvlos-best-practices/
● Europe (EASA) https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/UAS%20Prototype%20Regulation%20final.pdf
● ICAO - https://www4.icao.int/uastoolkit/Home/Narrative#background
● JARUS - http://jarus-rpas.org/publications
● UK - http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2016/765/contents/made;
http://www.caa.co.uk/Consumers/Unmanned-aircraft-and-drones/
While the scope of the UASPC is primarily applicable to U.S. operators, the recommended guidance and
best practices may have applicability in other jurisdictions. Consequently, the annotations selectively
include supporting or comparative references to relevant rules and guidance from these (and where
helpful, other) entities.
11

For example, because UAS pilot certification (in the United States) does not require the involvement of an
instructor, the need for non-regulatory or operational guidance is heightened.
Diminished Regulation - A current trend towards diminished regulation and oversight may also bolster the
need for voluntary practices such as a code of conduct. See, e.g., Wheeler, et al., Trump signs ‘2-for-1’ order
to reduce regulations, The Hill (Jan. 30, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/316839trump-to-sign-order-reducing-regulations (“The executive order [No. 13771, Reducing Regulation and
Controlling Regulatory Costs] is aimed at dramatically rolling back federal regulations.”); and Andy Pasztor,
Some Drone Regulations Delayed, Others Postponed Indefinitely: Highly anticipated rules await government
approval, but timeline is pushed back to late 2018 or early 2019, WSJ (Sept. 17, 2017), available (fee) at
www.wsj.com, and (free) at http://www.kathrynsreport.com/2017/09/some-drone-regulations-delayedothers.html; and Mark Dombroff, Dentons US LLP (“It seems in many respects everything has come to a halt
. . . . There’s almost a resignation that has set in.”). Cf., Jan Pie, Chairman, Int’l Coordinating Council of
Aerospace Indus. Ass’ns (ICCAIA), Presentation at RPAS2017, ICAO, Montréal (Sept. 19, 2017) (asserting that
regulations are essential to safely integrating UAS into existing aviation systems; and that without
appropriate regulation, the operation of UAS business would be premature. “No regulatory framework, no
business.”).
Diminished Federal Preemption - “[T]he FAA will address preemption issues on a case-by-case basis rather
than doing so in a rule of general applicability. . . . Rather than asserting preemption, the FAA in Part 107,
indicated many areas where state and local regulation may be appropriate.” N. DuPuis, et al., Cities &
Drones: What Cities Need to Know About Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, National League of Cities, pp. 5, 8
(2016), http://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/2016-12/NLC%20Drone%20Report.pdf. See UASPC, n.82
(regarding Federal preemption).
12

Drafting Considerations: The scope of the UASPC includes civil UAS operations and does not distinguish
between commercial vs. non-commercial operations, as the 14 C.F.R. 1.1 definition of civil aircraft
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inclusively contains both types of operations. Moreover, the decision to limit the scope to civil UAS
operations is not to suggest that some elements or recommendations may not apply to governmental
operations, but rather to acknowledge the inadequacy of the UASPC in fully addressing the unique
regulatory and operational framework of governmental UAS operations under military authority or state
aircraft rules.
“Other interested or responsible parties” is inclusive and intended to include anyone planning to work with
or hire UAS pilots.
Hobbyist/recreational users who typically operate under the Special Rule for Model Aircraft (14 C.F.R. Part
101, Subpart E, Special Rule for Model Aircraft, available at https://www.eC.F.R..gov/cgi-bin/textidx?SID=5a94599c486631fe22f2127461f38a26&mc=true&node=pt14.2.101&rgn=div5#sp14.2.101.e) may
either choose to operate under the more stringent Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems rules (14 C.F.R. Part
107), or will be subject to Part 107 if their operations are noncompliant with Part 101. See FAA, Advisory
Circular, AC 00-1.1A, Subj. Public Aircraft Operations (Feb. 12, 2014),
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_00-1_1A.pdf (defining civil and public
aircraft operations).
13

Limitations - The UASPC’s general, foundational guidance should inform any UAS operation although
many of its specific provisions may not address operations beyond the scope of 14 C.F.R. Part 107, such as
Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations or UAS carriage of people.
Part 107 is, however, just “the first step in the process of integrating small UAS operations into the NAS.”
Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,063 (June 28, 2016). “With this new rule [14 C.F.R. Part 107], we are taking a
careful and deliberate approach that balances the need to deploy this new technology with the FAA’s
mission to protect public safety. But this is just our first step. We’re already working on additional rules that
will expand the range of operations.”, Fmr. FAA Adm’r Michael Huerta (June 21, 2016).
https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=20515. Integration developments are
evolving quickly.
14

See ACI, Commentary Addressing Code of Conduct Model, Length, and Organization,
http://secureav.com/Comment-AMCC-General.pdf; and UASPC, n.3 (title).
15

The Code is founded on codifying best practices, which include professional procedures that are industry
benchmarks, or otherwise accepted as being the most correct or most effective in achieving identified
desirable effects. Nonetheless, the UASPC could become a model for standards development. See ASTM
Int’l, Form and Style for ASTM Standards, § C15.1A,
https://www.astm.org/FormStyle_for_ASTM_STDS.html#definitions (defining “standard practice” as “an
accepted procedure for the performance of one or more operations or functions.”).
16

See ACI, Commentary to the Title, http://secureav.com/Comment-AMCC-Title.pdf.

17

“SRPs” are distinct from ICAO's Standards and Recommended Practices (“SARPs”). See www.ICAO.int.

18

“Integrating the responsibility for management and oversight of all sUAS operations in a company under
a flight department can provide improved compliance, operational safety and effectiveness,
standardization, economies of scale and collaborative benefit.” NBAA, Integrated Operational Management
and Oversight for sUAS (May 13, 2016), https://www.nbaa.org/ops/uas/integrated-operationalmanagement-and-oversight-for-suas/NBAA-Resource-Integrated-Operational-Management-and-Oversightfor-sUAS.pdf.
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19

In addition, the UASPC may be helpful to civil aviation authorities for their development of associated
practices.
20

As noted above, the FAA has not developed or adopted standards for the qualification and certification of
UAS pilot instructors. Consequently, the UASPC emphasizes establishing a meaningful self-training program,
aided by experienced UAS pilots or other knowledgeable mentors. See UASPC, § III. Training and
Proficiency. The individual UAS pilot retains responsibility for assessing their own skill, comfort level, and
personal minimums associated with the UAS platform, mission, and operational environment, and should
adapt their training plan appropriately. Cf., ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 8.5 (presenting general prerequisites
and requirements for instructors).
21

As is often the case with an emergent technology, unmanned aircraft are likely to pose new ethical and
regulatory challenges. “As always, we must welcome innovation and the benefits it brings us. But, we must
also remain committed to sustainable development, taking into account issues of inequality, human dignity,
and inclusiveness.” Nayef Al-Rodhan, Scientific American (Mar. 13, 2015),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-many-ethical-implications-of-emerging-technologies/
(addressing ethical implications of emerging technologies); and Alisa M. Dolan, et al., Integration of Drones
into Domestic Airspace: Selected Legal Issues, Rpt. 7-5700, Cong. Research Service (Apr. 4, 2013), available
at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42940.pdf. Ethical behavior underlies and is integrated into the UASPC.
See, e.g., UASPC, § VII.e & n.133 (Autonomous Systems & Ethical Considerations).
22

See ACI, Commentary to AMCC 1.a – General Responsibilities; UASPC, n.8 (addressing safety risk
management); FAA Adm’r Michael Huerta, Preface to FAA, Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap, p. i (Nov. 7, 2013),
https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/uas_roadmap_2013.pdf (“The FAA is committed to the safe and efficient
integration of UAS into the NAS. However, as safety is our top priority, UAS integration must be
accomplished without reducing existing capacity, decreasing safety, impacting current operators, or placing
other airspace users or persons and property on the ground at increased risk.”) (emphasis added). Cf.,
JARUS, JARUS OPS, Recommendations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), Operations for Category A and
B, JAR_DEL_WG2_D.03, Art. 4–Principles for UA operations, ❡ 1 (Oct. 7, 2017), available at
http://apant.pt/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/jar_doc_14_draft_d3_ops_cat_a_extcons_251017.pdf (“The
operator of a UA shall be responsible for its safe operation.”); Australian Ass’n for Unmanned Systems, Code
of Conduct, v1.0 (Aug 19, 2016),
http://aaus.org.au/resources/Documents/Documents/AAUS%20Code%20of%20Conduct.pdf (“The safety
of your operations is paramount to any other concern.”); Gur Kimchi, VP, Amazon Prime Air, Presentation at
ICAO, DRONE ENABLE 2017, Montréal (Sept. 22, 2017) (“The number one priority for our service is safety.”);
ICAO, Manual on RPAS, Ch. 1, § 10.1.5 (“[Unmanned aircraft] will have to be as safe as, or safer than,
present manned operations.”); and Email from Michael Gadd, UK (Jan. 21, 2018) (urging “tests of
reasonableness”).
Consider the following perspective from Don Arendt, Ph.D., FAA (Dec. 2016):
It is common to say that safety is the top priority but this, arguably, may not be realistic. It
could, at its extremes, imply that we can achieve absolute safety, which can only be
achieved by eliminating the activity in which risk is incurred. We take on (or accept) risk
when we engage in these activities, but this needs to be done in a context of effectively
managing those risks - operating safely. People, particularly those who are innovators,
don't enter into their enterprises to "be safe." Safety is one of the three things, mission,
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money, and safety, that have to be balanced if we are to accomplish anything.
Achievement necessitates survival in all three areas. Risk has to be managed by
understanding the boundaries that have to be observed to stay in balance. We have to be
sure that people recognize these margins and not dismiss them with what can easily
become empty rhetoric. While it’s good rhetoric to place a high, if not the highest priority
on safety, I caution that it’s easy to compartmentalize safety into its own domain and lose
the fact that risks mostly exist as byproducts of operations – the real purpose(s) behind
what we’re doing. (emphasis added).
Drafting Considerations: Implementers may prefer alternative formulation of UASPC §1.a, (”make safety a
top priority”) such as: “make safety the top priority”, “make safety of operations the highest priority”, or
“make risk management the priority”.
23

Adherence to good airmanship and aeronautical decision-making practices is necessary to ensuring safe
flight operations. See ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 8.4.36 (“. . . demonstrate the ability to: d) exercise good
judgement and airmanship”). “The remote pilot in command is directly responsible for and is the final
authority as to the operation of the small unmanned aircraft system.” 14 C.F.R. § 107.19(b).
24

“Building upon the foundation of conventional decision-making, ADM enhances the process to decrease
the probability of human error and increase the probability of a safe flight. ADM provides a structured,
systematic approach to analyzing changes that occur during a flight and how these changes might affect the
safe outcome of a flight.” FAA, Remote Pilot – Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Study Guide, FAA-G-808222 (2016), Ch. 10, p. 52,
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/media/remote_pilot_study_guide.
pdf. See FAA, Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, FAA-H-8030-25B, Ch. 2, Aeronautical DecisionMaking, available at
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/phak/media/04_phak_ch2.pdf;
FAA, Aeronautical Decision Making, FAA-P-8740-69, AFS-8 (2008), available at
https://www.faasafety.gov/files/gslac/library/documents/2011/Aug/56413/FAA%20P-874069%20Aeronautical%20Decision%20Making%20[hi-res]%20branded.pdf (pamphlet addressing ADM); and
FAA, The Art of Aeronautical Decision-Making, available at
https://www.faasafety.gov/files/gslac/courses/content/28/216/The%20Art%20of%20Aeronautical%20Deci
sion.pdf (a brief ADM course).
25

See Michael Huerta, Fmr. FAA Adm’r, Speech at AirVenture, Oshkosh, WI, EAA AirVenture (July 28, 2016),
available at https://www.faa.gov/news/speeches/news_story.cfm?newsId=20575. (“[T]here’s a lot more to
flying than just knowing the rules and pushing buttons. It takes good judgment. It requires discipline. And it
demands a true sense of professionalism that’s rooted in a deep, unwavering commitment to doing the
right thing.”).
26

“The goal of risk management is to proactively identify safety-related hazards and mitigate the associated
risks. Risk management is an important component of ADM.” FAA, Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical
Knowledge, FAA-H-8030-25B, Ch. 2, p. 3.
“Aircraft operating without a pilot on board present a wide array of hazards to the civil aviation system.
These hazards must be identified and the safety risks mitigated, just as with introduction of an airspace
redesign, new equipment, or procedures.” ICAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, ICAO Cir. 328, § 2.17 (2011),
https://www.icao.int/Meetings/UAS/Documents/Circular%20328_en.pdf.
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See generally R. A. Clothier, et al., Safety risk management of Unmanned Aircraft Systems; Handbook of
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Netherlands: Springer Science (2014), (fee)
http://www.springer.com/us/book/9789048197064#otherversion=9789048197088 (providing in-depth
discussion of risk management applicable to UAS); FAA, Advisory Circular, AC 107-2, App. A., RIsk
Assessment Tools (June 21, 2016), https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/AC_107-2_AFS-1_Signed.pdf; ASTM
Int’l, F3178, Standard Practice for Operational Risk Assessment of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS),
available (fee) at https://www.astm.org/COMMITTEE/F38.htm. Cf., Sec’y of the Air Force, Air Force
Instruction 90-802, Risk Management (May 15, 2017), available at http://static.epublishing.af.mil/production/1/af_se/publication/afi90-802/afi90-802.pdf (excising references to
operational risk management and replacing with risk management “to emphasize the important of hazard
and risk mitigation and management in all aspects of the [Air Force], not just Operations.”). See also JARUS
guidelines on Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA), Doc. JAR-DEL-WG6-D.04 (June 26, 2017),
available at http://rpas-regulations.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/170626_JARUS_SpecificOperations-Risk-Assessment_SORA_v1.0.pdf.
27

Situational Awareness - “Maintaining situational awareness requires an understanding of the relative
significance of all flight related factors and their future impact on the flight. When a pilot understands what
is going on and has an overview of the total operation, he or she is not fixated on one perceived significant
factor. Not only is it important for a pilot to know the aircraft’s geographical location, it is also important he
or she understand what is happening.” FAA, Aeronautical Decision-Making and Judgement, Remote Pilot –
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Study Guide, FAA-G-8082-22 (2016) Ch. 10, p. 63. See FAA, Pilot’s
Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, FAA-H-8030-25B, Ch. 2-24, Aeronautical Decision-Making,
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/phak/, and FAA, Airplane Flying
Handbook, FAA-H-8083-3B (2016), Ch. 2-11.
The reader will note that we have adopted the US FAA’s standard usage of the phrase “situational
awareness,” as opposed to “situation awareness”. Cf., Mica R. Endsley, Toward a Theory of Situation
Awareness in Dynamic Systems, Human Factors, vol. 37(1), pp. 32-64 (1995), available at
https://doi.org/10.1518/001872095779049543.
Perceptual Illusions - “The pilot of an RPAS may be exposed to a range of perceptual illusions and conflicts
that do not occur in conventional aviation [for example:]
Control-consequence incompatibility. [In VLOS, where] the track of the aircraft is not aligned with
the pilot’s point of view, for example, if the aircraft is flying towards a visual pilot, or a map display
is not aligned with track up, then control inputs may result in the aircraft turning in a manner that
is inconsistent with the pilot’s point of view.
Depth cues. . . . Camera views can produce misleading depth cues, some of which may be related
to the lack of binocular cues. . . .
Camera direction. If a moveable camera located on board an RPA [Remotely Piloted Aircraft] is not
aligned as expected by the pilot, there may be an illusion of yaw, disorientation or other undesired
aircraft state.”
R. Jay Shively, NASA Ames Research Center, et al., Human Performance Considerations for Remotely Piloted
Aircraft Systems (RPAS), ICAO, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Panel (RPASP), Second Mtg. (RPASP/2),
Montréal (June 15-19, 2015), § 2.2.2, pp. 18-19, available at
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20150011435.pdf.
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28

See M. W. McFarland, The papers of Wilbur and Orville Wright, including the Chanute-Wright Papers:
1899-1905, McGraw Hill (2000), p. 62 (“The history of past investigation demonstrates that greater
prudence is needed rather than greater skill.” Wilbur Wright, 1901). Cf., Fischer v. S/Y Neraida, 508 F.3d 586
(11th Cir. 2007), available at https://www.leagle.com/decision/20071094508f3d58611092 (in maritime
practice, holding vessel owners to a “prudent seamanship” standard) (emphasis added).
29

See ACI, Commentary to AMCC 1.f – General Responsibilities (Nov. 14, 2005),
http://www.secureav.com/Comment-AMCC-I.f-General-Responsibilities.pdf (addressing professionalism);
and Fmr. FAA Adm’r Randy Babbitt, Statement before the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure,
Subcomm. on Aviation, An Update: The FAA’s Call to Action on Airline Safety and Pilot Training (Feb. 4,
2010), https://www.transportation.gov/content/update-faa%E2%80%99s-call-action-airline-safety-andpilot-training (“Professionalism is not something we can regulate . . . it is something we can encourage and
urge pilots and flight crews to aspire to.”).
30

No such code can ever create an exhaustive list of what it takes to be healthy, and the same holds for
ethics. The character of both morality and health is organic. And, if someone seeking a reference for
either encounters a list of behaviors, they might be misled into taking a “checklist” approach to a
matter that no checklist can describe. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. How to think and
the objects of thought occupy radically distinct categories. This issue pervades education, professional
development, strategy . . . maybe most fields concerned with humanity.

Email from Bill Rhodes, PhD., PEB Member, ACI (Oct. 27, 2017). Checklists are considered in UASPC, n.76.
“Ethics and integrity aren’t just buzzwords--they are an integral part of our culture.” NBAA, Business
Aviation Mgt. Comm., Promoting Ethics & Integrity, Business Aviation Insider (Sept./Oct. 2017),
https://www.nbaa.org/admin/leadership/promoting-ethics-and-integrity-in-business-aviation.php. See
Australian Association for Unmanned Systems, Code of Conduct,
http://aaus.org.au/resources/Documents/Documents/AAUS%20Code%20of%20Conduct.pdf
(“[D]emonstrate: The principles of justice, dignity, humanity, equanimity and moral balance while carrying
out an assignment under the UIS Program."); R. I. Baron, Do the right thing, Flight Safety Foundation (2011),
https://flightsafety.org/asw-article/do-the-right-thing/; and C. White, How is a pilot ‘professional’? No to
backpacks, yes to integrity., Forbes (2010), https://www.forbes.com/sites/wheelsup/2010/06/18/how-is-apilot-professional-no-to-backpacks-yes-to-integrity/#12e0141b130c.
31

See UASPC, n.82 (addressing state/local vs. Federal rules, and federalism). See generally, FAA, Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) Regulations & Policies, https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/uas_regulations_policy/.
Also, consider the implications of the FAA’s compliance philosophy. “Regulatory compliance represents the
minimum standards by which an operator can achieve a minimal degree of safety.” According to the FAA,
“Traditional oversight relies on the assumption that if an airman/organization is fully compliant with the
applicable regulatory requirements, then an adequate level of safety is achieved. However, the aviation
environment has reached a level of complexity where further safety improvements cannot be achieved by
simple compliance with prescriptive rules.” FAA, FSIMS, 8900.1 Chg 422, 14-1-1-5B,
http://fsims.faa.gov/PICResults.aspx?mode=EBookContents&restricttocategory=all~menu (describing
evolution of the FAA’s compliance philosophy).
There is an important trend towards safety risk management oversight based upon data-driven,
“performance-based” metrics, including within design standards. For example, 14 CFR Part 107 is widely
steeped in performance-based requirements. And, use of performance-based metrics in rule-making
transcend the FAA. Indeed, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget has stated that focusing on
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“outcomes rather than specifying the means to those ends . . . . are generally superior . . .”, OMB, Circular
A-4 (Sept. 7, 2013), available at
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/OMB%20Circular%20No.%20A-4.pdf (emphasis
added); and FAA, FSIMS, 8900.1 CHG 422 (Dec. 4, 2016), Ch. 14-1-1-7, Compliance Philosophy,
http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/8900.1/v14%20compliance%20&%20enforcement/chapter%2001/14_001_001.
htm (considering that “[t]he greatest systemic safety risk is not from a specific operational event or its
outcome, but rather from an airman or organization’s unwillingness or inability to comply with safety
standards and, most importantly, operating contrary to the core principles of Safety Risk Management
(SRM)”).
32

See generally FAA, Safety Management System (SMS), https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sms/;
ICAO, Manual on RPAS, Ch. 7.4.1 (requirement to implement a SMS); and ICAO, Safety Management
Manual, Doc. 9859, AN/474, ch. 5 (3rd ed. 2013),
https://www.icao.int/safety/SafetyManagement/Documents/Doc.9859.3rd%20Edition.alltext.en.pdf(Safety
Management Systems).
33

Visual Observers - Many organizations and UAS standards recommend or mandate use of a visual
observers. The effectiveness of visual observers is dependent on many factors, including: training and
competence, communication delays, simultaneous or failed communications from multiple visual
observers, or failure to “determine the optimum collision avoidance manoeuvre.” ICAO, Manual on RPAS, §
9.5.6. See Public Safety Aviation Accreditation Comm., Standards for Small Unmanned Aircraft System
(sUAS) Programs (2017), Draft Ver. June 5, 2017, § 02.02.03 (Min. Crew Composition for UAS Ops), available
at http://alea.org/images/Standards/tab_16_c_-_UAS_Stds_Draft___6-5-17.pdf (requiring preflight brief
underscoring effective communications between crew members, “clear definition of launch and recovery
location,” and scanning for aircraft); Kevin Williams, et al., A Review of Research Related to Unmanned
Aircraft System Visual Observers, DOT/FAA/AM-14/9 (Oct. 2014),
https://www.faa.gov/data_research/research/med_humanfacs/oamtechreports/2010s/media/201409.pdf;
and Arthur C. Poe, III, A model for visual detection of aircraft by ground observers, Tech Report: RD75-30,
Nat’l Tech. Info. Service (1974), available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a017599.pdf. Note that
visual observers may not apply to BVLOS operations.
Cf., S. M. Vance & R. J. Wallace, et al., Detecting and assessing collision potential of aircraft and small
unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) by visual observers, IAAA, vol. 4(4) (2017), available at
https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2017.1188 (“The use of visual observers is one of many tools available to
remote pilots to comply with aviation regulations and ensure safety of flight. [Recognize] the important
human performance limitations associated with visual observer performance . . . . and be wary of relying
solely on this fallible modality of hazard detection.”).
First-Person View (FPV) - While FPV devices are commonly used for flying some UAS (such as for drone
racing activities), they do not satisfy the requirements of 14 C.F.R. § 107.31(a), Visual Line of Sight Aircraft
Operation. The FAA has not addressed FPV usage under 14 C.F.R. Part 107, however, 14 C.F.R. Part 101 may
support such use provided such operations are conducted under the auspices of programming of a national
community-based organization. If operating under FPV, it is highly recommended to use a visual observer to
assist in maintaining situational awareness.
34

A hazardous payload may increase risks associated with UAS operation . . . . Wherever there are shared
resources or interactions between the payload and the air vehicle, there is a need to analyze and manage
this sharing of resources to ensure that all hazards have been mitigated.” Kelly J. Hayhurst, et al.,
Unmanned aircraft hazards and their implications for regulation, pp. 5B1-1, -12, Proc. of the 25th Digital
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Avionics Sys. Conf. (2006), available at https://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/people/jmm/5B1_201hayhu.pdf.
Hazardous payloads may also include the carriage of hazardous materials, or HAZMAT prohibited by 14
C.F.R. § 107.36 (“A small unmanned aircraft may not carry hazardous material. [T]he term hazardous
material is defined in 49 C.F.R. 171.8.”).
35

FAA, UAS Facility Maps, available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/request_waiver/uas_facility_maps/ (“the
maps are for “airspace authorizations and waivers in controlled airspace”—not for navigation). See FAA
ATO, Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC) Concept of Operations, DRAFT v0.93
(Feb. 14, 2017), available at https://faaco.faa.gov/index.cfm/attachment/download/75780 (describing the
limitations of LAANC utilizing UAS Facility Maps).
The UAS Facility Maps are designed to identify permissible altitudes (above ground level)
at which UAS, operating under the Small UAS Rule (14 C.F.R. § 107), can be authorized to
fly within the surface areas of controlled airspace. These altitude parameters, provided
by the respective air traffic control facilities, are criteria used to evaluate airspace
authorization requests (14 C.F.R. § 107.41), submitted via FAA.GOV/UAS. Airspace
authorization requests for altitudes in excess of the predetermined map parameters will
require a lengthy coordination process. This dataset will be continually updated and
expanded to include UAS Facility Maps for all controlled airspace by Fall 2017. This map
is not updated in real time. Neither the map nor the information provided herein is
guaranteed to be current or accurate. Reliance on this map constitutes neither FAA
authorization to operate nor evidence of compliance with applicable aviation regulations
in or during enforcement proceedings before the National Transportation Safety Board
or any other forum.
FAA, UAS Facility Map Data: Description, http://uas-faa.opendata.arcgis.com/.
36

Confirm that an “emergency response plan is coordinated with the emergency response plan of those
organizations with which it would interface.” ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 7.7.1. Develop and maintain a
current emergency/contingency checklist and an emergency contact list. See Global Aerospace, et al.,
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: An Introductory Guide to Emergency Response (2016), available at
http://ctsaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/UAS-Emergency-ResponseGuide_GA.55_Watermarked.pdf (considerations for UAS emergency response planning). Consider unique
response requirements for each type of UAS operation.
37

Be prepared for flight termination, including the loss/destruction of the UAS, and understand procedures
to mitigate loss or injury to life and damage to property. See flight termination, and lost link, UASPC, App. 2,
Definitions.
38

See FAA, Advisory Circular, AC 107-2, Subj. Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS), Ch. B.2., sUAS
Loading and Its Effects on Performance (June 21, 2016),
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_107-2.pdf; Unmanned Systems
Canada, Small RPAS Best Practices for BVLOS, v1.1, App. 2, § 5XX.3.5, p. 43 (Oct. 2016),
https://www.unmannedsystems.ca/download/usc-small-rpas-bvlos-best-practices/ (“A centre of gravity
envelope, where the RPA remains safely controllable, shall be established. The RPA centre of gravity,
including all modifications, consumables, configurations and payloads, shall remain within this envelope
during flight."); and FAA, Remote Pilot - Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Airman Certification Standards,
FAA-S-ACS-10, Task A. Loading and Performance, p. 10 (July 2016),
https://www.faa.gov/training_testing/testing/acs/media/uas_acs.pdf.
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39

UAS pilots should perform a brief stability and controllability test immediately after launch to ensure the
craft appropriately responds as expected to operator inputs, flight controllability is not adversely affected
by UAS payloads or weight distribution loading, and the craft demonstrates characteristics of positive static
and dynamic stability. See FAA, Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, FAA-H-80-8335B, pp. 5-14,15
(2016), https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/phak/. For non-standard
payloads, uncertain weight and balance, or where UAS controllability is in question, recognize the enhanced
need for such a test. Cf., FAA, ORDER 8130.34D, SUBJ. Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems and Optionally Piloted Aircraft, p. 3-2(4)(f) (Sept. 8, 2017), available at
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_Order_8130.34D.pdf (“. . . . the applicant must
demonstrate control link and control station [and other associated elements] functionality by performing
procedures such as turning on/off the aircraft lights, deflecting flight controls, and/ or conducting an engine
run.”).
40

Consider the human factors implications of the belief harbored by some manned aircraft pilots that
manned certification/training/experience alone is adequate for UAS operations.
41

The UAS pilot may make aeronautical decisions that increase risk to other NAS users, but is unlikely to
share in the actual risk like manned pilots. That is, the UAS pilot’s decisions are influenced by being “safe,
on the ground” rather than assuming the personal risks of flight. Indeed, training standards in development
recognize the absence of the UAS pilot’s “shared fate” with the UAS. See ASTM Int’l, Comm. F38,
https://www.astm.org/COMMITTEE/F38.htm.
42

See K. W. Williams, et al., A review of research related to unmanned aircraft system visual observers, FAA,
Office of Aerospace Medicine Report: DOT/FAA/AM-14/9, p. 5 (Oct. 2014),
https://www.faa.gov/data_research/research/med_humanfacs/oamtechreports/2010s/media/201409.pdf
(citing, e.g., Crognale: “participants were relatively poor at judging both distance and altitude of the UA”).
Ascertaining altitude from the ground may require visual slant angle estimation which is inherently
inaccurate. See Marcus Johnson, et al., Flight Test Evaluation of a Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic
Management (UTM) Concept for Multiple Beyond-Visual-Line-of-Sight Operations, NASA Ames, Twelfth
USA/Europe Air Traffic Mgt. Research and Devel. Seminar (ATM2017), available at
https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/docs/2017-Johnson_12th_ATM2017-Seminar.pdf (“Measurement and reporting
of vehicle altitude was not consistent among airspace users.”); S. M. Vance & Ryan J. Wallace, et al.,
Detecting and Assessing Collision Potential of Aircraft and Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) by
Visual Observers (2017), Int’l J. of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, vol. 4(4), p. 14, available at
https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2017.1188 (Discerning altitude differences and collision potential was
difficult, in part because of size differential between manned aircraft and sUAS platforms.); and Igor Dolgov,
Moving towards Unmanned Aircraft System Integration into the National Airspace System: Evaluating Visual
Observers’ Imminent Collision Anticipation during Day, Dusk, and Night sUAS Operations, Int’l J. of Aviation
Sciences, vol. 1(1), pp. 41-56 (2016), https://www.ijas.us/index.php/issues/current-issues/issue-i-volume1/articles/moving-towards-unmanned-aircraft-systems-integration-into-the-national-airspace-systemevaluating-visual-observers-imminent-collision-anticipation-during-day-dusk-and-night-suas-operationsigor-dolgov.
43

Threat and Error Management (TEM) - See FAA Advisory Circular, AC 120-9, Subj. Line Operations Safety
Audits, Appendix 1, Threat and Error Management (Apr. 26, 2006),
https://www.faa.gov/documentlibrary/media/advisory_circular/ac_120-90.pdf; D. Maurino, Threat and
Error Management, Canadian Aviation Safety Seminar (CASS), Vancouver, B.C. (Apr. 18-20, 2005), available
at
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https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/losa/publications/media/maurino_(2005)_tem.pdf
(“Flight crews must, as part of the normal discharge of their operational duties, employ countermeasures to
keep threats, errors and undesired aircraft states from reducing margins of safety in flight operations.”);
and European Helicopter Safety Team (EHEST), The Principles of Threat and Error Management (TEM) for
Helicopter Pilots, Instructors and Training Organisations, HE8,
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/HE8.pdf (tutorial on TEM principles and training for
helicopter operations providing general aid to understanding TEM fundamentals).
44

Application of Threat & Error Management in UAS Operations - Voluntary standards are in development
within ASTM Int’l, Comm. F38 that recognize and advance CRM and TEM principles using skill sets that
include planning, decision-making, leadership and effectiveness, situation awareness, communications,
monitor/cross-check, workload management, automation management, and general aeronautical decision
making.
45

Crew Resource Management (CRM) - See FAA, Advisory Circular, AC 107-2, Subj. Small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (sUAS) (June 21, 2016),
]https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_107-2.pdf (“CRM is a component of
ADM, where the pilot of sUAS makes effective use of all available resources: human resources, hardware,
and information.”), and FAA, Advisory Circular, AC 120-51E, Subj. Crew Resource Management Training
(2004), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC120-51e.pdf.
46

Power Reserve - The original proposal for 14 C.F.R. Part 107 included a requirement that the remote pilot
ensure that the sUAS had sufficient power to operate for its intended operational time plus an additional
five-minute reserve. In the Final Rule, however, “the FAA retains the requirement that the small UAS has
enough power to operate for its intended operational time, but has eliminated the additional five minute
requirement. . . . The FAA concurs with commenters who suggest that a small UAS should have enough
power to operate for its intended operational time and land safely. . . . As such, a requirement for an
additional five minutes of power is unnecessary.” Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,155 (June 28, 2016) (amending 14 C.F.R. Part 107),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-06-28/pdf/2016-15079.pdf. Cf., Unmanned Systems Canada,
Small RPAS Best Practices for BVLOS, v1.1, § 4.2, p. 22 (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://www.unmannedsystems.ca/download/usc-small-rpas-bvlos-best-practices/ (recommending “a 15%
of flight time (up to 30 minutes) fuel/energy reserve be planned for VFR BVLOS operations.”).
Temperature Effect on Lithium-Ion Batteries - For electric aircraft, cold temperatures may dramatically
diminish battery capacity. See, e.g., Sony, Lithium Ion Rechargeable Batteries Technical Handbook, Fig. 7, p.
21 (undated), available at
http://dlnmh9ip6v2uc.cloudfront.net/datasheets/Prototyping/Lithium%20Ion%20Battery%20MSDS.pdf
(presenting discharge curve demonstrating material reduction of power as a function of decreasing
temperatures).
47

See FAA, FSIMS 8900.1, Vol. 16, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, § 2A,
http://fsims.faa.gov/PICDetail.aspx?docId=8900.1,Vol.16,Ch2,Sec2 (“require[ment] to establish
maintenance and inspection criteria that support safe operations” absent an airworthiness certification
requirement under Part 107). See UASPC, n.76 (addressing checklists), and UASPC, n.229 (addressing
airworthiness and conditions for safe operation).
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48

See ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 10.2.2 (“For a single hazard, two risk analyses may be needed, one for
manned aircraft and one for unmanned aircraft. One should not assume that the hazard, the severity of the
risk or the mitigation strategies will be the same.”). See UASPC, n. 26 (on risk management).
49

See UASPC n.204 (addressing well clear regarding aircraft-to-aircraft separation and DAA). The FAA
expects that most remote PICs will avoid operating in the vicinity of airports because their aircraft generally
do not require airport infrastructure.
Drafting Considerations: "well clear” has many non-aircraft usages in aviation. See, e.g., FAA, Advisory
Circular, AC 90-66A, Subj. Recommended Standards Traffic Patterns for Aeronautical Operations at Airports
without Operating Control Towers, § 9.2.1 (Aug. 26, 1993),
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/docume
ntID/23093 (a "point well clear of the pattern"); FAA, Pilots Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (2016), p.
14-3,
https://www.fa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/phak/media/16_phak_ch14.pdf
("Well clear of the pattern"); and many usages of "well clear" concerning obstructions, and other nonaircraft objects, such as in Chart Supplements. See, e.g., FAA, Chart Supplement, NE, Oct. 12, 2017 - Dec. 7,
2017, Troy Airport (5B7), http://aeronav.faa.gov/afd/07dec2017/ne_248_07DEC2017.pdf ("use best angle
of climb speed until well clear of residential area").
Notification - Unlike operations under 14 C.F.R. Part 101, commercial and other pilots operating under 14
C.F.R. Part 107 are not generally required to notify airports (including heliports and other types of
aerodromes). Instead, their notification and authorization responsibilities are well-defined and directed to
ATC. It may nonetheless be prudent to voluntarily provide airport authorities with such notice. As a
practical matter, ATC and airport management sometimes neither have effective information
sharing/reporting procedures nor do they necessarily coordinate safety management systems. See also
UASPC, n.35 (addressing LAANC).
50

See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 107.43, Operation in the vicinity of airports; and 14 C.F.R. § 107.41, Operation in
certain airspace. Sensitivity to operations near airports is also manifest in legislative initiatives such as the
proposed Drone Operator Safety Act of 2017, H.R.3644 - 115th Congress (2017-2018),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/housebill/3644/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22unmanned+aircraft%22%5D%7D&r=1 (prohibiting
unauthorized flight operations within a rectangular runway exclusion zone extending one sm from each end
of the runway with a ½ sm width). See also UASPC, n.35 (addressing LAANC); and UASPC, n.49 (addressing
notification).
51

The primary hazard in urban environments are operations over humans. See 14 C.F.R. § 107.39, Operation
over human beings, “No person may operate a small unmanned aircraft over a human being unless that
human being is: (a) Directly participating in the operation of the small unmanned aircraft; or (b) Located
under a covered structure or inside a stationary vehicle that can provide reasonable protection from a
falling small unmanned aircraft.”
See ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 9.5.16 (“Operations over heavily populated areas or over open air assemblies
of people may require special considerations [including]: a) altitudes for safe operations, b) uncontrolled
landings, c) obstructions, d) proximity to airports/emergency landing fields, e) local restrictions . . . and f)
the emergency termination of an RPA flight.”).
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52

See Public Safety Aviation Accreditation Comm., Standards for Small Unmanned Aircraft System (suas)
Programs, Draft Ver. 6/5/17, § 02.03.06 (Over Water Operations), available at
http://alea.org/images/Standards/tab_16_c_-_UAS_Stds_Draft___6-5-17.pdf:
Standard: If missions are routinely flown over water the UAS should be equipped for a
water recovery.
Commentary: Programs that operate over water should have the ability to safely recover
the UAS in the event that it lands in the water. As such, UAS should float or should be
equipped with external flotation equipment.
In some cases certain systems will not function effectively in some environments and RPs
need to understand those limitations and the subsequent risks they incur by proceeding.
53

See John Croft, NASA and industry tackle the next phase of drone flight, AviationWeek (Nov. 18, 2017),
http://m.aviationweek.com/aircraft-design/nasa-anomalies-drive-uas-traffic-management (“vehicle
performance degradations caused by hot and high conditions”).
54

See UASPC, n.80 (operations exceeding the standard limitations of 14 C.F.R. Part 107 that may require a
waiver per 14 C.F.R. § 107.200, Subpart D-Waivers).
55

See ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 6.8.1 (“[E]nsure that operational and emergency equipment necessary for
the intended flight are serviceable.”).
56

Consider that aeronautical sectional charts do not include man-made obstructions below 200 ft. AGL. See
FAA, FAA Aeronautical Chart User's Guide,
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/digital_products/aero_guide/. See email from Rex
Alexander, Uber (Jan. 17, 2018) (“There may be errors in the FAA Airport Master Record database and some
airports and heliport may be incorrectly located.”). Aeronautical products are generally updated on a 28- or
56-day cycle. Effective dates are listed on applicable charts and aeronautical products. Users can also
consult the FAA’s Dates of Latest Editions webpage to determine chart currency and subsequent edition
publication dates, at https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/productcatalog/doles/.
57

Remote Pilots should consult a variety of map resources to better understand the layout, topography,
obstructions, and other site hazards prior to commencing UAS operations. Such resources may include but
are not limited to Google (satellite or street view) Maps, digital terrain elevation data charts, and other
resources. See National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
https://www.nga.mil/ProductsServices/TopographicalTerrestrial/Pages/DigitalTerrainElevationData.aspx.
58

Preventing Distraction - Such practices are widely recognized as maintaining a sterile cockpit. The
concept of a sterile cockpit prohibits manned aircraft pilots from engaging in non-essential tasks or
conversation during critical phases of flight such as taxi, takeoff, climb, descent and landing, i.e., high-task
load or high-risk events. Remote pilots are also required to effectively manage similar critical, high task-load
operations and must avoid unnecessary communication or activity that could cause distractions leading to
human errors, and potentially, an incident or accident. See FAA, Order 8900.1 CHG 477, vol. 16-5-2-17, F.
Mission and Operations (Oct. 17, 2016),
http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/8900.1/v16%20unmanned%20aircraft%20systems/chapter%2005/16_005_002.
htm (“It is important to observe the . . . ‘sterile cockpit concept’”); NTSB, Safety Recommendation A–06–7
(Jan. 24, 2006),
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Pages/Collision_with_Trees_and_Crash_Short_of_the_Runway_Corpo
rate_Airlines_Flight_5966_British_Aerospace_BAE-J3201_N875JX_Kirks.aspx (importance of strict
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compliance with the sterile flight deck rule); 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.542, 135.100 (sterile cockpit rule for
commercial manned aircraft); and S. A. Shappell, et al., The Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System--HFACS, DOT/FAA/AM-00/7 (2000), available at
https://www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_documents/humanfactors_classAnly.pdf (categorizing relevant
“Adverse Mental States” including loss of situational awareness, task fixation, distraction, and mental
fatigue).
UAS Application - Public Safety Aviation Accreditation Comm., Standards for Small Unmanned Aircraft
System (sUAS) Programs (2017), Draft ver. June 5, 2017, § 02.02.04, Crew Coordination and
Communications, available at http://alea.org/images/Standards/tab_16_c_-_UAS_Stds_Draft___6-5-17.pdf
(urging “the aviation equivalent of a ‘sterile cockpit’ during launch and recovery where non-essential
communications are prohibited to avoid distracting the crew.” And, UAS “operator procedures must not
allow remote flight crew members to perform any activities during critical phases of flight other than those
required for the safe operation of the [UAS].”); ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 6.2.5; ICAO, Doc 9870, Manual on
the Prevention of Runway Incursions, AN/463 (2007),
http://cfapp.icao.int/fsix/_Library/Runway%20Incursion%20Manual-final_full_fsix.pdf (promoting a “sterile
flight deck”); and Sec. of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 11-2MQ-1&9, vol. 3 (Nov. 1, 2012), available at
https://www.google.com/url?q=http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3/publication/afi112mq-1%269v3/afi11-2mq1%269v3.pdf&sa=D&ust=1506525802382000&usg=AFQjCNEzlHMF3FDcIymK2czccZLP_9yUxA (maintaining
sterile cockpit regarding ground control station).
59

Conspicuity - See ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 9.5.4 (VLOS operation conspicuity “dependent on their colour,
size, speed, lighting, etc.”); and J. M. Loffi, et al., Seeing the threat: Pilot visual detection of small unmanned
aircraft systems in visual meteorological conditions, Int’l J. of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, vol. 3.3,
p. 19 (2016), available at http://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol3/iss3/13/ (While not specifically studied
during the experiment, 80% of the participants indicated that the white (contrasting) color of the UAS
platforms aided in their detection. Conversely, 10% of the participants found the white color made the UAS
more difficult to spot.).
Night Vision - “Bright lighting and strobes may impair vision and control of the aircraft in low lighting
conditions. Before flight, limit use of strobes and other bright lights that may impair your night vision.”
Interview with Brandon Montellato, DJI (Palo Alto, Dec. 2, 2017). See FAA, Airplane Flying Handbook, FAAH-8083-3B, ch. 10 (2016),
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/airplane_handbook/media/12_afh
_ch10.pdf (addressing night vision); and 14 CFR § 107.29(b), Daylight operation (permitting operations
during civil twilight; and permitting the RP to “reduce the intensity of the anti-collision lighting if . . . in the
interest of safety”); and a standard inclusion in night-flight waivers - FAA, Waiver Safety Explanation
Guidelines for Part 107 Waiver Applications,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/request_waiver/waiver_safety_explanation_guidelines/.
60

See-and-Avoid - Recognize that even manned aircraft can be very challenging to see. See ICAO, Manual
on RPAS, § 10-3-1 (“If a very small RPA is to be integrated into non-segregated airspace, it is doubtful that it
will be visible to manned aircraft.“), § 14-3-1 (“Owing to the relatively small size and low conspicuity of
some [UAS], it may be difficult for pilots of manned aircraft and other remote pilots to visually acquire the
[UAS].”); NTSB, Safety Alert, No. SA-058 (Nov. 2016), https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safetyalerts/Pages/default.aspx (“[T]he inherent limitations of this [see-and-avoid] concept, including human
limitations, environmental conditions, aircraft blind spots, and operational distractions, leave even the most
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diligent pilot vulnerable to the threat of a midair collision with an unseen aircraft.”); and UASPC, § VI. Use of
Technology (addressing detect and avoid technology).
See generally ACI, Flight Safety in the Drone Age, v1.0, n.15, http://www.secureav.com/DroneAgeTechPaper-v1.0.pdf (highlighting challenges associated with manned aircraft using see and avoid
procedures for UAS detection and evasion):
a.

Too Small to See: Manned aircraft are typically at least an order of magnitude bigger than
many small drones, and small drones cannot effectively be seen by pilots. As an analogy,
consider the extent of helicopter wire-strikes which occur with unacceptable frequency even
where there are multiple observers on-board.

b.

Half the Eyes: As a practical matter, see-and-avoid for small drones has the benefit of only half
the eyes watching effectively for other aircraft (that is, only the drone operator or observer,
not the manned pilot can see-and-avoid). This arguably might make it only half as effective.

c.

Degraded Visual Environments: Drone operator see-and-avoid is handicapped by degraded
visual environments, obstacles, varying altitudes (between drone and operator), and slopes
that may reduce the ability to see approaching aircraft.

d.

Reduced Safety Margins: The ability of drone operators to see-and-avoid other traffic
decreases with distance between operator and drone.

e.

Areas of Reduced Buffer: There is a safety gap beyond the extreme edge of line-of-sight
operation, precluding effectiveness of see-and-avoid.

61

Drafting Considerations: The term “mission” is used throughout the UASPC to denote flight operations
performed with a specific operational objective or purpose. This usage is not necessarily synonymous with
its recognized use in a military context.
Collision Risks - See David Arterburn, et al., FAA study Final Report for the FAA UAS COE Task 4A: UAS
Ground Collision Severity Evaluation, Rev. 2, p. 145 (2017), available at http://pr.cirlot.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/assure_a4_final_report_uas_ground_collisionseverity_evaluation_rev_2_20170428_final.pdf (presenting conclusions); and Military Avi Auth., BALPA, UK
DoT, Small Remotely Piloted Aircraft systems (drones) Mid-Air Collision Study (2016), p. 5,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/drones-and-manned-aircraft-collisions-test-results
(asserting “drone components used can cause significantly more damage than birds of equivalent masses at
speeds lower than required to meet birdstrike certification standards”).
62

Recognize that not all manned aircraft operate above 500 AGL. Even below 500 AGL, helicopters,
agricultural applicators and other manned aircraft operate frequently—both in the airport environment and
beyond. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(d), Minimum safe altitudes: General (helicopters, powered parachutes, and
weight-shift-control aircraft “may be operated at less than the minimums prescribed [altitude]”). See Keith
C. Heidorn, Winds of the City (2005), http://www.islandnet.com/~see/weather/elements/citywind.htm
(urban canyon winds).
63

See FAA, Risk Management Handbook, FAA-H-8083-2, Ch. 3, p. 3-3, Identifying Hazards and Mitigating
Risk (2009, 2016),
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/media/risk_management_hb_cha
nge_1.pdf; and 14 C.F.R. § 91.17, Alcohol or drugs.
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See FAA, Best Practices for Mentoring in Aviation Education, v.1.2 (2016),
https://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/media/mentoring_best_practices.pdf. Emergency scenarios
that are recommended for practice include: control surface failures, landing gear failures, engine failure for
rotorcraft and fixed-wing, and loss of VLOS.
65

Radio Communication - E.g., ERAU UAS Flight Operations require the operator to monitor air traffic with
a hand-held VHF radio and to be able to make calls to notify manned aircraft in proximity to the UAS in an
emergency. Conversation with Scott Burgess, PhD., ERAU (San Jose, CA, Oct. 3, 2017). See Marcus Johnson,
et al., Flight Test Evaluation of a Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management (UTM) Concept for
Multiple Beyond-Visual-Line-of-Sight Operations, NASA Ames, Twelfth USA/Europe Air Traffic Mgt. Research
and Development Seminar (ATM2017), available at https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/docs/2017Johnson_12th_ATM2017-Seminar.pdf (“the ability to communicate with other operators during off-nominal
conditions would greatly improve an operator’s ability to react to hazardous conditions caused by other
users of the airspace”); FAA, Small Unmanned Aircraft System Study Guide (FAA-G-8082-22), Ch. 7, Radio
Communications Procedures, pp. 39-42 (Aug. 2016),
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/media/remote_pilot_study_guide.
pdf (addressing traffic advisories). See also ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 12.4, Voice and Data To/From the RPS
Without A Relay Via the RPA (addressing both VHF and telephonic communications with ATC), § 12.5,
Specific Communication Requirements for Operations in VLOS, and § 12.5 (implications of non-standard
communication methods on the overall traffic situation).
66

“A remote pilot is not expected to communicate with other aircraft in the vicinity of an airport, and
should not do so unless there is an emergency situation.” FAA, Remote Pilot - Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Study Guide (2016), FAA-G-8082-22, p. 42,
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/media/remote_pilot_study_guide.
pdf. But see, 47 C.F.R. § 87.43, Operation during emergency, https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/textidx?SID=f587a3bf77b94dcc8f18c5714ac4367e&mc=true&node=se47.5.87_143&rgn=div8 (“A station may
be used for emergency communications in a manner other than that specified in the station license or in
the operating rules when normal communication facilities are disrupted.”); and 14 C.F.R. § 107.21
(specifying that the remote pilot may deviate from regulations in an in-flight emergency requiring
immediate action).
Remote pilots who wish to transmit on an aviation frequency must hold an FCC ground station
authorization in accordance with 14 C.F.R. Part 87 (radio station licensure for aviation services). “Ground
station authorizations are usually only issued to aviation service organizations located on airports,
businesses engaged in pilot training, aircraft manufacturers, or persons engaged in chase activities related
to soaring and ballooning.” www.fcc.gov/wireless/bureau-divisions/mobility-division/aviation-radioservices/ground-stations.
67

A distance that is within the formal airport environment, restricted by Part 107, that may create an
unsafe condition, or that is otherwise imprudent.
68

See FAA, Chart Supplements Basic Search,
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/digital_products/dafd/search/. Consider that many
private airports and heliports (such as hospitals) may not be listed in the Chart Supplements.
69

See Kathy Yodice, Esq., Legal Briefing, AOPA (July 5, 2004), available at
https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/2004/july/flight-trainingmagazine/legal-briefing&sa=D&ust=1504204565982000&usg=AFQjCNGwKr_Ae5mvxtXQ4N1YR3sbE0xXUQ
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(Pilots ". . . must check notams as often as feasible, including immediately before takeoff and en route,
too."); and FAA, Advisory Circular, AC 107-2, Subj. Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (2016),
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_107-2.pdf (addressing NOTAMs).
70

See FAA, TFR Map, http://tfr.faa.gov/tfr_map_ims/html/index.html.

71

See Leidos Flight Service, 1800wxbrief, https://www.1800wxbrief.com/Website/#!/, and
https://www.1800wxbrief.com/Website/resources/help.pdf;jsessionid=CD7FB706FAA3E4C6EAA7336FDBA
BE4A9 (presenting Unmanned Operating Areas (UOAs), planning, filing, activating, NOTAMs features, and
access to an associated Web User Guide, § 10, UAS).
72

See FAA, Advisory Circular, AC 107-2, Subj. Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (June 21, 2016), ch. 5.5,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/AC_107-2_AFS-1_Signed.pdf (requiring preflight inspection to verify
aircraft is in a safe condition for flight), ch. 7.4 (listing recommended preflight inspection items), and app. C
(sUAS maintenance and inspection best practices); and ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 6.7.1 (before flight
“ascertain[] by every reasonable means available that [facilities are available for] safe operation”) (emphasis
added). See also Check3GPS, http://www.check3gps.com/ (providing a “quick and easy method to assess
any activity or event for possible hazards and allow mitigation when required” -- Gear, Plan, Skills).
73

See, e.g., Mavic Pilots Web Forum, Domain Block List for Firmware Update Check on DJI Go 4,
https://mavicpilots.com/threads/domain-block-list-for-firmware-update-check-on-dji-go-4.20394/ (a
description of how one user blocked automatic UAS firmware updates); Aaron Luo, Drones Hijacking, multidimensional attack vectors and countermeasures,
https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2024/DEF%20CON%2024%20presentations/DEFCON-24-AaronLuo-Drones-Hijacking-Multi-Dimensional-Attack-Vectors-And-Countermeasures-UPDATED.pdf (addressing
hijacking vulnerabilities, and by implication the importance of keeping firmware current. Note that the
subject manufacturer subsequently issued firmware updates that materially resolved the identified
vulnerabilities); Ben Sullivan, DJI is Locking Down its Drones Against a Growing Army of DIY Hackers,
Motherboard (July 7, 2017), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/3knkgn/dji-is-locking-down-itsdrones-against-a-growing-army-of-diy-hackers (summarizing diverse firmware exploits and manufacturer
response mandating firmware updates—or losing functionality); and Gary Mortimer, DJI to restrict noncompliant drones at next software update, sUAS News (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.suasnews.com/2017/05/dji-restrict-non-compliant-drones-next-update/amp/.
74

Additionally, understand any firmware/software updates before implementation—read the release notes.
Consider performing a functional flight test following any system modifications.
75

See ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 9.5.28, Diversion to alternate aerodromes (Among other factors in choosing
an emergency landing site, consider fuel reserves, C2 reliability, and field conditions.), § 9.7, Emergencies
and Contingencies; and NASA, Safe2Ditch, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kM_FFWgPV_Q
(demonstrating autonomous crash management technology and emergency landing location resolution).
See also ASTM Int’l, Operational Risk Assessment standard, F3178; and UASPC, n.26).
76

Checklists provide safety benefit for all phases of flight. See Atul Gawande, The Checklist Manifesto,
Picador, p. 72 (2011):
For generations after the first aviation checklist went into use, a lesson is emerging:
checklists seem able to defend anyone, even the experienced, against failure in many
more tasks than we realized. . . . They provide a kind of cognitive net. They catch mental
flaws inherent in all of us—flaws of memory and attention and thoroughness.
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See Asaf Degani & Earl L. Wiener, NASA, Human Factors of Flight-Deck Checklists, The Normal Checklist, esp.
App. A (1990), available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19910017830.pdf (on
incorporating modern human factors research into new principles for cockpit checklist design and usage);
and FAA, SAFO 17006, Subj. Safety Concerns with Using Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) or Personally
Developed Checklists (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/USAFAA/2017/04/27/file_attachments/808068/SAFO17006.
pdf (highlighting risks of commercially and personally-developed checklists “in lieu of using the checklist
contained in the manufacturer ’s Pilot Operating Handbook (POH)/Airplane Flight Manual (AFM)”; urging
meticulous comparison with “manufacturer’s checklist and placards contained in the POH/AFM”).
Nonetheless, many sUAS may not provide manufacturers checklists; and homebuilt or UAS with optional
equipment or modifications may render “standard” checklists ineffective or inadequate. Also, there are
important limitations to the efficacy of checklists, see UASPC n.30.
77

See FAA, Advisory Circular, AC 107-2, Subj. Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, § 5.9.1, Prior to Flight (June
21, 2016), https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/AC_107-2_AFS-1_Signed.pdf. Also, identify areas where your
visibility may be obscured by structures or sun glare.
78

Drafting Considerations: The UASPC adopted “limitations” rather than “minimums” reflecting that some
parametric values will be maximums rather than minimums.
79

See 14 C.F.R. § 107.19(c) (RP in command must ensure sUA poses no undue hazard to people, aircraft or
property).
80

See 14 C.F.R. Part 107, Subpart D-Waivers; 14 C.F.R. § 107.200, Waiver policy and requirements; 14 C.F.R.
§ 107.205, List of regulations subject to waiver; the FAA online portal, FAADroneZone,
https://faadronezone.faa.gov/#/ (including for submission of waiver requests); and
https://www.faa.gov/uas/request_waiver/waivers_granted/ (Part 107 waivers granted).
81

“[O]perating location” may include, inter alia, droneports and vertiports. See, e.g., the charted Dallas Cbd
Vertiport (49T), https://nfdc.faa.gov/nfdcApps/services/ajv5/airportDisplay.jsp?airportId=49T. See also 14
C.F.R. Part 77, Safe, Efficient Use and Preservation of the Navigable Airspace; 14 C.F.R. Part 157, Notice of
Construction, Alteration, Activation and Deactivation; FAA Order JO 7400.2L, Procedures for Handling
Airspace Matters; and FAA, FSIMS, vol. 16 (on UAS criteria); and ASTM Int’l, Comm. F38,
https://www.astm.org/COMMITTEE/F38.htm (developing a vertiport standard).
82

State, Local, and Tribal Rules - See generally N. DuPuis, et al., Cities and drones: What Cities Need To
Know About Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), National League of Cities, (2016),
http://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/2016-12/NLC%20Drone%20Report.pdf; Institute for Nat’l Security
and Counterterrorism, Syracuse Univ., Domesticating the Drone, http://uavs.insct.org/local-regulation/
(providing, inter alia, an interactive map of UAV legislation); U.S. Dept. of Transp., FAA, State and Local
Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Fact Sheet, p. 3 (Dec. 17, 2015),
https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/uas_regulations_policy/media/uas_fact_sheet_final.pdf (state and
local police power laws “including land use, zoning, privacy, trespass, and law enforcement operations—
generally are not subject to federal regulation”); Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, Current Unmanned
Aircraft State Law Landscape (July 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmannedaircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx; and Rupprecht Law, US Drone Laws (2017) – Drone Laws by State,
https://jrupprechtlaw.com/drone-laws-state.
Federalism; Federal Preemption - Federalism is a system of government that (in the US) bifurcates
governance between the states (including its subdivisions) and national government. See New York v. US,
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505 U.S. 144 (1992), available at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/505/144/case.html
(anthology of federalism’s underpinnings). Federal preemption is premised on Art. VI, cl. 2 (the Supremacy
Clause) of the U.S. Constitution: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” Available at https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution. It grants Congress
power to preempt, or override state law that interferes with or are contrary to powers granted Congress.
See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), available at
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/17/316 (“The Government of the Union, though limited in
its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action, and its laws, when made in pursuance of the
Constitution, form the supreme law of the land.”). The extent of federal preemption depends on Congress’s
intent: field preemption arises where Congress intends to preempt an entire field; whereas conflict
preemption arises where state-federal law conflicts to the extent of physical impossibility. Federal
preemption affecting UAS operations is undergoing scrutiny. See, e.g., Singer v. City of Newton, Case No.
1:17-CV-10071-WGY (Sept. 21, 2017), available at https://www.ecfr.gov/cgibin/retrieveECFR?gp=&SID=5a94599c486631fe22f2127461f38a26&mc=true&n=sp14.2.107.b&r=SUBPART&
ty=HTML#se14.2.107_123 (conflict preemption).
Federal authority over navigable airspace appears in 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a), Sovereignty and use of airspace,
available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/49/40103 (exclusive sovereignty; public right of
transit through navigable airspace); and 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b) (FAA authorization; prescription of air
navigation regulation). See Brian P. Wynne, Pres. and CEO, AUVSI, Letter to Pres. Donald J. Trump (Oct. 11,
2017) (“Federal control of the airspace is a bedrock principle of aviation law that dates back over 50 years,
and is the primary reason the United States maintains an aviation safety record that is the envy of the
world. Maintaining the FAA’s authority helps keep the skies safe for all aircraft – manned and unmanned.”).
Nonetheless, the FAA recognizes limitations to federal preemption with regard to sUAS:
The FAA is not persuaded that including a preemption provision in the final rule is
warranted at this time. Preemption issues involving small UAS necessitate a case-specific
analysis that is not appropriate in a rule of general applicability. Additionally, certain legal
aspects concerning small UAS use may be best addressed at the State or local level. For
example, State law and other legal protections for individual privacy may provide
recourse for a person whose privacy may be affected through another person’s use of a
UAS.
FAA, Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (RIN 2120-AJ60), (NPRM at 9552)
(effective Aug. 29, 2016), available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FAA-2015-0150-4721,
and 81 Fed. Reg. 42,064, 42,194 (June 28, 2016) (“Final Rule”).
Also, consider Fmr. FAA Adm’r Huerta’s acknowledgment of Federalist principles, suggesting the efficacy of
certain limited local control on UAS: “. . . in addition to the FAA’s rules, there are existing state and local
laws in areas of reckless endangerment, trespass, and privacy that could apply.” Statement by the Hon.
Michael Huerta, Fmr. FAA Adm’r, Before the U.S. Senate Appropriations Subcomm. on Transp., Housing and
Urban Dev., and Related Agencies (Oct. 28, 2015),
https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/102815-Huerta-Testimony.pdf. See Drone
Innovation Act of 2017, HR 2930, available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/housebill/2930?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22unmanned+aerial%22%5D%7D&r=2 (requiring development of
a policy framework that, inter alia, “preserve[s] the legitimate interests of State, local, and Tribal
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governments including—(1) Protecting public safety; (2) protecting personal privacy; (3) protecting property
rights; (4) managing land use; and (5) restricting nuisances and noise pollution.” And other limitations
intended to advance such rights); and Sen. Feinstein’s introduction of the Drone Federalism Act of 2017,
available at https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/d/b/dbf0d059-09d2-43ae-9e173ca960592798/88CC2E3D7D090130DE655B22BEA674C7.ros17470.pdf.
The erosion of support for Federal preemption of the airspace was noted by Steven J. Brown, COO, NBAA,
Presentation to NBAA’s Access Comm. (Oct. 9, 2017): “I’ve never before seen a time when local government
had such an open disregard for Federal provisions. . . . This type of assertiveness and disregard is clearly a
pattern that has been in place for a couple of years and is metastasizing.” As stated above, the limits of
Federal authority over low-altitude airspace remain a work in progress.
There is a disconnect between preemption (which bars local municipalities from regulating) and the P.L.
112-95 limits imposed in Section 336 (which bars the FAA from rulemaking for model aircraft). Some model
aircraft operators argue that preemption means local governments cannot create binding ordinances
because the FAA has responsibility for regulating aviation. They then argue that enjoining the FAA from
rulemaking means, in effect, that no one can create binding ordinances.
Aviation Apps Informing State/Local Rule Compliance - Separately, consider the extent to which aviation
apps provide sufficient actionable local rule content. For example, the B4UFLY application (available at
https://www.faa.gov/uas/where_to_fly/b4ufly/) is designed primarily to assist operator compliance with
Federal airspace rules—not state and local rules. Operators should independently become familiar with
available resources to ascertain applicable state and local rules.
83

See 14 C.F.R. § 107.9, Accident reporting, available at the FAADroneZone Portal,
https://faadronezone.faa.gov/ (UAS pilots must report accidents no later than 10 days after occurrence that
meet designated criteria. UAS accidents are defined as any operation of a UAS involving at least: (a) serious
injury or loss of consciousness, (b) or property damages greater than $500). And, FAA Hotline,
https://hotline.faa.gov/ (for reports related to the safety of the NAS, violations of FAA regulations, safety
issues, and FAA employees or facilities). Conversely, the NTSB defines an unmanned aircraft accident as “an
occurrence associated with the operation of any public or civil unmanned aircraft system that takes place
between the time that the system is activated with the purpose of flight and the time that the system is
deactivated at the conclusion of its mission, in which (1) Any person suffers death or serious injury; or (2)
The aircraft has a maximum gross takeoff weight of 300 pounds or greater and sustains substantial
damage.” Events that do not meet the criteria for classification as accidents are considered incidents. NTSB,
Notification and Reporting of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and Overdue Aircraft, and Preservation of
Aircraft Wreckage, Mail, Cargo, and Records, 49 C.F.R. § 830.2.
All accidents are required to be reported, whereas only some incidents—depending on the type—require
reporting. See also FAA, Accident and Incident Reporting FAQs, https://www.faa.gov/uas/faqs/#air. Where
practicable, preserve UAS data for accident or incident investigation purposes. ICAO, Manual on RPAS, §
9.10.8.
84

FAA, Near Mid Air Collision System (NMACS), FAA Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing
(ASIAS), http://www.asias.faa.gov/pls/apex/f?p=100:33:0::NO. See FAA, Order 8900.1 vol. 7, ch. 4, § 1
(sUAS NMAC are to be processed with current aircraft NMAC report forms, pilot bill of rights and added
sUAS items that address determining ownership of the UAS; the order references vol. 16, Unmanned
Aircraft Systems, and FAA, Advisory Circular, AC 107-2, Subj. Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems).
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Aircraft Registry and Investigation - If the investigation process involves a sUAS and the aircraft cannot be
found in the aircraft registry (see FAA, Aircraft Registry, http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/), it may have
been registered per 14 C.F.R. Part 48, Registration and Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft.
The investigating office is to contact the Law Enforcement Assistance Program (LEAP), at
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ash/ash_programs/investigations/leap/. See
generally Unmanned Aircraft System Handbook and Accident/ Incident Investigation Guidelines, Int’l Society
of Air Safety Investigators (2015),
http://www.isasi.org/Documents/ISASI%20Unmanned%20Aircraft%20System%20Handbook%20and%20Acc
ident_Incident%20Investigation%20Guidelines.pdf.
See Jeff Guzzetti, Why it Makes a Difference to Report and Investigate UAS Incidents . . . Even When They
Don’t Really Happen, Int’l Society of Air Safety Investigators, Submission for the 2017 ISASI Seminar, San
Diego, http://www.isasi.org/Documents/library/technicalpapers/2017/Wed/9.%20Why%20it%20Makes%20a%20Difference%20to%20Report%20and%20Investigate
%20UAS%20Incidents.docx (“investigation of UAS sightings and, when warranted, root cause analysis of
incidents [where UAS/human-piloted aircraft] have come in close proximity, are essential to validate the
effectiveness of the safety controls in place today for preventing accidents [and] help guide the industry’s
ongoing research into the development of future safety controls related to the operation and design of
UAS.”).
NTSB Accident Reporting - NTSB accident reporting is not required for hobbyists, per FAA Modernization
and Reform Act of 2012, § 336. See NTSB, Advisory to Operators of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the
United States (“NTSB Advisory”) (July 29, 2016),
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/process/Documents/NTSB-Advisory-Drones.pdf. The NTSB requires all
other UAS operators to provide immediate notification of any accident involving serious injury or death, or
if the aircraft has a maximum takeoff weight of 300 pounds or greater, and sustains substantial damage, or
any serious incident involving UAS of any weight that meets the following criteria: flight control system
malfunction or failure, inability of any required flight crewmember to perform normal flight duties as a
result of injury or illness, inflight fire, aircraft collision in flight, More than $25,000 in damage to objects
other than the aircraft, Release of all or a portion of a propeller blade from an aircraft, excluding release
caused solely by ground contact, Damage to helicopter tail or main rotor blades, including ground damage,
that requires major repair or replacement of the blade(s), or an aircraft is overdue and is believed to have
been involved in an accident. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 830.2, 830.5, and NTSB Advisory, above. See generally
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/process/Documents/NTSB-Advisory-Drones.pdf.
85

Aviation Safety Reporting (ASRS) - See ASRS, https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/ (NASA’s cooperative safety
reporting program encourages reporting actual or potential discrepancies or deficiencies involving the
safety of aviation operations); and FAA, Advisory Circular, AC-00-46E, Subj. Aviation Safety Reporting
Program, p. 1 (Dec. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC%2000-46E.pdf (explaining the ASRS
reporting system and that “[t]he FAA considers the filing of a report with NASA concerning an incident of
occurrences . . . to be indicative of a constructive attitude [that] will tend to prevent future violations” and
may preclude civil penalty or certificate suspension); and 14 C.F.R. § 91.25, Aviation Safety Reporting
Program: Prohibition against use of reports for enforcement purposes (”The Administrator of the FAA will
not use reports submitted to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under the Aviation Safety
Reporting Program (or information derived therefrom) in any enforcement action except information
concerning accidents or criminal offenses which are wholly excluded from the Program.”). Cf., 14 C.F.R. § 13
(investigative and enforcement actions); and 14 C.F.R. § 13.19, Certificate Action. See also R. S. Sharma,
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Investigation into Unmanned Aircraft System Incidents in the National Airspace System, Int’l J. of Aviation,
Aeronautics, and Aerospace, vol. 3(4) (Dec. 2, 2016), available at https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2016.1146
(summarizing FAA reports); and ASRS references, UASPC, n.121.
86

Maintenance Program - See FAA, Advisory Circular, AC 107-2, Subj. Small UAS Systems § 7.2-3 (2016),
available at https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_107-2.pdf (addressing
sUAS maintenance and inspection):
Whenever possible, the operator should maintain the sUAS and its components in
accordance with manufacturer’s instructions. The aircraft manufacturer may provide the
maintenance program, or, if one is not provided, the applicant may choose to develop
one. . . . There may be components of the sUAS that are identified by the manufacturer
to undergo scheduled periodic maintenance or replacement based on time-in-service
limits (such as flight hours, cycles, and/or the calendar-days). All manufacturer scheduled
maintenance instructions should be followed in the interest of achieving the longest and
safest service. . . .
Maintenance Practices - See ASTM Int’l, Standard Practice for Maintenance and Continued Airworthiness of
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS), F2909, https://www.astm.org/COMMITTEE/F38.htm. ASTM Int’l
is also developing a guide for UAS maintenance qualification and certification. See also ACI, Aviation
Maintenance Technicians Model Code of Conduct, http://www.secureav.com/AMTMCC-Listings-Page.html.
Product Registration/Warranty and Alerts - Laws such as the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 5 U.S.C.
§§ 2051−2089, available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/chapter-47), provide for product
registration by consumers and notification in the event of a product recall or safety alert. However, the
CPSA expressly excludes “aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances (as defined in section 101 of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, section 40102(a) of title 49),” CPSA § 2052(A)(5)(F). Also, aircraft are not
considered consumer products under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq.
(available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/2301), a policy formulated on the premise that
"no appreciable portion of new aircraft are sold to consumers, for personal, household or family purposes.”
Modification of Implementation and Enforcement Policy, 41 Fed. Reg. 26,757 (1976). Given the dramatic
proliferation of sUAS, and their substantial application for personal, household and family use, this policy
should be reconsidered. Or, the FAA could qualify its definition for an “aircraft”, providing that sUAS
weighing less than a weight threshold for registration would no longer be considered aircraft, thereby
(presumably) invoking the CPSA.
Importantly, many sUAS do not undergo formal airworthiness certification, and thus may not benefit from
direct notification of Airworthiness Directives (ADs) (14 C.F.R. Part 39, https://www.ecfr.gov/cgibin/retrieveECFR?n=pt14.1.39), and particularly by Emergency ADs. See
https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/continued_operation/ad/type_pub/type_emerg/. See UASPC, nn.
120 and 229 (airworthiness).
In sum, most UAS are neither subject to Airworthiness Directives, nor subject to product recall under the
Consumer Product Safety Act. Thus UAS owners and operators should maintain a direct relationship with
sUAS and component manufacturers and dealers by: (1) signing-up for product announcements on their
websites, (2) configuring and updating sUAS apps, and (3) submitting product registration cards (and any
updates to reflect change of address).
87

Navigation Database Discrepancy Reporting - Recognize that navigation and other database
discrepancies may warrant reporting. The FAA encourages submission of charting error reports regarding
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FAA Aeronautical products. FAA, FAQ, https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/faq/#q6a
(“Chart Discrepancies How can I report chart discrepancies?”). The ASRS also encourages reporting such
discrepancies to the ASRS. See UASPC, n.85. Additionally, navigation product manufacturers solicit database
error reports. See, e.g., Garmin, Report a Database Error,
https://my.garmin.com/mapErrors/report.faces?type=aviation. Cf., Reporting of consumer database errors:
GPS.GOV, How to Report a Mapping Problem Affecting GPS Devices, Apps, and Maps,
https://www.gps.gov/support/user/mapfix/devices-and-maps/ (“[U]nderstand that the U.S. government
cannot correct mapping errors in consumer devices and apps”—rather, it is the responsibility of the
commercial map provider.).
88

FAA, Advisory Circular, AC 107-2, Subj. Small UAS Systems, § 7.3.5 (June 21, 2016) (addressing benefits of
recordkeeping). Cf., ICAO, Manual on RPAS, §§ 6.6.3 d-f (requiring “Journey log book for the RPA . . .
maintenance log book and technical log for the RPA,” and remote pilot stations), and § 6.4.5 f (recordkeeping items "covering at a minimum: . . . security management records.").
89

Communication of safety issues should be directed by law, an organization’s procedures, applicable SOPs
and guidelines, and undertaken such that there is confidence of their communication to the intended
recipient.
90

See, e.g., Richard M. Lusk, et al., An Early Survey of Best Practices for the Use of Small Unmanned Aerial
Systems by the Electric Utility Industry, Oak Ridge Nat’l Lab., ORNL/TM-2017/93, § 4.3.30, p. 54 (Feb. 2017),
http://nias-uas.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/An-Early-Survey-of-Best-Practices-for-the-Use-of-SmallUnmanned-Aerial-Systems-by-the-Electric-Utility-Industry-RM-Lusk-Feb-2017.pdf (recommending
anemometer and wind sock); Unmanned Systems Canada, Small RPAS Best Practices for BVLOS, v1.1, §
4.6.2(e), p. 26 (Oct. 2016), https://www.unmannedsystems.ca/download/usc-small-rpas-bvlos-bestpractices/ (recommending timepiece readily available to each flight crew member); and Scott Burgess,
PhD., ERAU (Oct. 3, 2017) (urging spectrum analyzer to assess C2 reliability near electrical transmission and
high-power radio antenna). See The Application of Handheld Spectrum Analyzers in Interference Testing,
Techi-Tools, reprinted by Agilent Technologies, http://www.technitool.com/site/ARTICLE_LIBRARY/Agilent%20%20The%20Application%20of%20Handheld%20Spectrum%20Analyzers%20in%20Interference%20Testing.p
df (RFI prediction tool).
91

C2 Link Loss and Latency - Lost link involves two failures: a control link failure, followed by the unmanned
aircraft’s failure to follow its lost link programming. These are unpredictable, potentially hazardous, and
outside current certification thinking. Even lost links that follow their profiles represent autonomous
operations until re-captured or terminated, and those are prohibited because of the inherent risk
associated with them. Pilots should read and understand manufacturer’s documentation addressing lost
link functionality, and that lost link protocols may vary greatly among each aircraft and operation. Such
familiarity should include understanding any redundancy, timing/latency in lost link initiation,
annunciations of lost link and lost link protocols, how the aircraft is programmed to function upon lost link,
and how/whether to modify lost link factory settings. See R. Jay Shively, NASA Ames Research Center, et al.,
Human Performance Considerations for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), ICAO, Remotely Piloted
Aircraft Systems Panel (RPASP), Second Mtg. (RPASP/2), Montréal, Human performance considerations for
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) (June 15-19, 2015), § 2.4, p. 43-47,
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20150011435.pdf (addressing C2 latency and its
human factors affects).
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Recognize that C2 latency may diminish RP ability to respond timely to DAA alerts where such response
requires RP inputs; and understand all surveillance system error and bias. Id., § 2.5, pp. 53-54. Additionally,
RP SOPs should define the criteria triggering link loss protocol. See Unmanned Systems Canada, Small
Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) Best Practices for BVLOS Operations, v1.1, § 4.7.2.1(3), p. 28 (Feb.
16, 2017), https://www.unmannedsystems.ca/download-usc-small-rpas-best-practices-document/
(“Unless otherwise authorized, alternative contingency planning measures must allow for safe termination
of the flight under any circumstances during all phases of flight.”) (emphasis added). Id., § 4.7.2.3.5 (Lost
link procedures when flying VFR in uncontrolled airspace include: executing lost link procedure, remaining
in VMC and uncontrolled airspace, advising ATC as soon as possible, squawking appropriate lost link code if
transponder equipped, where practicable broadcasting location and intent in plain language at regular
intervals to advise local traffic, and landing as soon as practicable at nearest safe suitable site.). See UASPC,
n.66 (regarding emergency reporting).
C2 Link Security - Consider “the security of the C2 link against hacking, spoofing and other forms of
interference or malicious hijack, as well as unintentional interference. Mitigations must be implemented to
prevent the C2 link from connecting the RPS [Remote Pilot Station] to an unintended RPA [Remotely Piloted
Aircraft] or vice versa.” ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 4.5.5. See UASPC, § IV. Security and Privacy (addressing C2
security).
Drafting Considerations: The UASPC contains a number of principles and SRPs that could have been placed
in sections other than where they appear. For example, this SRP relating to learning lost control link and
other automation failure procedures could have been placed in Section III. Training and Proficiency, or in
Section VI. Use of Technology. The Drafting Team recognized that there would be overlap of subject matter
across the UASPC’s sections and resolved questions of placement on the basis of context and intended
meaning.
92

See ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 4.3 Governing Principles, 4.3.1 d) ("the remote PIC is expected to have
continuous control over the RPA under normal operating conditions."); FAA, Order JO 7110.65X, § 5-2-9,
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Lost Link (Oct. 12, 2017), available at
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/JO_7110.65X_Air_Traffic_Control.pdf. For larger (and
some small) UAS, understand “lostlink route of flight, lost link orbit points, lost link altitudes,
communications procedures and pre-planned flight termination points if the event recovery of the UAS is
deemed unfeasible.”); and FAA, ORDER 8900.1 CHG 468, Ch. 16-4-8-7, Contingency Planning,
http://fsims.faa.gov/PICDetail.aspx?docId=8900.1,Vol.16,Ch4,Sec8 (addressing risk mitigation and lost link
procedures).
93

See ASTM Int’l, F3005 Specification for Batteries for Use in Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS),
available (fee) at https://www.astm.org/search/fullsite-search.html?query=f3005& (re discharge, § 8.1.3
Storage, requiring “charge [ ] / discharge [] to a level that is optimal for storage based on the particular
chemistry . . . stored at approximately one-half capacity or at the supplier-specified charge level for long
term storage any time a pack is out of service for more than one month”); and UASPC, § V. Environmental
Issues (environmental considerations regarding batteries). See also n.175 (addressing batteries), and
UASPC, § V.c (addressing hazards and special handling procedures for batteries and other fuels).
94

See 14 C.F.R. § 107.19(c) (“The remote pilot in command must ensure that the small unmanned aircraft
will pose no undue hazard to other people, other aircraft, or other property . . .”); Parimal Kopardekar, et
al., Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management (UTM) Concept of Operations, p. 3 (June 2016),
https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/docs/Kopardekar_2016-3292_ATIO.pdf (“The biggest risk is to people and assets
on the ground and to manned aviation . . .”); Gerardo Olivares, et al., ASSURE, Volume III–UAS Airborne
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Collision Severity Evaluation–Fixed-Wing, § 8.2.1, p. 176 (July 2017),
http://www.assureuas.org/projects/deliverables/a3/Volume%20III%20%20UAS%20Airborne%20Collision%20Severity%20Evaluation%20-%20Fixed-wing.pdf (“UAS operations may
pose unique hazards to other aircraft and people on the ground.”); and UK, Civil Aviation Auth., CAP 1627,
Drone Safety Risk: An Assessment,
http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/modalapplication.aspx?catid=1&pagetype=65&appid=11&mode=list&type=sea
rch&search=CAP1627.
95

Drafting Consideration: The term “surface” is adopted rather than “ground” to include both bodies of
water as well as solid land. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 91.119(a) (addressing “hazard to persons or property on the
surface”).
96

See 14 C.F.R. § 107.37, Operation near aircraft; right-of-way rules (“(a) Each small unmanned aircraft
must yield the right of way to all aircraft, airborne vehicles, and launch and reentry vehicles. Yielding the
right of way means that the small unmanned aircraft must give way to the aircraft or vehicle and may not
pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear.”); 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b) (general right-of-way rule); and
FAA, Advisory Circular, AC 107-2, Subj. Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS), § 5.8.1 (June 21, 2016),
https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/AC_107-2_AFS-1_Signed.pdf (“the remote PIC must yield right-of-way to
all other aircraft, including aircraft operating on the surface of the airport.”).
97

See 14 C.F.R. § 107.39(b), Operation over human beings, available at
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/107.39 (requiring “covered structure” or “a stationary vehicle”
providing “reasonable protection” from a falling sUAS). Also, ASTM Int’l, Comm. F38 is developing a
specification for operations over people that includes possible equipment-based risk mitigations, such as
ballistic parachutes, digital flight data recorders, braking motors, geo-fencing, battery redundancy,
enhanced C2, and functional hold capability. See UASPC, n. 98.
98

See Academy of Model Aeronautics, AMA National Model Aircraft Safety Code, § B.3. (Jan. 1, 2014),
https://www.modelaircraft.org/files/105.pdf (addressing safety lines); and AMA, Recommended RC Flying
Site Specifications, Doc# 706, http://www.modelaircraft.org/files/706.pdf.
99

Understand that use of UAS non-manufacturer aftermarket devices may void warranties, potentially
create unacceptable safety risks, or possibly lead to an accident.
100

See generally David Arterburn, et al., Final Report for the FAA UAS Center of Excellence Task A4: UAS
Ground Collision Severity Evaluation, Rev. 2 (2017), available at http://pr.cirlot.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/assure_a4_final_report_uas_ground_collisionseverity_evaluation_rev_2_20170428_final.pdf (and particularly the Report’s conclusions, p. 145).
Drafting Considerations: This SRP is relevant even when operations over people are not anticipated.
Recognize that operations over people generally require explicit approval.
101

Jason Maddocks, et al., Avian, Colo. Ag. Avi. Ass’n, p. 1 (2015) available (upon request) at
http://coagav.org/ (During the subject experiment “all pilots were easily able to see the prototype ground
crew markings.” Pilots were less likely to see the actual drone in flight and more likely to see the crew or
high-visibility markers indicating UAS operations were being conducted). See FAA, InFo 17018, Subj. Use of
Reflective Vests by Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) Remote Pilots (Nov. 27, 2017),
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/info/all_infos/media/2
017/InFO17018.pdf (urging use of reflective vests with suggested warning against distracting pilot, e.g.,
“Drone Pilot Please Do Not Disturb” or “Drone Pilot Stand Clear”).
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Insurance - Although not included in 14 C.F.R. Part 107, commentators to the proposed sUAS Rule
(NPRM for Part 107) urged an insurance requirement because: “(1) other countries require liability
insurance for small UAS operations; (2) liability insurance would incentivize safe operations and encourage
operators to keep pace with technological developments; and (3) small UAS operations are analogous to
automobile operations, which require liability insurance.” FAA, Operation and Certification of Small
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Final Rule, K. Misc. Provisions, 1. Mandatory Insurance, p. 497, available at
https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/RIN_2120-AJ60_Clean_Signed.pdf. See NBAA, Integrated Operational
Management and Oversight for sUAS (May 13, 2016), https://www.nbaa.org/ops/uas/integratedoperational-management-and-oversight-for-suas/NBAA-Resource-Integrated-Operational-Managementand-Oversight-for-sUAS.pdf (suggesting aviation liability coverage of at least $2 million per occurrence, and
professional liability/errors and omissions insurance with limits of at least $1 million for each claim or
wrongful act). Cf., AMA, 2017 Insurance Summary,
https://www.modelaircraft.org/files/insurancesummarymembers.pdf (providing per occurrence coverage
for members of “$2,500,000 involving bodily injury and/or property damage”). Separately, where indicated,
urge [potential] customers to obtain non-owned UAS coverage in excess of the operator’s coverage limits.
103

Operations Manual - See, e.g., ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 9.3, RPAS Manuals; HK Civil Aviation Dept.,
Application for UAS Operations Manual Template,
http://www.cad.gov.hk/reports/UAS_operations_manual.pdf (outlining areas that should be in a UAS
operations manual); and Unmanned Systems Canada, Small RPAS Best Practices for BVLOS, v1.1, App. 2, §
5XX.13.2, p. 58 (Oct. 2016), https://www.unmannedsystems.ca/download/usc-small-rpas-bvlos-bestpractices/ (suggested Basic Structure of a Small RPAS Operating Manual).
Concept of Operations - Consider review of applicable concept of operations to inform drafting of
operations manuals. See FAA, Integration of Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace System,
ver. 2 (Sept. 28, 2012), available at https://www.suasnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/FAA-UASConops-Version-2-0-1.pdf; EASA, Concept of Operations for Drones,
https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/204696_EASA_concept_drone_brochure_web.pdf; Parimal
Kopardekar, et al., Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management (UTM) Concept of Operations, NASA
(June 2016), https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/docs/Kopardekar_2016-3292_ATIO.pdf; and EUROCONTROL, RPAS
ATM CONOPS, Ed. 4.0 (2017), https://www.eurocontrol.int/sites/default/files/publication/files/rpas-atmcocept-of-operations-2017.pdf.
104

Consider establishing minimum standoff distances. See, e.g., Public Safety Aviation Accreditation
Commission, Standards for Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) Programs (2017), Draft Ver. June 5,
2017, § 02.02.3, Minimum Standoff Distances and Maximum Altitudes, available at
https://publicsafetyaviation.org/images/Standards/tab_16_c_-_UAS_Stds_Draft___6-5-17.pdf (“Minimum
standoff distances from people and objects and maximum altitudes shall be established to ensure safe
operations. . . . ).
105

Recognize your legal and ethical obligations to avoid injuring others and their property.

106

Drafting Considerations: The Drafting Team adopted the term “proficiency” over prescribed specific
recurrency or recency requirements, acknowledging that proficiency is highly individualistic and
encompasses elements of both recent experience and recurrent training and practice.
See ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 6.9.8 (training programme “should include: knowledge and skills related to
the RPA operational procedures for the intended area of operations . . . remote flight crew coordination . . .
abnormal and emergency situations . . . methods to maintain situational awareness . . . human performance
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aspects [re CRM], threat and error management (TEM), and automation or human-machine interface (HMI)
which are unique to unmanned aviation.”); R. Jay Shively, NASA Ames Research Center, et al., Human
Performance Considerations for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), Report of the ICAO, Remotely
Piloted Aircraft Systems Panel (RPASP), Second Mtg. (RPASP/2), Montréal (June 15-19, 2015), § 2.1.6, p. 13,
available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20150011435.pdf (“Retention of
knowledge and skills is dependent on the level of expertise of the pilot when they are first developed, the
frequency at which they are used in daily activities, the importance that is placed on retention during the
training process, and other factors.”).
107

“Minimum requirements” that meet or exceed applicable law may be fashioned via private organization
SOPs or other non-regulatory instrument. Minimum requirements are presented in 14 C.F.R. Parts 91, 101,
107, and elsewhere. See e.g., nn.8, 20, 115 & 122, and corresponding text (addressing minimum
requirements and the ACS).
108

See UASPC, n.103 (operations manuals).

109

Securing payloads includes ensuring slung or towed payloads do not adversely affect unmanned aircraft
control or flight stability, and are not susceptible to unintended payload release. Payloads should also
create no unsafe electromagnetic radiation. See UASPC, n.34 (addressing hazardous payloads).
110

Placards provide necessary information to aid in the safe operation of UAS. See, e.g., ASTM Int’l,
Committee F38, https://www.astm.org/COMMITTEE/F38.htm (developing standards assuring that placards
are prominently available to the UAS pilot).
111

Some unmanned aircraft are equipped with orientation or system status lighting. For example, DJI
platforms are equipped with front LED lights that provide the remote pilot with flight orientation
information, and aft color-coded aircraft status lights indicating system status, operational limitations, or
malfunctions. Users can reference the meaning of various lighting colors and flash patterns in the
manufacturer’s UAS user manual.
Some sUAS may utilize position lighting modeled after manned aircraft. If seeking issuance of a special
airworthiness certificate in the experimental category, UAS operators must present evidence of aircraft
visibility acceptable for integration in the NAS. This may include high visibility paint, anti-collision lighting, or
position lighting. See FAA, Order 8130.34D, App. D, Airworthiness Certification for Unmanned Aircraft
Systems and Optionally Piloted Aircraft (9/8/2017), available at
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_Order_8130.34D.pdf.
112

See, e.g., FAA, ALC Content, ALC-42: Airspace, Special Use Airspace and TFRs,
shttps://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/ALC/course_content.aspx?cID=42&sID=505&preview=true.
113

See UASPC, n.133 (addressing autonomous aircraft).

114

See, e.g., Tom Haritos, et al., The Use of High Fidelity Simulators to Train Pilot and Sensor Operator Skills
for Unmanned Aerial Systems (2012), available at
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271837225_The_Use_of_High_Fidelity_Simulators_to_Train_Pil
ot_and_Sensor_Operator_Skills_for_Unmanned_Aerial_Systems; Paul Cianciolo, Simulating your Drone
Flight, FAA Safety Briefing, p. 29 (Nov./Dec. 2017),
https://www.faa.gov/news/safety_briefing/2017/media/NovDec2017.pdf (benefits of UAS simulation); and
Deonna Neal & William Rhodes, Failure Predicts Success: Professional Ethical Decision-Making in Aviation
Simulators, J. of Character & Leadership Integration (Winter 2017), available at
https://jcli.scholasticahq.com/article/1307-failure-predicts-success-professional-ethical-decision-making-in-
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aviation-simulators (benefits of "real time" decision-making training). See also SRP corresponding to UASPC,
n.114 (“use flight simulators and other training devices . . .”).
115

Standards in development for the design, construction and verification of various types of UAS recognize
the efficacy of emergency training, where the standard requires the UAS to remain controllable, predictable
or capable of performing a safe recovery maneuver following certain anomalies. See, e.g., ASTM Int’l,
Comm. F38, https://www.astm.org/COMMITTEE/F38.htm.
116

See FAA, Airman Information Manual (AIM), § 7-5-3(c), available at
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/ (“[M]any power lines do not require notice to the FAA and,
therefore, are not marked and/or lighted. Many of those that do require notice do not exceed 200 feet AGL
or meet the Obstruction Standard of 14 C.F.R. Part 77 and, therefore, are not marked and/or lighted.”). See,
e.g., Jason Green, Drone crash knocks out power to 1,600 in Mountain View, The Mercury News (June 9,
2017), http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/06/09/drone-crash-knocks-out-power-to-1600-in-mountainview/. With or without a pilot in the aircraft, there are preflight actions that may mitigate wire strikes. See
FAA, SAFO, Subj. Flying in the Wire Environment (Aug. 6, 2010), available at
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2
010/SAFO10015.pdf (referenced in the FAA’s Remote Pilot ACS); and News 9, Wire Strike Story (Aug. 28,
2017), http://m.news9.com/story.aspx?story=36233805&catId=112032.
117

Where applicable, train for mission-specific skills, those uniquely germane to particular vertical market
applications, and, e.g., long-duration flights requiring RP handover. See R. Jay Shively, NASA Ames Research
Center, et al., Human Performance Considerations for Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), Report of
the ICAO, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Panel (RPASP), Second Mtg. (RPASP/2), Montréal (June 15-19,
2015), § 1.2, p. 7, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20150011435.pdf (“While more
[frequently applicable to] larger UAS, '[h]andovers can be a time of particular risk, associated with system
mode errors and coordination breakdowns’.”); Unmanned Systems Canada, Small RPAS Best Practices for
BVLOS, v1.1, § 3.2.1, p. 16 (Oct. 2016), https://www.unmannedsystems.ca/download/usc-small-rpas-bvlosbest-practices/ (“During pilot handovers, there shall be a means to synchronize and positively transfer
control between control stations and/or pilots.”).
118

See 14 C.F.R. § 107.49(a)(1), Preflight familiarization, inspection, and actions for aircraft operation (re
local weather conditions); 14 C.F.R. § 91.103, Preflight action (requirement to “become familiar with all
available information”); NOAA, Aviation Weather Center, https://www.aviationweather.gov/; FAA, Advisory
Circular, AC 00-6B, Subj. Aviation Weather (Aug. 23, 2016),
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_00-6B.pdf; FAA, Order 8900.1 CHG
447, vol. 3, ch. 26, Safety Assurance System: Regulatory Sources of Aviation Weather Information and
Aviation Weather Information Systems (Mar. 2, 2016),
http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/8900.1/v03%20tech%20admin/chapter%2026/03_026_002.pdf; ICAO, Manual
on RPAS, § 9.4.1 (“pilot should review all available meteorological information pertaining to the
operation”). Cf., 14 C.F.R. § 135.213, Weather reports and forecasts (requirement to use “a weather report
or forecast . . . of the U.S. National Weather Service, a source approved by the U.S. National Weather
Service, or a source approved by the Administrator” except for VFR operations if such report is unavailable).
119

“Water” may confuse optical or sonar-based stabilization sensors; and “urban areas” are recognized for
pockets of poor GPS reception. See UASPC, n.62 (regarding “urban canyons”).
120

See 14 C.F.R. § 107.15, Condition for safe operation, 14 C.F.R. § 107.49, Preflight familiarization,
inspection, and actions for aircraft operation, FAA, Advisory Circular, AC 107-2, Subj. Small Unmanned
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Aircraft Systems (sUAS), App. C. sUAS Maintenance and Inspection Best Practices (June 21, 2016),
https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/AC_107-2_AFS-1_Signed.pdf; and ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 6.8.1
(“operator responsible for ensuring that all components of the RPAS are maintained in an airworthy
condition”). See “Airworthy” Definition, UASPC, n.229.
121

See, e.g., Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), Report Sets/Unmanned Aerial Vehicle,
https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/search/reportsets.html (most recent 50 reports, updated semi-annually). See
UASPC n.85 (on ASRS).
122

FAA, Remote Pilot - Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Airman Certification Standards, FAA-S-ACS-10
(July 2016), https://www.faa.gov/training_testing/testing/acs/media/uas_acs.pdf.
123

See Academy of Model Aeronautics, Charter Club Search, http://www.modelaircraft.org/clubsearch.aspx
(providing a query search by zip code or city/state of available flying sites; and UASPC, § IV, addressing
security and privacy issues.
124

Any simulated mission training for any size and type of UAS is valuable to rehearse and revise procedures
and emergency situations. See David C. Ison, et al., Designing Simulation to Meet UAS Training Needs, Int’l
Conf. on Human Interface and the Mgt. of Info., Springer-Berlin Heidelberg (2013),
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-39215-3_67 (in part, describing best practices for
simulation-based training); and ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 8.4.38 (applicants for RPAS “license should have
appropriate experience flying an RPA in actual or simulated flight”) (emphasis added).
125

FAA, Aviation Instructor's Handbook, FAA-H-8083-9A, p. 2-23,
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/aviation_instructors_handbook/m
edia/FAA-H-8083-9A.pdf (“The student profits by having someone watch the performance and provide
constructive criticism to help eliminate errors . . . . Allowing the student to critique his or her performance
enhances student-centered learning.").
126

See “Additional Resources” (providing information that includes UAS education).

127

WINGS offers many sUAS-relevant safety courses as well as training material on diverse general
aeronautical knowledge subjects applicable to UAS operations. See, e.g., FAA, FAASafety Document
Resources, https://www.faasafety.gov/search/default.aspx?keywords=unmanned&submit=Search.
Although sUAS pilots do not require flight reviews, and therefore WINGS credits do not provide such
incentives, the FAA offers UAS-centric WINGS training courses. Accordingly, the SRP adopts “Attend” rather
than “Participate”. See Ryan J. Wallace, EdD, Position Paper: Safety Culture: Why the FAA Should Consider
Adapting the WINGS Pilot Proficiency Program as a Method of Remote Pilot Recertification, vol. 3(3), IJAAA
(Aug. 2016), available at http://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1138&context=ijaaa.
128

Such organizations include UAS industry associations, advocacy, and user groups.
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Such publications may include but are not limited to: Advisory Circulars, Chart Supplements U.S., and the
extensive guidance on UAS provided at FAA, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Regulations & Policies,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/uas_regulations_policy/.
130

New UAS models may have different flight or control characteristics and configurations, and automation
features that, without familiarization, could adversely affect the safety of flight. See also UASPC, n.111
(differences in aircraft status lighting), and UASPC, n.133 (automation and autonomy).
131

Such training may also enhance discipline, and improved situational awareness. See, e.g., ACI, Flight
Safety in the Drone Age, http://www.secureav.com/Drone-Listings-Page.html (describing challenges and
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suggested flight safety responses by manned aircraft pilots operating in the presence of UAS). See, e.g.,
PrecisionHawk, PrecisionHawk Research Outlines Operations Risk for Drones Flying Beyond Line of Sight
(Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.precisionhawk.com/media/topic/precisionhawk-releases-faa-pathfinderphase-2-data-at-uas-taac/ (In FAA Pathfinder Program research, manned aircraft pilots could typically
detect intruding aircraft at a distance of 2-3 nautical miles compared to 1-2 nautical miles for non-pilots.).
132

See generally Douglas M. Marshall, et al., Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 2nd Ed., ch.12,
Communications Systems, pp. 333, et seq., CRC Press (2016), available at http://tinyurl.com/y7h86spc
(addressing C2); and UASPC, n.134.
133

Autonomous Aircraft/Operations - See ICAO, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), Cir 328 AN/190 (2011),
https://www.icao.int/Meetings/UAS/Documents/Circular%20328_en.pdf (defining “autonomous aircraft”
as: “[a]n unmanned aircraft that does not allow pilot intervention in the management of the flight.”); ICAO,
Working Paper, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems Panel (RPASP), Autonomy and Automation (Mar. 13-17,
2017), available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20170002271.pdf (considering
pilot “in,” “on” and “out of the loop”). Cf., FAA, Advisory Circular, AC 107-2, Subj. Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, § 5.2.3, Autonomous Operations (June 21, 2016), https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/AC_107-2_AFS1_Signed.pdf (“An autonomous operation is generally considered an operation in which the remote pilot
inputs a flight plan into the CS, which sends it to the autopilot onboard the small UA. During automated
flight, flight control inputs are made by components onboard the aircraft, not from a CS."); Kristine M.
Kiernan, PhD, Human factors considerations in autonomous lethal unmanned aerial systems, Abstract,
A3IRCON (2015), available at https://commons.erau.edu/aircon/2015/Friday/22/. See generally Am.
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) Intelligent Systems Tech Comm. (ISTC), Roadmap for
Intelligent Systems in Aerospace (June 6, 2016),
https://info.aiaa.org/tac/isg/ISTC/Shared%20Documents/Roadmap%20for%20Intelligent%20Systems%20in
%20Aerospace/AIAA_Roadmap_for_Intelligent_Systems-v1.0_14Jun2016.pdf; NIST, Autonomy Levels for
Unmanned Systems, https://www.nist.gov/el/intelligent-systems-division-73500/cognition-andcollaboration-systems/autonomy-levels-unmanned (portal for framework, terminology, publications); and
Andrew Lasher, et al., MITRE, A Framework for Discussing Trust in Increasingly Autonomous Systems (June
2017), https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/17-2432-framework-discussing-trustincreasingly-autonomous-systems.pdf (trustworthiness as the “real competency of a system”). Also,
consider the effects of autonomous operations on complacency. John Markoff, Robot Cars Can’t Count on
Us in an Emergency, NYT (June 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/technology/google-selfdriving-cars-handoff-problem.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share (human as a reliable
backup a “fallacy”).
Autonomous Systems & Ethical Considerations - Autonomous systems increasingly rely on artificial
intelligence (AI) or machine learning to give the appearance of intelligence. The algorithms underlying these
systems, and the machines’ decisions, are generally opaque to their users—yet the algorithms may raise
ethical issues. See U.S. Dep’t of Transp. & Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Federal Automated Vehicles
Policy: Accelerating the next Revolution in Roadway Safety, p. 26 (2016),
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/AV%20policy%20guidance%20PDF.pdf (“Even in
instances in which no explicit ethical rule or preference is intended, the programming of a [highly
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automated vehicle] may establish an implicit or inherent decision rule with significant ethical
consequences.”); Markus Christen, et al., An Evaluation Schema for the Ethical Use of Autonomous Robotic
Systems in Security Applications (Oct. 2017), UZH Digital Society Initiative, U. of Zurich, available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3063617 (framework for and survey of ethical issues affecting autonomous
UAS); NASA Selects Three Aeronautics Teams to Explore an Autonomous Future, UAS Vision (June 8, 2017),
http://www.uasvision.com/2017/06/08/nasa-selects-three-aeronautics-teams-to-explore-an-autonomousfuture/; IEEE Standards Ass’n, The IEEE Global initiative for Ethical Considerations in Artificial Intelligence
and Autonomous Systems, https://standards.ieee.org/develop/indconn/ec/autonomous_systems.html; and
United Nations Office in Geneva (UNOG), Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems,
https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/8FA3C2562A60FF81C1257CE600393DF6?OpenDocu
ment (materials addressing ethical considerations).
134

Additional issues deserving of attention in training may include: electrical load management, heat
thresholds, controllers, battery performance, RF interference, frequency spectrum challenges, and satellite
latency. See generally FAA, Remote Pilot - Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Study Guide, FAA-G-8082-22
(Aug. 2016),
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/media/remote_pilot_study_guide.
pdf, and JARUS, RPAS “Required C2 Performance” (RLP) concept, Doc. JAR_DEL_WG5_D.04, § 3.3.1, p. 22,
http://jarus-rpas.org/sites/jarus-rpas.org/files/storage/LibraryDocuments/jar_doc_13_rpl_concept_upgraded.pdf (“[T]he RPAS C2 function is dependent on the C2
system design, including but not limited to transmission protocols, automation levels, message error
correction, performance of the flight and ground computers and message criticality prioritization.” And, §
2.1.2, “Poor performance in the communications between the RPIL [Remote Pilot] and the RPA would for
example lead to increased separation and reduced airspace capacity to maintain the current safety levels.”).
Thus, training and understanding their limitations is essential.
135

See, e.g., Vampire® for Unmanned Air Systems, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tzEk1k0uvMk (simulation and related UAS training video); and UASPC,
n.124 (addressing simulation).
136

See 14 C.F.R. § 107.49(c) (“Ensure that all control links between ground control station and the [sUAS]
are working properly.”). Consider that some UAS do communicate cautions and warnings to ground
stations. Be attentive to, and proactively and appropriately responsive to such cautions and warnings. See
also ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 13.4.3 (“All warnings and alerts currently provided for manned aircraft should
be considered for inclusion in the RPS.”).
Implement procedures for real-time monitoring of the control link, and awareness of its quality—and
minimum acceptable quality. Many UAS control stations display (at least) signal strength graphically—
typically as the corresponding number of “bars”. See Kerry Williamson, et al., FAA Interim Technical Report,
Radio Line of Sight (RLOS) Coverage Field Tests with a 900 MHz Antenna (100mW), p. 23 (Feb. 2, 2017),
http://www.assureuas.org/projects/deliverables/a2/FAA_Progress_Deliverable_RLOS_Testing.pdf
(manufacturer radio specifications under ideal conditions may overestimate the RLOS link distance in realworld conditions; significant link margin (15 dBm or greater) as a closer estimate of a “safe” RLOS coverage
area due to complexity / variability of RF signal attenuation at low AGLs; variability of battery life a factor;
maintenance critical). Some experienced UAS operators propose a rule-of-thumb for signal strength: links
should be capable of a reliable signal over a minimum range equivalent to twice the visible distance of the
aircraft for VLOS operation.

116

UAS Pilots Code –Annotated Version 1.0
137

Both UAS and manned aircraft pilots take responsibility for safety of the NAS.

Drafting Considerations: The Drafting Team sought to avoid the principle from being misinterpreted to
mean that if the UAS operator observes anything suspicious or illegal via the UAS sensors, the UAS operator
should report it. That is, the provision and associated SRPs do not imply "deputizing" UAS operators to
report illegal activities based on their UAS feed monitoring or otherwise impinging on privacy rights.
Instead, the intent is to cover activities that tend to threaten aviation safety. For example, if a UAS pilot
becomes aware of someone pointing lasers at aircraft, or maliciously using an aviation transceiver, or other
activities that may compromise the safety of the NAS, it should be reported immediately.
138

The UASPC embraces immutable elements of the proposed FAA Reauthorization Act of 2017,
particularly:
It is the policy of the United States that the operation of any unmanned aircraft or
unmanned aircraft system shall be carried out in a manner that respects and protects
personal privacy consistent with the United States Constitution and Federal, State, and
local law.
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2017 (Senate Bill), Title II, Part I-Privacy and Transparency (§ 2101), available at
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/1e5fb629-5fde-49da-9e09e7bfce702c99/FDA7993A27A984DBEC38510A5DA60E58.s.-1405---faa-bill.pdf. See NTIA, Voluntary Best
Practices for UAS Privacy, Transparency, and Accountability, § 4(a) (May 18, 2016),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2016/multistakeholder-process-unmanned-aircraft-systems
(regarding “Secure Covered Data”):
UAS operators should take measures to manage security risks of covered data by
implementing a program that contains reasonable administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards appropriate to the operator’s size and complexity, the nature and scope of its
activities, and the sensitivity of the covered data.
Examples of appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards include those
described in guidance from the Federal Trade Commission, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework,
https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework, and the International Organization for
Standardization’s 27001 standard for information security management,
https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.html.
For example, UAS operators engaging in commercial activity should consider taking the
following actions to secure covered data:
• Having a written security policy with respect to the collection, use, storage, and
dissemination of covered data appropriate to the size and complexity of the
operator and the sensitivity of the data collected and retained.
• Making a reasonable effort to regularly monitor systems for breach and data
security risks.
• Making a reasonable effort to provide security training to employees with access
to covered data.
• Making a reasonable effort to permit only authorized individuals to access
covered data.
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Internet-of-Things - sUAS can also be viewed as a specie of the Internet of things (IoT)—with corresponding
security and privacy implications—and that its “evolution will be constrained until safety and security
requirements can be proven in flight operations.” WIND, The Internet of Things in Commercial Aviation,
White Paper, p. 6 (2015), http://events.windriver.com/wrcd01/wrcm/2016/08/WP-IoT-the-internet-ofthings-for-commercial-aviation.pdf. See FTC, Internet of Things: Privacy & Security in a Connected World,
Staff Report, pp. 27–46 (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federaltrade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf
(presenting FTC Comm’n Staff’s views and recommendations for IoT data security and data
minimization/privacy best practices); NIST, Cyber-Physical Systems, https://www.nist.gov/el/cyber-physicalsystems (addressing cyber-physical systems); and Tim Polk, et al., Mitigating IoT-Based Distributed Denial of
Service (DDOS,) NIST (Nov. 2017), https://nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/library/project-descriptions/iotddos-project-description-final.pdf.
As a practical matter, information security of UAS as IoT endpoints is largely the realm of equipment
manufacturers and possibly network operators as more begin to use mobile networks for C2 and/or
payload communications. From the remote pilot’s perspective, any kind of attack that renders the UAV
unresponsive is the same as a lost link condition. Nonetheless, UAS pilots and operators should become
aware of the attendant security threats to inform their overall flight risk decisions and mitigation strategies.
139

Special Use Airspace (SUA) is a subset of Special Activity Airspace (SAA), defined as “[a]ny airspace with
defined dimensions within the National Airspace System wherein limitations may be imposed upon aircraft
operations. . . .” Cf., SUA is defined as “[a]irspace of defined dimensions identified by an area on the surface
of the earth wherein activities must be confined because of their nature and/or wherein limitations may be
imposed upon aircraft operations that are not a part of those activities . . .” FAA, Pilot/Controller Glossary
(Aug. 25, 2011), http://tfmlearning.faa.gov/Publications/atpubs/PCG/S.HTM (defining SUA).
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ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 9.11.1 (“Security is a vital issue for [RPAS]”).
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See, e.g., Gov’t of India, Office of the Dir. Gen. of Civil Avi., Civil Avi. Regs., § 3, Series X, Part 1, Sub. 8.1,
http://www.dgca.nic.in/misc/draft%20cars/CAR%20-%20UAS%20(Draft_Nov2017).pdf (“The
owner/operator shall be responsible for the safe custody, security and access control of the RPAS.”).
142

The permissibility of flight over property—whether public or private—remains a contentious and
developing issue. See, e.g., Boggs. v. Merideth, Case 3:16-CV-00006-DJH (W. Dist. KY Ct, 2016), available at
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2674191/001-Complaint-for-Declaratory-Judgment-and.pdf
(supporting the practice of seeking permission); U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946), available at
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/328/256/case.html (property owner’s right to control “at
least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land.”).
143

There is an impetus to restrict UAS pilot access to certain safety and security features, such as those
designed to limit unmanned aircraft to within line of sight and "return to home" functions. See UAS-ID ARC,
ARC Recommendations, Final Report, p. 3 (dated Sept. 30, 2017, released Dec. 19, 2017). Additionally, many
sUAS make use of a smartphone or tablet device, certain settings of which may adversely affect flight
operations. Pilots should consider disabling screen auto-lock, and setting the device to airplane mode to
avoid receiving phone or text messages on the device, which may interrupt critical flight operations or
impede C2. Consult your UAS user guide, operating handbook or manual for additional information.
144

Some practical pilot actions may include, but are not limited to contacting and introducing yourself to
nearby people to explain the intended mission, dressing professionally, carrying/wearing credentials,
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posting signage near the intended mission, and presenting a postcard with the pilots (or, where applicable,
operators) credentials and mission description.
Drafting Consideration: The Drafting Team sought to recommend practices that would not unreasonably
constrain the legal rights and scope of legitimate UAS operations. “[A]voiding even the appearance of a
security threat,” although a subjective determination, is intended to yield the most prudent course of
action.
145

Counter-UAS - “The Small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) is a disruptive commercial technology that
poses a unique and currently undefined threat to U.S. national security. Although, as with any new
technology, the parameters of the capabilities regarding military uses have yet to be fully discovered,
recent events highlight the potential danger. . . . To effectively counter sUASs it will be necessary to refine
and practice procedures and doctrine, while developing the capability to effectively detect, track, and
positively identify the threat.” Anthony Tingle & David Tyree, The Rise of the Commercial Threat: Countering
the Small Unmanned Aircraft System, JFQ 85 2nd Ed., pp. 30-31 (2nd Qtr 2017), available at
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-85/jfq-85_30-35_Tingle-Tyree.pdf.
Perceived Threats Precipitating Shoot-downs - The perceived threats by the public extend from privacy
(see below) to the existential, perhaps exacerbated by widespread media focus on weaponized UAS. See,
e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security (DHS), National Terrorism Advisory System Bulletin (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/ntas/advisory/ntas_17_1109_0001 (“Some terrorist groups overseas are using
battlefield experiences to pursue new technologies and tactics, such as unmanned aerial systems and
chemical agents that could be used outside the conflict zones.”).
Perceived privacy threats and vigilante shoot-downs are increasing, as reflected in case law and the media.
See, e.g., Boggs v. Merideth, No. 3:2016cv00006 - Doc. 20 (W.D. Ky. 2017), available at
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/kentucky/kywdce/3:2016cv00006/96944/20/; WDRB,
Judge dismisses charges for man who shot down drone (Oct. 26, 2015),
http://www.wdrb.com/story/30354128/judge-dismisses-charges-for-man-who-shot-down-drone; Julie
Carey, et al., Virginia Woman Says She Shot Down Drone Near Actor Robert Duvall's Home, NBC Wash.,
http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Virginia-Woman-Shoots-Down-Drone-Near-Actor-RobertDuvalls-Home-391423411.html; and Cyrus Farivar, Man takes drone out for a sunset flight, drone gets shot
down, ARS Technica (Apr. 25, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/04/man-takes-drone-outfor-a-sunset-flight-drone-gets-shot-down/; http://www.popsci.com/it-is-federal-crime-to-shoot-downdrone-says-faa.
146

UAS Registration - Registration is required in the United States for all commercial and recreational UAS
greater than .55 lbs. See FAA, Getting Started, https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/; 14 C.F.R. §
107.13, Registration (requiring compliance with § 91.203(a)(2)); and the Nat’l Defense Auth. Act for Fiscal
Year 2018, § 1092(s) (enacted Dec. 12, 2017), restoring a UAS registration requirement for model aircraft:
(d) RESTORATION OF RULES FOR REGISTRATION AND MARKING OF UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT.—The rules adopted by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration in the matter of registration and marking requirements for small
unmanned aircraft (FAA-2015-7396; published on December 16, 2015) that were vacated
by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Taylor v.
Huerta (No. 15-1495), [dec. May 19, 2017, available at
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15932350315687343901&hl=en&as_sdt=
2006] shall be restored to effect on the date of enactment of this Act.

119

UAS Pilots Code –Annotated Version 1.0

http://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20171113/HRPT-115-HR2810.pdf. Registration for small UAS platforms
can be accomplished online via FAADroneZone, https://faadronezone.faa.gov/#/. See 14 C.F.R. Parts 47 and
48 (prescribing general aircraft and sUAS registration requirements). As of January 2018, "more than a
million UAS have been registered with the FAA." Elaine Chow, US Secy. of Transp., Presentation at CES, Las
Vegas (Jan. 11, 2018). Cf., JARUS, JARUS OPS, Recommendations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS),
Operations for Category A and B, JAR_DEL_WG2_D.03, Art. 5–Registrations and identification, ❡ 1 (Oct. 7,
2017), available at http://apant.pt/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/jar_doc_14_draft_d3_ops_cat_a_extcons_251017.pdf (“The operator of an UA .
. . shall register in the manner established by the NAA . . .”).
The following highlights a few proposals by industry, government, and NGOs that may contribute to
effective UAS registration infrastructure and practices, and also interface and support identification,
authorization and other security services addressed in UASPC, nn.146-7. See UAS-ID ARC Final Report,
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/UAS%20ID%20ARC%
20Final%20Report%20with%20Appendices.pdf.
Global Registry - ICAO has proposed a registry concept for drones to facilitate state
interoperability for international drone use; “provide a plug-and-play option for States without an
existing drone registry, or enable API integration with a State’s existing drone registry.” Stephen
Creamer, Dir., Air Nav. Bureau, ICAO, Presentation at DRONE ENABLE 2017 (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://www.icao.int/Meetings/UAS2017/Documents/Drone%20Registry%20Presentation%20Dro
ne%20Enable_FINAL.pdf (also noting ICAO’s experience operating the Aircraft Registration System
integrating with the Int’l Registry of Commercial Aircraft). See ICAO, Aircraft Nationality And
Registration Marks, Annex 7 (4th ed. 1981), available at
https://www.highergraphics.com/hg_docs/ICAO%20Annex%207.pdf; and Int’l Registry of Mobile
Assets, https://www.internationalregistry.aero/ir-web/ (global registry example for interests in
aircraft assets).
Domain Name System (DNS) - The Domain Name System (DNS), the internet's hierarchical,
decentralized naming system may in part enable UAS registration (in coordination with the ICAO
registry initiative), recognizing the DNS’ extensible, scalable, and ubiquitous nature. See Hillman
Mitchell Pres., Critical Infrastructure Cyber Security Consultants, Presentation at ICAO, DRONE
ENABLE 2017, Cyber Threats: Initiatives to assist industry in building resilient system (Sept. 22,
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TJJJbaqsPyc (“We think the addressable entities within
aviation in the future need to actually be scaled . . . up to 10 billion entities.” emphasis added.
Identifying namespace conventions and schemes are essential to a UAS ecosystem.). See also
ICANN, Global UAS Registry initiative,
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/registries/registries-en; and IoT, Air: The Next Frontier for
the IoT (Oct. 7, 2016), available at https://ipv6.net/news/air-the-next-frontier-for-the-iot/; and
UASPC, n.138 (regarding IoT).
Legacy Services - Various traditional manned aviation service providers have proposed using
aviation-centric databases and related capabilities to support UAS registration.
147

Identification, Tracking, and Authorization - The remote identification, tracking, and authorization (for
specific privileges such as entry to particular airspace) requires use of diverse technologies. The choice of
such technologies may impact flight safety, cost, operational efficiency/effectiveness/ease-of-use,
interoperability, mission and equipment, national security, public safety, and technology
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availability/readiness. Pilots and operators must have at least a basic understand of the applicable
technologies and their associated limitations, recognizing that each may affect flight safety, operations, and
efficiency.
The FAA is considering new identification and tracking rules that will be informed by the Final Report of the
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Identification (ID) and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC)
(“UAS-ID ARC”), ARC Recommendations, Final Report (dated Sept. 30, 2017, released Dec. 19, 2017) (“UASID Final Report”),
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/UAS%20ID%20ARC%
20Final%20Report%20with%20Appendices.pdf. Key recommendations include: “two methods for UAS to
provide remote ID and tracking information -- (1) direct broadcast (locally, e.g., ADS-B, Low-Power Direct
RF, Unlicensed Integrated C2, and Visual Light Encoding); and (2) network publishing (e.g., Networked
Cellular, Satellite, and SW [software]-based Flight Notification w/ Telemetry) to an FAA-approved internetbased database,” UAS-ID Final Report, § 6.2, p. 33; “a tiered approach” to direct broadcast and network
publishing requirements, UAS-ID Final Report, § 6.3, p. 35; and minimum data requirements, UAS-ID Final
Report, § 6.5, p. 39. The ARC’s recommendations did not include a third option (or means) that would have
provided for proven, developed, or designed systems fitting safely into the existing or a future version of an
ATM framework.
There is an expectation for robust interoperability of an ID and tracking system with ATC. UAS-ID Final
Report, § 6.6, p. 44. And yet, there may be limitations on interoperability with ATC that may not fit the
autonomous UTM framework. To this extent, perhaps UAS flight operations should remain entirely invisible
to ATC.
A schema to manage personally identifiable information is also proposed, UAS-ID Final Report, § 7.1, p. 46.
And, it was recognized that “it is important to protect the privacy of UAS owners and operators,” UAS-ID
Final Report, § 6.5.3, p. 41; and recommending three levels of data access, UAS-ID Final Report, § 7.1.
The UAS-ID Final Report states that the committee failed to reach consensus on certain ID and tracking
threshold requirements, such as exemptions for model aircraft users. UAS-ID Final Report, § 5.2.3, pp. 2930. See, e.g., The Comm. Drone Alliance, The Comm. Drone Alliance Dissents from the Key
Recommendations of the UAS ID and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking Committee (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://www.commercialdronealliance.org/newsarchive/2017/12/19/the-commercial-drone-alliancedissents-from-the-key-recommendations-of-the-uas-id-and-tracking-aviation-rulemaking-committee (in
part, urging a weight threshold, “accommodating technological development”, and eliminating the model
aircraft exclusion).
One “direct broadcast (locally)” or non-network, localized approach is described in DJI, “What’s In a
Name?” A Call for a Balanced Remote Identification Approach, A DJI Technology Whitepaper (Mar. 22,
2017), available at http://tinyurl.com/yaqdvth9; and Walter Stockwell, PhD, Dir. Tech. Stds., DJI,
Presentation at ICAO, DRONE ENABLE 2017, Montréal (Sept. 22, 2017) (utilizing existing UAS radios,
embedding ID data in the C2 link, thereby facilitating scaling & int’l compliance, without an internet
connection: AeroScope https://www.dji.com/newsroom/news/understanding-dji-aeroscope-solution).
Another “direct broadcast” technology facilitating network publishing is Automatic Dependent Surveillance
Broadcast (ADS-B) that uses GPS signals and aircraft avionics to transmit aircraft location to ATC and aircraft
receivers to support aircraft separation and traffic flow mgt. FAA, Fact Sheet—Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=7131; and
FAA, ORDER 8200.85, Subj: Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Flight Inspection (Oct. 19,
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2014), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/8200_45_ADS-B.pdf. ADS-B transceivers
increasingly provide cost, form-factor, etc. and ID message protocol extension can enable sUAS —still, its
practical implementation will require low power ADS-B approval. See uAvionix, Concept for Remote
Identification (Mar. 22, 2017), http://www.uavionix.com/downloads/whitepapers/uavionix-remoteidentification-white-paper.pdf; and R. Michael Guterres, et al., Small UAS Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Like Surveillance Concept of Operations: A Path Forward for Small UAS
Operations Surveillance (2017), https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/16-4497-AIAA-2017ADS-B.pdf. ADS-B transmission power and traffic density parameters can be balanced to provide
safety/utility sUAS operation). See generally RTCA, DO-317B, Minimum Operational Performance Standards
(MOPS) for Aircraft Surveillance Applications (ASA) System (June 17, 2014), available (fee) at www.rtca.org.
The UAS-ID Final Report’s discussion of “Network publishing (to an FAA-approved internet-based
database)”, and, among other recommendations, urges that the “FAA should leverage internet-based
database infrastructure that exists or that is already under development and that could integrate with the
FAA’s future UTM roadmap . . . [and] could result in the rapid deployment of internet-based database
publishing capability by leveraging technologies that already exist.” Different or competing technologies
could coexist so long as they could be published "to an API" and satisfy "the internet-based database
publishing requirement.” UAS-ID ARC Final Report, § 6.2.2, p. 34.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) - PKI is an extensible/scalable technology that can support transportable
identities and provide diverse security services by deploying trusted digital certificates. Its use for UAS
registration, authentication, and privacy has been proposed. See, e.g., FAA, Rob Segers, Info. Sec. Sys. Engr,
FAA, NextGen Security Branch, Presentation at ICAO, Second Global Air Nav. Industry Symposium
(GANIS/2), Cyber Threats: Initiatives to assist industry in building resilient system (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=youtu.be&v=TJJJbaqsPyc&app=desktop (proposing a PKI-based
ICAO “Trust” Bridge); Patrick Mana, EUROCONTROL, SWIM Common PKI and policies & procedures for
establishing a Trust Framework (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.sesardeploymentmanager.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/3.-Common-PKI-INEA-2017-Kick-off.ppt; and Jared Ablon, Presentation at ICAO,
DRONE ENABLE 2017, Montréal (Sept. 22, 2017) (“We believe the digital identity should be in the form of a
digital certificate . . . based on public key cryptography.”).
The UAS-ID ARC Final Report, § 5.1.2.3, p. 18, sought a technology security solution providing three
attributes: “Spoofing Security”, “Tamper Proof”, and “Tracking Verification”. PKI can provide such services.
Digital certificates are broadcast-method independent, can support diverse identity and privacy policy
requirements, and be embedded in diverse schemes, architectures, and registries. See generally Michael S.
Baum, Federal Certification Authority Liability and Policy, MITRE Corp. under Contract #50SBN1C6732
(1992), available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/rvgwyev058qy2r9/Fed-Cert-Auth.pdf?dl=0; and Warwick
Ford & Michael S. Baum, Secure Electronic Commerce, Building the Infrastructure for Digital Signatures and
Encryption, 2nd Ed., Prentice Hall (2000).
148

See 49 C.F.R. § 171.8, available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title49-vol2/pdf/CFR-2011title49-vol2-sec171-8.pdf (defining hazardous material as “a substance or material [including] hazardous
substances, hazardous wastes, marine pollutants, elevated temperature materials, materials designated as
hazardous in the Hazardous Materials Table (see 49 CFR 172.101) . . .”); and 14 C.F.R. § 107.36, Carriage of
hazardous materials (prohibiting the carriage of certain agricultural materials, such as pesticides or other
products by small unmanned aircraft systems). This provision is not eligible for waiver under 14 C.F.R. §
107.205, List of regulations subject to waiver. 49 C.F.R. § 171.8, Hazardous material means a substance or
material that the Secretary of Transportation has determined is capable of posing an unreasonable risk to
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health, safety, and property when transported in commerce, and has designated as hazardous under
section 5103 of Federal hazardous materials transportation law (49 U.S.C. § 5103).
149

See, e.g., ASTM Int’l, F3201, Standard Practice for Ensuring Dependability of Software Used in Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS), available (fee) at https://www.astm.org/COMMITTEE/F38.htm; RTCA SC-228,
Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, available (fee) at
www.rtca.org; and JARUS, RPAS “Required C2 Performance” (RLP) concept, Doc JAR_DEL_WG5_D.04, § 2.1.2
(Jan. 5, 2016), http://jarus-rpas.org/sites/jarus-rpas.org/files/storage/LibraryDocuments/jar_doc_13_rpl_concept_upgraded.pdf (“Poor performance in the communications between
the RPIL [Remote Pilot not co-located] and the RPA would for example lead to increased separation and
reduced airspace capacity to maintain the current safety levels.”; and presenting possible safety
requirements, including time stamping. Table B-4 Safety reqs., pp. 45-46). See also Richard M. Lusk, et al.,
An Early Survey of Best Practices for the Use of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems by the Electric Utility
Industry, § 4.3.5 (asserting power line inspection industry best practices to “Encrypt Aircraft Control Signal
Frequencies” and “Encrypt Datalink Frequencies”); and UASPC, n.147 (introducing PKI).
150

Such requirements may derive from, among other sources, UAS operator / enterprise-client contract,
regulation, standards, and industry best practices. See ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 6.4.7 (“When contracting
or purchasing service as part of its activity . . . ensure that such services or products conform to the
applicable requirements.”). Security assurances extend to safety-critical service providers. See JARUS, JARUS
OPS, Recommendations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), Operations for Category A and B,
JAR_DEL_WG2_D.03, Art. 10.–Safety-critical services, ❡ 1 (Oct. 7, 2017), available at http://apant.pt/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/jar_doc_14_draft_d3_ops_cat_a_extcons_251017.pd (“The provider of any
safety-critical services is responsible for the accuracy and integrity of the provided information and data,
and for the quality of the services.”).
Responsibility for security extends to third party service providers used by UAS operators, UAS
manufacturers and their supporting service and product providers, and regulators. Indeed, the
responsibility for security is shared; and, it cannot be provided unilaterally by government. See generally
NIST, Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Draft Ver. 2 (Dec. 5, 2017),
https://www.nist.gov/cybersecurity-framework/cybersecurity-framework-draft-version-11, pursuant to
Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-criticalinfrastructure-cybersecurity (directing NIST to publish a baseline framework that “promot[es] safety,
security, business confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberties . . . and implement risk-based standards.”),
updated by the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (CEA), 15 U.S.C. § 272(e)(1)(A)(i) (enacted Dec.18,
2014), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/1353/text.
151

See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 1552.23, Security awareness training programs, https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/textidx?SID=cac873cb4523ff550f4dec504af03818&mc=true&node=se49.9.1552_123&rgn=div8 (flight school
security awareness training). Cf., 49 C.F.R. § 1542.113, Airport tenant security programs,
https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/textidx?SID=98e5059218489fbbca1fa21fa6526d34&mc=true&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title49/49cfr1542_main_02.tpl;
and NTIA, Voluntary Best Practices for UAS Privacy, Transparency, and Accountability, § 4 (“Mak[e] a
reasonable effort to provide security training to employees with access to covered data.”).
152

Public agencies, operators with a Certificate of Authorization or Special Government Interest Addendum,
or private commercial operators may issue NOTAMs to advise pilots of their activities. For NOTAMS defining
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UAS operating areas (UOAs), see www.1800wxbrief.com; and may also be referred to as “DROTAMS”. See
Gen. Aviation News (Mar. 21, 2016), https://generalaviationnews.com/2016/03/21/skyvector-adds-realismto-drone-movie-adds-drotams/ (introducing DROTAMs).
153

See 14 C.F.R. § 107.47, Flight restrictions in the proximity of certain areas designated by notice to airmen
(requiring compliance with: 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.137 Temporary flight restrictions in the vicinity of
disaster/hazard areas, 91.138 Temporary flight restrictions in national disaster areas in the State of Hawaii,
91.139 Emergency air traffic rules, 91.141 Flight restrictions in the proximity of the Presidential and other
parties, 91.143 Flight limitation in the proximity of space flight operations, 91.144 Temporary restriction on
flight operations during abnormally high barometric pressure conditions, and 91.145 Management of
aircraft operations in the vicinity of aerial demonstrations and major sporting events); and UASPC, n.139
(addressing Special Activity Airspace).
154

See 14 C.F.R. § 99.7, Special security instructions, available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012title14-vol2/pdf/CFR-2012-title14-vol2-sec99-7.pdf (“Each person operating an aircraft in an ADIZ or
Defense Area must, in addition to the applicable rules of this part, comply with special security instructions
issued by the Administrator in the interest of national security . . .”); FAA, Sporting Event TFR, FDC NOTAM
4/3621, available at https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/uas_regulations_policy/media/Sports_TFRUAS_Handout.pdf (re stadiums; large crowds); FAA, FAA Restricts Drone Operations Over Certain Military
Bases, https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=87865); and Nat’l Interagency Fire Center,
https://www.nifc.gov/drones/ (prohibition on public lands to “[r]esist or interfere with the efforts of
firefighter(s) to extinguish a fire.” 43 C.F.R. § 9212.1(f)). See generally, FAA, Airspace Restrictions,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/where_to_fly/airspace_restrictions/ (Special Flight Rules Areas); and FAA, UAS
Data Delivery System, https://uas-faa.opendata.arcgis.com (providing graphical UAS data, including for
security restrictions).
155

Critical Infrastructure - See FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, § 2209, available at
https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ190/PLAW-114publ190.pdf (facilitating petitions for FAA “to
prohibit or restrict the operation of an unmanned aircraft in close proximity to a fixed site facility” that
includes “critical infrastructure”); DHS, Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) - Critical Infrastructure,
https://www.dhs.gov/uas-ci; https://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure (addressing, in part, “Why is
the Threat Important to Critical Infrastructure?”; asserting UAS threats “will continue to expand in nature
and increase in volume in the coming years”; and recognizing that “UAS can often evade detection and
create challenges for the critical infrastructure community”); and FAA Restricts Drone Operations Over DOE
Facilities, https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=89365. Threats extend beyond unmanned aircraft
themselves to the broader computing base used to process, communicate, and store UAS-related data,
including flight log, UA performance, and UA sensor data. Regarding threats to the computing base, see,
e.g., DHS, DHS Statement on the Issuance of Binding Operational Directive 17-01 (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/13/dhs-statement-issuance-binding-operational-directive-17-01
(prohibiting Kaspersky Lab products and services, citing risk of Russian government compromise to
infosystems implicating U.S. national security). Regarding threats from UAS, see, e.g., Paul Mozur, Drone
Maker D.J.I. May Be Sending Data to China, U.S. Officials Say, NYT (Nov. 29, 2017), available at
tinyurl.com/y8rtdybe (asserting “commercial drones and software may be sending sensitive information
about American infrastructure abroad [and explaining] how consumer technology companies have become
increasingly central to debates about national security”); and Michael Pehel, DJI Responds to the Army Ban
with No-Internet Mode, Interdrone (Aug. 15, 2017), available at http://tinyurl.com/ya9hendh (DJI creates
“local data mode” to prevent connection and transfer of data.).
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Trespass to Land - “One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of whether he thereby
causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other, if he intentionally (a) enters land in the
possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails
to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove.” Restatement (Third) of Torts § 158
(2013).
Aerial Trespass - “Flight by an aircraft in the air space above the land of another is trespass if [the aircraft]
enters the immediate reaches of the air space next to the land, and (1) [it] interferes substantially with the
other’s use and enjoyment of the land.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 159(2). Unlike in surface land
cases where “two-dimensional surface boundary lines are usually perfectly clear . . . . [t]he analysis is far
less straightforward in the murky realm of aerial trespass because the upper boundaries of landowners’
airspace rights are largely undefined . . . [and] courts must engage in subjective and unpredictable inquiries
into whether the alleged aerial intrusion penetrated the amorphous ‘immediate reaches’ of the plaintiff’s
airspace and whether such intrusion substantially interfered with the plaintiff’s ‘use’ of her land.” Troy A.
Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, B.U. L. Rev. vol. 95, pp. 155, 170 (2015),
http://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2015/02/RULE.pdf; and Hillary B. Farber, Keep Out! The Efficacy of
Trespass, Nuisance and Privacy Torts as Applied to Drones, 33 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 359 (2017), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2852083.
157

Private Nuisance - “One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal
cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is
either (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules
controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities.”
Restatement (Third) of Torts (2013), § 822, General Rule.
Public Nuisance - See John E. Bryson, et al., Public Nuisance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and
Environmental Law, Ecology L.Q., Vol. 2 Spring (1972), available at
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=elq. Trespass and private
nuisance “may be distinguished by comparing the interest invaded; an actionable invasion of a possessor's
interest in the exclusive possession of land is a trespass; an actionable invasion of a possessor's interest in
the use and enjoyment of his land is a nuisance.” Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790,
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960), available at https://law.justia.com/cases/oregon/supremecourt/1959/221-or-86-0.html.
158

Intrusion Upon Seclusion - “One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude
or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Restatement (Third) Torts, §
652B, available at https://cyber.harvard.edu/privacy/Privacy_R2d_Torts_Sections.htm. Such invasion may
be physical or by “use of the defendant's senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear
the plaintiff's private affairs.” Id., Comments b.
159

See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in the age of drones, 95 B.U. L. Rev. vol. 95, p. 155 (2015),
http://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2015/02/RULE.pdf (There is unavoidable tension between the
permissible scope of available airspace and the low-altitude rights of landowners—such rights are not yet
clearly defined.). A uniform law is under development that might provide a measured, incremental
extension of traditional trespass law addressing low altitude flight (most likely at or below 200 AGL) by the
Nat’l Conf. of Comm. on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), http://www.uniformlaws.org/.
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See FAA, ORDER JO 7110.65x, Subj. Air Traffic Control ( Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/JO_7110.65X_Air_Traffic_Control.pdf (§ 2−1−21,
TRAFFIC ADVISORIES: describing general reporting instructions for ATC; and § 2−1−22, UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (UAS) ACTIVITY INFORMATION for ATC: “Issue UAS advisory information for known UAS
activity, when in your judgment their proximity warrants it. If known, include position, distance, course,
type of unmanned aircraft (UA), and altitude. . . . b. Issue UAS advisory information for pilot−reported or
tower−observed activity, when in your judgment, their proximity warrants it. If known, include position,
altitude, course, and type. Continue to issue advisories to potentially impacted aircraft for at least 15
minutes following the last report. . .”); and FAA, Flight Service,
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/systemops/fs/ (describing
mission, services and use).
161

See FAA, AIM, Pilot/Controller Glossary, Special Activity Airspace, http://www.faraim.org/faa/aim/aim705.html (“Any airspace with defined dimensions within the National Airspace System wherein limitations
may be imposed upon aircraft operations.”).
162

See FAA, SUA, www.sua.faa.gov; FAA, TFR, http://tfr.faa.govl, and
https://notams.aim.faa.gov/notamSearch/disclaimer.html; FAA, Map of FAA UAS Flight Data, http://uasfaa.opendata.arcgis.com; FAA, B4UFLY Mobile App, available at
https://www.faa.gov/uas/where_to_fly/b4ufly/, and AIRMAP, App, https://www.airmap.com/.
163

See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, § 333, 14 C.F.R. Part 107B,
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ95/pdf/PLAW-112publ95.pdf; 14 C.F.R. §§ 107.200,
107.205; and UASPC, nn.112, 139 & 154 (addressing airspace restrictions).
164

Avoid or restrict operations that infringe on non-participants' right to privacy, particularly when
operating in areas or vantage points where an individual has a public expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Katz
v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967), available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/389/347
(individuals retain 4th Amendment protections where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists); Kyollo v.
U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001), available at http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/533/27.html (certain
sensors can violate 4th Amendment protections); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), available at
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/488/445.html (aerial observation of marijuana production;
privacy would include areas such as the curtilage of one's home); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-15
(May 19, 1986), available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/476/207#writingUSSC_CR_0476_0207_ZO (expectation of privacy unreasonable re police “naked eye” observation of
marijuana from 1,000 AGL “within public navigable airspace [] in a physically nonintrusive manner”); Dow
Chemical Co. v. US, 476 U.S. 227, 228 (1986), available at
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/476/227/case.html (“open areas of an industrial plant
complex . . . . not analogous to the "curtilage" of a dwelling for purposes of aerial surveillance”); Florida
Statutes, § 934.50, Searches and seizure using a drone,
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=09000999/0934/Sections/0934.50.html (penal aspects); and NTIA, Voluntary Best Practices for UAS Privacy,
Transparency, and Accountability, § 4(a) (May 18, 2016),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/uas_privacy_best_practices_6-21-16.pdf (“Mak[e] a
reasonable effort to provide security training to employees with access to covered data.”).
165

Additionally, recognize that sophisticated sensors and other UAS payloads may dramatically and
persistently enhance the capability of UAS to surveil people without their knowledge and consent. See, e.g.,
US v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), available at http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/533/27.html
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(surveillance with a device not in general public use is a Fourth Amendment “search”, presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant). See also UK, ANO 2016 (CAP 393), § 167, Small unmanned surveillance
aircraft, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2016/765/contents/made (“. . . must not fly the aircraft . . . (a)
over or within 150 meters of any congested area, (b) over or within 150 meters of an organization open-air
assembly of more than 1,000 persons, (c) within 50 meters of any vessel, vehicle or structure which is not
under the control of the person in charge of the aircraft, or (d) . . . within 150 meters of any congested
areas . . .”); and UK, Dep’t of Transp., Unlocking the UK’s high tech economy: Consultation on the safe use of
drones in the UK, p. 21 (2016),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/579562/consultation-onthe-safe-use-of-drones.pdf (“Whilst the rule was introduced for safety reasons, it also has benefits for
privacy.”).
166

Minimizing data capture duration and location may prevent unintended privacy violations and optimize
data storage use on the UAS. See UASPC n.167.
167

See Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Aviation Comm., Recommended Guidelines for the use of Unmanned
Aircraft (Aug. 2012), www.theiacp.org (“IMAGE RETENTION: 1. Unless required as evidence of a crime, as
part of an ongoing investigation, for training, or required by law, images captured by a UA should not be
retained by the agency. 2. Unless exempt by law, retained images should be open for public inspection.”).
168

“[P]ersonal data” here means information collected by a UAS that identifies a particular person. Cf.,
NTIA, Voluntary Best Practices for UAS Privacy, Transparency, and Accountability, § III. Definitions (May 18,
2016), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/uas_privacy_best_practices_6-21-16.pdf (defining
“covered data”).
169

See NTIA, Voluntary Best Practices for UAS Privacy, Transparency, and Accountability, § 1(b) (addressing
privacy policy and its recommended content).
170

Despite their typically smaller footprint than manned aircraft, UAS’ potential environmental impacts
require assessment.
Noise - “To date, there have not been any objective studies published to gain even a coarse view of
annoyance due to sUAS noise specifically. Further, it is clear that the noise of these machines does not
resemble, qualitatively, the noise of contemporary aircraft. This difference in sound quality introduces an
unknown factor into the prediction of the resultant annoyance.” Andrew Christian, et al., NASA Langley
Research Center, Initial Investigation into the Psychoacoustic Properties of Small Unmanned Aerial System
Noise, Am. Inst. of Aeronautics and Astronautics (2017), available at
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20170005870.pdf.
“[T]he FAA is measuring noise of different UAS to help determine an appropriate certification plan." FAA,
Environment and Energy,
https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/where_we_are_now/nextgen_update/progress_and_plans/environment/.
Internationally, ICAO’s Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP) has investigated “the
current state of noise certification for remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) and will continue monitoring
certification issues in this fast-growing sector.” ICAO, CAEP, Annual Report (2015),
https://www.icao.int/annual-report-2015/Pages/progress-on-icaos-strategic-objectives-safetyenvironmental-protection-caep.aspx.
One helpful analogy (to UAS noise characteristics) is that presented by helicopters. Helicopter noise
research found that helicopters tend to annoy people differently than straight-wing aircraft, both in terms
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of frequency and operational characteristics. See HAI, Fly Neighborly/Noise Abatement Training,
https://www.rotor.org/Operations/FlyNeighborly/NoiseAbatementTrainingCD.aspx. Consider also that UAS
will operate in more environments than do manned aircraft since they are not confined to aerodromes—
and thus may impact a broader scope of environments that have not been the subject of current research.
These differences suggest that in the future, separate UAS requirements or recommendations for noise may
deserve consideration, whether via certification, or voluntary industry standards, e.g., ASTM Int’l, Comm.
F38, www.astm.org. “The FAA is gathering data for all UAS on which it may base future certification
standards . . . . At this time, however, the FAA does not believe there is sufficient evidence to warrant such
a standard. . . . For similar reasons, the FAA lacks sufficient evidence at this time to justify imposing
operating noise limits on small UAS.” Final Rule, Discussion, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,186-7 (June 28, 2016).
FAA’s UAS Rules Excluded From Environmental Assessment - The Final Rule asserts that the Dept. of
Transp. determined that the proposed action (enacting Part 107, etc.) qualifies for a categorical exclusion
(CATEX) under the National Environmental Policy Act (DoT ORDER 5610.1C, Para 4.c.5,
https://www.transportation.gov/office-policy/transportation-policy/procedures-consideringenvironmental-impacts-dot-order-56101c), Final Rule, p. 510, thus precluding the need for an
Environmental Impact Statement. See FAA Order 1050.1F, ❡ 5-6.5(f), Categorical Exclusions for Procedural
Actions, https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_Order_1050_1F.pdf (determining that
the Final Rule is covered by the CATEX). See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Energy, Office of Legacy Mgt., List of Recent
Categorically Excluded Actions, https://energy.gov/lm/services/joint-environmental-management-systemems/national-environmental-policy-act-nepa-0 (includes multiple categorical exclusions for UAS).
The lack of a comprehensive regulatory response reflects the unprecedented/unexpected growth of UAS, a
lack of data and modeling, and government personnel resource constraints. Notwithstanding, the FAA’s
internal work plan for the next fiscal year anticipates further research and response. The FAA’s primary
office on environmental issues is the Environmental Policy and Operations Division, Office of Environment
and Energy, Environmental Policy and Operations Division,
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/research/.
Other Environmental Considerations - See Chris Wargo, et al., UAS Industry Growth: Forecasting Impact on
Regional Infrastructure, Environment, and Economy, p. 5 (2016),
https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/docs/Wargo_DASC_1570263430.pdf (Massachusetts Institute of Technology
studying UAS environmental factors; recognizing, inter alia, “many interrelated and non-linear factors”; and
that “[t]here is no single model to predict environmental impact generally.”). And, the U.S. military
recognizes that UAS present unique environmental challenges. Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Service
Demand 2015-2035, Tech. Rep. DOT-VNTSC-DoD-13-01, V. 0.1, Sec. 6.3 (2013),
https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/service.pdf (“The noise produced by the UAS could mean the difference
between the success and failure of this type of [noise sensitive] mission. . . . The fumes and gaseous
emissions produced by the powerplants will be subject to the same scrutiny of all other transportation
appliances and vehicles.”).
171

Among other protected/sensitive areas are national parks. See Sarah Gray, Drones banned from
Yosemite National Park, for negative impact on environment and safety, Salon.com (May 5, 2014),
http://www.salon.com/2014/05/05/drones_banned_from_yosemite_national_park_for_negative_impact_
on_environment_and_safety/ (describing Yosemite National Park’s UAS prohibition, citing 36 C.F.R. §
2.17(a)(3), Resource Protection, Public Use And Recreation, Aircraft And Air Delivery, and noting an “impact
[on] the natural soundscape” and “creating an environment that is not conducive to wilderness travel.”);
and NPS, Policy Memorandum, Unmanned Aircraft-Interim Policy 14-05 (June 19, 2014),
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https://www.nps.gov/policy/PolMemos/PM_14-05.htm (recognizing “potential to cause unacceptable
impacts such as harming visitors, interfering with rescue operations, causing excessive noise, impacting
viewsheds, and disturbing wildlife”).
172

See Parimal Kopardekar, et al., Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management (UTM) Concept of
Operations, NASA (June 2016), p. 4, https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/docs/Kopardekar_2016-3292_ATIO.pdf (“The
environmental considerations associated with noise stemming from vehicles in the low-altitude operations
could influence large-scale acceptance.”); and Andrew Christian, et al., Initial Investigation into the
Psychoacoustic Properties of Small Unmanned Aerial System Noise, NASA Langley Research Ctr. (2017),
UASPC, n. 170.
173

See ACI, Commentary to AMCC V.a - Environmental Issues, p. 1, http://www.secureav.com/CommentAMCC-V.a-Environmental.pdf (also quoting Jane F. Garvey, fmr. FAA Adm’r, “Environmental protection is
valued and is everyone’s responsibility.”).
174

See Nat’l Fire Protection Ass’n (NFPA), Standard for Aircraft Fuel Servicing, NFPA 407 (2017),
http://www.nfpa.org/Assets/files/AboutTheCodes/407/407_AIF-AAA_A2016_PCResponses.pdf.
175

See, e.g., FAA, Advisory Circular, AC 20-184, Subj. Guidance on Testing and Installation of Rechargeable
Lithium Battery and Battery Systems on Aircraft (Oct. 15, 2015), available at
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_20-184.pdf. Cf., UASPC SRP
corresponding to UASPC, n.93 (addressing battery hazards to persons and property).
176

See NOAA Fisheries, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Responsible Use to Help Protect Marine Mammals,
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/uas.html; Capt. Philip Hall, Office of Marine and Aviation Operations, NOAA,
HQ Perspectives and Impacts of other Federal Regulations Related to UAS Operations (Oct. 26, 2016),
https://swfsc.noaa.gov/uploadedFiles/Events/Meetings/UAS_2016/Pr… (the FAA has underscored that the
Final Rule, p. 526, “does not authorize the harassment, harming, or killing of wildlife, and remote pilots of
small UAS remain subject to environmental and wildlife laws . . .”); The National Marine Sanctuaries Act,
Title 16, Ch. 32, § 1431, et seq., available at https://nmssanctuaries.blob.core.windows.net/sanctuariesprod/media/archive/library/national/nmsa.pdf (unlawful to “destroy, cause the loss of, or injure any
sanctuary resource managed under law or regulations for that sanctuary,” 16 U.S.C. § 1436); and asso.
regulations, available at https://www.eC.F.R..gov/cgi-bin/textidx?tpl=/eC.F.R.browse/Title15/15C.F.R.922_main_02.tpl (includes sanctuary-specific overflight altitude
restrictions).
177

See Chelsea Harvey, Drones could be stressing out wildlife, scientist suggest, Wash. Post (Aug. 13, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/08/13/drones-could-be-stressingout-wildlife-scientists-suggest/?utm_term=.aa1641eb2269; Alexander Stimpson, et al., Understanding How
Drone Noise May Affect Wildlife Studies, Unmanned Systems, pp. 20-21 (Jan.-Feb. 2018) (higher frequency
range of some UAS with potential similarities to honeybees could create distress in elephants); Horse put
down after drone causes accident in Zermatt, The Local (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.thelocal.ch/20170131/horse-put-down-after-drone-causes-accident-in-zermatt (domesticated
animals stress: horses panicked, took flight, suffered several fractures, and had to be put down); The Final
Rule, Discussion, p. 520, et seq. (recognizing interference or harassment of wildlife is prohibited by law);
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703, available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/703;
Endangered Species Act (ESA), 50 C.F.R. Part 21, available at https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esalibrary/pdf/ESAall.pdf; Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 18 U.S.C. § 21, available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/laws/mmpa/; and Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 50 C.F.R. Part 22
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(prohibiting disturbing, agitating or bothering bald or golden eagles—which includes injuring, or interfering
with breeding, feeding, sheltering, or leading to nest abandonment, "killing, injuring, inflicting harm, or
harassing protected wildlife,” impairing wildlife behavior patterns, or annoying wildlife by disrupting their
normal behavior). See also Oceans Unmanned, ECO Initiative, http://oceansunmanned.org/eco-drone/
(Best practices “to advance and encourage Environmentally Conscious Operations of drones to protect and
limit disturbances to marine resources.”).
Recognize your obligation to report wildlife strikes. See FAA, Report a Wildlife Strike Report,
https://wildlife.faa.gov/strikenew.aspx; and FAA, Advisory Circular, AC 150/5200-32B, Subj. Reporting
Wildlife Aircraft Strikes (May 31, 2013),
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/150_5200_32b.pdf.
178

See The Nat’l Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), pp. 511-513, https://ceq.doe.gov/; and FAA, Order
1050.1F, Subj. Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures (July 16, 2015), ❡ 5-6.5(f),
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_Order_1050_1F.pdf.
179

Technologies required to make UAS pervasive “are not just in the realm of aeronautics but also
information technology, computer science, perception, autonomy . . .” Juan J. Alonso, PhD, Prof. of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Stanford U., Testimony before the House Subcomm. on Aviation, Unmanned
Aircraft Systems Integration: Emerging Uses in a Changing National Airspace (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://transportation.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=402013.
180

See ICAO, Manual on RPAS, §§ 11.4.7-11.4.9 (addressing considerations for redundant C2 link); and
UASPC, n.183, (addressing graceful degradation).
181

For example, where applicable, use a transponder with altitude encoding and keep it operable unless
otherwise authorized or directed by ATC. Confirm that UAS “ID Settings” are accurately set. 14 C.F.R. §
91.215, ATC transponder and altitude reporting equipment and use.
182

Where implemented, ensure all DAA equipment is functional, that there is proper annunciation, and that
such annunciation is acted upon timely. See generally FAA ATO, Literature Review on Detect, Sense, and
Avoid Technology for Unmanned Aircraft Systems, DOT/FAA/AR-08/41 (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/ar0841.pdf; https://www.faa.gov/uas/research/reports/. See
UASPC, n.204 (regarding DAA).
183

See, e.g., Oscar González, et al., Adaptive Fault Tolerance and Graceful Degradation Under Dynamic Hard
Real-time Scheduling, Comp. Sci. Dept. Faculty Pub. Series. 188 (1997), available at
http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cs_faculty_pubs/188?utm_source=scholarworks.umass.edu%2Fcs_faculty_
pubs%2F188&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages. Observe that Dronecode Project, Inc.,
the influential open source software has adopted this approach in flight controllers. Dronecode,
www.Dronecode.org. See also UASPC, § IV.d (regarding fault tolerance).
184

See NASA, UTM, https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/; Parimal Kopardekar, et al., NASA Ames Research Center,
th
Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management (UTM) Concept of Operations, 16 AIAA Aviation Tech.,
Integration, and Ops. Conf., Wash., DC., p. 3 (June 2016), available at
https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/docs/Kopardekar_2016-3292_ATIO.pdf (“The safety of existing traditional
[manned] operations cannot be reduced by the introduction of these new UAS operations.”). Cf., SESAR, Uspace Blueprint (2017), http://www.sesarju.eu/sites/default/files/documents/reports/Uspace%20Blueprint%20brochure%20final.PDF (describing the low-altitude ATM initiatives by the Single
European Sky ATM Research Joint Undertaking (SESAR JU)).
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185

UTM includes recognition of and support for certain VLOS sUAS operations. As such, it contributes to
general VLOS (rather than only BVLOS) operational safety. Similarly, selected BVLOS standards and
guidelines have informed the UASPC to the extent such standards and guidelines are extensible to VLOS
operations. See, e.g., Unmanned Systems Canada, Small RPAS Best Practices for BVLOS, v1.1 (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://www.unmannedsystems.ca/download/usc-small-rpas-bvlos-best-practices/.
186

See ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 11.1.3 (“C2 link should support a range of data link health monitoring
functions, including a heartbeat, or positive and negative acknowledgements of messages exchanged in
either direction.”); and UASPC, n.72 (addressing preflight).
187

See ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 11.6.11 (listing possible causes of C2 link loss, including: obstacles, ground
clutter, natural (weather) interference, unintentional interference such as by television broadcast,
intentional interference such as by jamming, out of range, equipment failure, human error, and aircraft
maneuvers), § 11.3.10-11.3.15 (addressing C2 link spectrum protection from interference and available
bands), and § 11.3.18 (identifying performance parameters, including: communications transaction time,
continuity, availability, and integrity); NOAA, Space Weather Prediction Center, http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/
(indicating impact of solar storms on GPS and radio communications); UASPC, n.196 (addressing GPS
interference); and FAA, ORDER 8130.34D, SUBJ. Airworthiness Certification of Unmanned Aircraft Systems
and Optionally Piloted Aircraft, p. D-3 (Sept. 8, 2017), available at
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_Order_8130.34D.pdf (requiring manufacturer to
disclose: “. . . how the radio signal strength, signal error rate, or similar information is computed and
displayed to the pilot. Identify the threshold values that represent a critically degraded signal.”). Also,
recognize the possibility of interference between two UAS operating in close proximity. See UASPC, n.207
(address GPS anomaly reporting).
See 47 C.F.R. Part 15, Subpart D—Unlicensed Personal Communications Service Devices,
https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/textidx?SID=5e2a156ecddf773e7c470324e2b7df7e&mc=true&node=sp47.1.15.d&rgn=div6 (requirements for
use of unlicensed spectrum); and Letter to Ricardo Durham, Acting Chief, Spectrum Enforcement Div., FCC,
from Christopher D. Imlay, General Counsel, ARRL (Jan. 11, 2017), available at https://tinyurl.com/y9ol3unp
(drones illegally transmitting on licensed spectrum, causing interference and “representing a significant
hazard to public safety”).
188

“Generally speaking, electromagnetic interference (EMI) should not be a factor for flights greater than 30
ft (10 m) from energized equipment; however, flights at 6–12 ft (2–4 m) have been observed to experience
EMI issues.” Richard M. Lusk, et al., An Early Survey of Best Practices for the Use of Small Unmanned Aerial
Systems by the Electric Utility Industry, Oak Ridge Nat’l Lab., ORNL/TM-2017/93 (Feb. 2017), available at
http://nias-uas.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/An-Early-Survey-of-Best-Practices-for-the-Use-of-SmallUnmanned-Aerial-Systems-by-the-Electric-Utility-Industry-RM-Lusk-Feb-2017.pdf.
189

See ICAO, Manual on RPAS, §§ 9.4.3, -5 (Impacts on radio frequencies), & § 11.6.24 (C2 link contingency
options); Harrison Wolf, Drones: Safety Risk Management for the Next Evolution of Flight, p. 120
(Routledge, 2017) ("Electro-magnetic interference that can cause lost-link procedures when coming close to
transformers or towers of different sizes provide a need for policies, procedures, and training that consider
such environmental issues."); and FCC, Accessing Spectrum, https://www.fcc.gov/general/accessingspectrum (addressing, in part, Licensed Spectrum for Commercial Services). See UASPC, n.207 (address GPS
anomaly reporting).
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190

L. Han, et al,. Research on compass error compensation of certain UAS, 2013 IEEE Int’l Conf. on Info and
Automation (ICIA), Yinchuan, pp. 811-815, available at http://doi.org/10.1109/ICInfA.2013.6720405. See
UASPC, n.189.
191

See 14 C.F.R. § 107.49, Preflight familiarization, inspection, and actions for aircraft operation (requiring
RP to evaluate local weather conditions during preflight assessment and satisfy requirements of 14 C.F.R. §
107.51(c) & (d), addressing flight visibility and distance from clouds, respectively). Particularly for longerduration missions, weather resources are essential—in addition to complying with applicable regulations.
See generally NOAA, Aviation Weather Center, https://www.aviationweather.gov/ (comprehensive aviation
weather resources); and NOAA, Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) Tool,
https://new.aviationweather.gov/hems (providing low-altitude aviation weather information).
192

See, e.g., Drone Complier, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Wz-dBPdxpg&t=4s;
Skyward Fleet Management, https://skyward.io/commercial-drone-software/ (UAS planning and
compliance tools); and Jonathan Edwards, CEO, Skyward,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jvG7MGkcmLg (discussion).
193

See, e.g., FAA, B4UFLY Mobile App., https://www.faa.gov/uas/where_to_fly/b4ufly/ (app for airspace
and other services); AIRMAP, https://www.airmap.com (airspace compliance tool providing situational
awareness and real-time traffic notifications); Skyward, https://skyward.io (UAS mission planning,
compliance, and task management software); FAA, FAADroneZone, https://faadronezone.faa.gov/#/
(provides for waiver requests); FAA, UAS Facility Maps,
https://faa.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=9c2e4406710048e19806ebf6a06754ad
(UAS Facility Maps); FAA, UAS, https://www.faa.gov/uas/; and FAA Safety Team,
https://www.faasafety.gov/.
194

See FCC, Licensing, https://www.fcc.gov/licensing-databases/licensing; Robert J. Kerczewski, et al., NASA
Glenn Research Center, Frequency Spectrum for Integration of Unmanned Aircraft (Oct. 2013),
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20140011093.pdf; Drones, UTM and Spectrum - A
review, Drone Alliance Europe (2016), http://dronealliance.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/SpectrumAllocation-White-Paper-Drone-Alliance-Europe-fin.pdf; and Alan Hobbs, PhD., San José State U. Research
Found., NASA Ames Research Ctr., Human Factors Guidelines For Remotely Piloted Aircraft System Remote
Pilot Stations, TN-34128, § T_1.5.1, p. 36 (July 2016), https://humanfactors.arc.nasa.gov/publications/PS_02219_Human_Factors_Guidelines_web.pdf (“The RPS should enable
the pilot to confirm spectrum availability before selecting link” and, maintain selected communications
mode.).
195

See Unmanned Systems Canada, Small RPAS Best Practices for BVLOS, v1.1, App. 2, § 5XX.114.2., p. 54
(Oct. 2016), https://www.unmannedsystems.ca/download/usc-small-rpas-bvlos-best-practices/
(“Throughout the RPA flight envelope, the pressure altitude presented to the pilot must have an overall
altitude error of less than 30 feet.”).
196

GPS Accuracy - GPS-based navigation aid precision can be improved by using the Wide Area
Augmentation System (WAAS) or employing Real-Time Kinematics (RTK) technology. WAAS is a highly
accurate navigation system developed for civil aviation covering the NAS. Precisely surveyed Wide Area
Reference Sites compare, correct, and transmit augmented information to GPS receivers to enhance the
accuracy and reliability of position estimates. A tool is available to predict the performance (including
outages) of the WAAS signal at airports for a particular date. http://www.nstb.tc.faa.gov/AirportSchedules/.
A localized variant of WAAS for other GNSS, RTK, exploits signal phase-shift rather than only GPS time data
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in concert with a static base station within a limited geographical area. FAA, Satellite Navigation – Wide
Area Augmentation System (WAAS),
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_units/techops/navservices/gnss/
waas/.
GPS Interference - See Muhammad Darwish, Did Russia make this ship disappear?, CNN (Nov. 3, 2017),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/03/technology/gps-spoofing-russia/index.html (presenting a survey of GPS
spoofing and other vulnerabilities). See also UASPC, n.203 (address GPS anomaly reporting). Additionally,
tall buildings may cause multipath reflections resulting in large position errors. See NovAtel, An introduction
to GNSS, Ch. 4. GNSS Error Sources, https://www.novatel.com/an-introduction-to-gnss/chapter-4-gnsserror-sources/error-sources/ (explaining multipath); Paul D Groves, et al., Intelligent Urban Positioning
using Multi-Constellation GNSS with 3D Mapping and NLOS Signal Detection, 25th Int’l Meeting of the Sat.
Div., Inst. of Nav., Nashville (Sept. 17-21, 2012), http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1394444/1/0681.pdf; and
Gianluca Falco, et al., Loose and Tight GNSS/INS Integrations: Comparison of Performance Assessed in Real
Urban Scenarios, (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5335985/ (in particular,
consider the error described in § 4.2. Zone 2: Urban Canyon, and § 4.3. Zone 3: Straight Avenue of Trees).
197

Many systems are equipped with multifunction controls that permit reconfiguration in flight. Inflight
reconfiguration can potentially compromise platform controllability or lead to loss of situational awareness.
Refer to manufacturer’s guidance addressing use in different flight modes. See Alan Hobbs, PhD., San José
State U. Research Found., NASA Ames Research Ctr., Human Factors Guidelines For Remotely Piloted
Aircraft System Remote Pilot Stations, TN-34128, § G_5, p. 36 (July 2016), https://humanfactors.arc.nasa.gov/publications/PS_02219_Human_Factors_Guidelines_web.pdf.
198

See, e.g., R. J. Stone, et al., Standard Operating Procedures Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (sUAVs) and
Small Unmanned Surveillance Vehicle (sUSVs), Human Interface Technologies Team School of Electronics,
Electrical & Systems Engineering U. of Birmingham, v. 1.2 (Nov. 2014) available at
https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-eps/eece/research/bob-stone/sUAV-standardoperating-procedures.pdf (“Propeller guards, if available, should be used at all times.”). Also, ASTM Int’l,
Comm. F38 is developing a new specification for sUAS parachutes. See
https://www.astm.org/COMMITTEE/F38.htm.
199

See UASPC, n.58 (addressing the sterile cockpit and distractions).

200

“Complex Functions are defined as software functions or algorithms that may cause the UAS to operate
in a manner that is difficult to predict due to compounded implications from factors such as sensor
measurement precision, algorithm complexity, environmental variables, multi-core processing, probabilistic
algorithms, fuzzy logic, machine learning, genetic algorithms, resource availability, and aircraft system state.
These functions may contain algorithms that are sometimes referred to as ‘autonomous’, ‘nondeterministic’, ‘artificial intelligence’, ‘adaptive’, or ‘intelligent’ algorithms, and there is an industry demand
to employ these technologies in UAS. And, an acceptable level of flight safety maintained through use of a
‘run-time assurance (RTA) architecture’.” ASTM Int’l, F3269, Standard Practice for Methods to Safety Bound
Flight Behavior of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Containing Complex Functions, available (fee) at
https://www.astm.org/Standards/F3269.htm?A&utm_source=tracker&utm_campaign=20171005&utm_me
dium=email&utm_content=standards.
201

This may include backup or alternative control stations, as well as integrating the functional status of
such devices into standard preflight checks. See Alan Hobbs, PhD., San José State U. Research Found., NASA
Ames Research Ctr., Human Factors Guidelines For Remotely Piloted Aircraft System Remote Pilot Stations,
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TN-34128, § T_1.3.2, p. 22 (July 2016), https://humanfactors.arc.nasa.gov/publications/PS_02219_Human_Factors_Guidelines_web.pdf.
202

Keep appraised of the useful life of each battery for both the UAS and control stations, taking into
consideration use in both normal and emergency conditions. Understand any load-shedding capabilities of
the equipment. Additionally, understand the combustibility and other safety risks and corresponding
mitigations associated with each type of battery deployed, including storage conditions, charging and
discharge limitations, thermal thresholds, handling and inspection, adherence to manufacturer’s
instructions / technical data sheet, testing, and firmware updates. See, e.g., FAA, SAFO 09013, Subj. Fighting
Fires Caused By Lithium Type Batteries in Portable Electronic Devices (June 23, 2009), available at
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2
009/SAFO09013.pdf; ASTM Int’l, F3005, Standard Specification for Batteries for Use in Small Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (sUAS), available (fee) at https://www.astm.org/Standards/F3005.htm; RTCA SC-225,
Rechargeable Lithium Batteries and Battery Systems Committee, [draft] RTCA/DO-331A, Minimum
Operational Performance Standards for Rechargeable Lithium Battery Systems (Mar. 2008); and Steve
Summer, FAA Fire Safety Branch, RTCA SC-225: Rechargeable Lithium Batteries and Battery Systems, Int’l
Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working Group, Dresden, (May 12 - 13, 2015), available at
https://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/systems/May15Meeting/Summer-0515-RTCAandEUROCAE-SAE.pdf
(summarizing battery safety standards initiatives).
203

Drafting Considerations: While the UASPC makes primary reference to GPS, the same limitations apply
to all Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), which include GPS, GLONAS, Galileo, Beidou, and other
systems. Also, because the term “GPS” is more familiar than “GNSS” to a broader audience, “GPS” is
presented throughout the UASPC to represent all GNSS systems. Implementers are free to substitute
“GNSS” or specific GNSS systems.
GPS Anomaly Reporting - Aviation-related GPS anomalies, including degradations, disruptions, or other
incidents should be reported to the FAA at GPS Anomaly Reporting Form,
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/nas/gps_reports/. See US Coast Guard Navigation Center, GPS Problem
Reporting, https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?pageName=gpsUserInput. The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting
System also solicits GPS anomaly reports.
204

Well Clear - The limitations, in part, should be understood in terms of their objectives and parameters to
resolve “well clear” requirements. While there are no universally accepted criteria that establish
aeronautical standards for “well clear,” pilots are required to adhere to 14 C.F.R. § 91.111 that state “(a) no
person may operate an aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard; (b) no person may
operate an aircraft in formation flight except by arrangement with the pilot in command of each aircraft in
the formation.” Additionally, pilots should consider the potential risk associated with the proximity of
operations to other aircraft, which may constitute a violation of 14 C.F.R. § 91.13, Careless or reckless
operations: “No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life
or property of another.” Finally, specific guidance regarding UAS operations is contained in 14 C.F.R. Part
107, which states, “No person may operate a small unmanned aircraft in a manner that interferes with
operations and traffic patterns at any airport, heliport, or seaplane base. Additional guidance is available in
FAA, Order 7110.65X, Air Traffic Control (Oct. 12, 2017),
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/JO_7110.65X_Air_Traffic_Control.pdf (defining
minimally acceptable vertical and lateral separation distance between aircraft).
Right-of way protocols should also be understood. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.113(b): “General . . . When a rule of
this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass
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over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear.” (emphasis added) And, 14 C.F.R. § 91.181(b): “On any other
route . . . this section does not prohibit maneuvering the aircraft to pass well clear of other air traffic . . ."
(emphasis added); Andrew Weinert, et al., A Well Clear Recommendation for Small Unmanned - Aircraft
Systems based on Unmitigated Collision Risk, Lincoln Lab (2016) (copy on file with Drafting team); Dallas
Brooks, et al., UAS Excom, Science and Research Panel (SARP) Update, Presentation at AUVSI, XPONENTIAL
(April 2017) (recommending 2000’ horizontal, and 250’ vertical distance for safe separation between sUAS
and manned aircraft).
See also RTCA, DO-365, Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Detect and Avoid Systems (May
31, 2017), available (fee) at www.rtca.org; Kevin W. Williams, et al., An Investigation Of Minimum
Information Requirements For An Unmanned Aircraft System Detect And Avoid Traffic Display, FAA Office of
Aerospace Medicine, DOT/FAA/AM-17/14 (June 2017), available at http://libraryonline.erau.edu/onlinefull-text/faa-aviation-medicine-reports/AM17-14.pdf; ICAO, Manual on RPAS, § 10.2.4 (“One or more DAA
capabilities may be needed to meet requirements to address the [DAA] hazards.”); Unmanned Systems
Canada, Small RPAS Best Practices for BVLOS, v1.1, § 5XX.8.4.d, p. 51 (Oct. 2016),
https://www.unmannedsystems.ca/download/usc-small-rpas-bvlos-best-practices/ (“System Reliability –
-3
The probability of failure of the system to avoid a conflicting aircraft shall be less than 10 per flight hour. .
.”); RTCA, Program Management Committee Meeting Summary (June 22, 2017),
https://www.rtca.org/sites/default/files/pmc_june_2017_summary.pdf; and Doug Davis, CANSO, RPAS &
ET Co-Chair, & Northrop Grumman, Presentation at ICAO, RPAS 2017, Montréal (Sept. 17, 2017) (“When we
get a mature RPAS collision avoidance system – that should shock the aviation world.”).
205

See generally ACI, Commentary to AMCC VII.e., Promote Ethical Behavior within the GA Community (Mar.
16, 2006), http://www.secureav.com/Comment-AMCC-VII.e-Ethics.pdf; and Ass’n of Remotely Piloted
Aircraft Systems UK, Code of Conduct, https://www.arpas.uk/mem-code-of-conduct/ (“As an industry, it is
incumbent upon us to hold ourselves and each other to a high professional and ethical standard.”). See
also, Email from Parimal Kopardekal (“PK”), Sr. Tech. Air Transport, NASA (Jan 17, 2018) (“The overall theme
[of the UASPC] could be “share and care” share information about your intent and care about safety all
airspace users and assets on the ground.”).
206

See ACI, Recent Developments, http://www.secureav.com/newdevelopments.html (presenting, in part,
noteworthy code of conduct implementations).
207

See AUVSI, Code of Conduct, http://www.auvsi.org/code-conduct (“We will respect the rights of other
users of the airspace.”).
208

See Joerg Lamprecht, It starts at the park: Local governments lead the way in drone advocacy and
regulation, GovFresh (March 30, 2017), http://govfresh.com/2017/03/starts-park-local-governments-leadway-drone-advocacy-regulation/ (highlighting the increasing role of local government in regulating UAS);
Reggie Govan, FAA Chief Counsel, Presentation at the FAA UAS Symposium, Daytona Beach (Apr. 20, 2016)
(“The FAA has had a hard time enforcing manned aviation. . . . It is virtually impossible for us to enforce
unmanned aviation.”); FAA, Law Enforcement Guidance for Suspected Unauthorized UAS Operations, ver. 4
(June 6, 2017), https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/law_enforcement/media/FAA_UASPO_LEA_Guidance.pdf; FAA, Law Enforcement Engagement with Suspected Unauthorized UAS Operations,
https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/law_enforcement/; UASPC, n.31 (addressing regulations, compliance
philosophy, and enforcement); and UASPC, n.82 (addressing state, local, and tribal rules).
209

See AOPA, Five Questions for Dallas Brooks (June 12, 2017), https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/allnews//2017/June/12/Five-questions-for-Dallas-
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Brooks?utm_source=drone&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=170613drone (urging participation in
local unmanned clubs):
What you lose [in online communities], however, is the discipline—you can take the
information you want without caveats, without conditions, and apply it instantly.
Sometimes that makes it easy for people to do irresponsible things. Not because they
are irresponsible people, but because they could get to the information on how to do
something without having to truly understand the context and the consequences of
what they are doing. . . .
[Y]ou don’t have to be a manned pilot to understand and embrace a safety culture.
We all share the same sky, and we must all consider the impact of what we do on
everyone. That’s what a community does—they look out for one another.
See Additional Resources (for a nonexclusive list of recognized UAS associations).
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https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/uas_privacy_best_practices_6-21-16.pdf (“In order to
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